Baer v. Choir
| Decision Date | 14 February 1893 |
| Parties | BAER v. CHOIR. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Appeal from superior court, King county; I. J. Lichtenberg, Judge.
Action by Milton L. Baer against Melody Choir to quiet title to land. The action was dismissed, plaintiff's motion for a new trial denied, and he appealed. Reversed.
Beriah Brown, Jr., for appellant.
Hughes & Hastings and Fred H. Peterson, for respondent.
This was an equitable action brought by the appellant, who was in possession of the land which was the subject of the controversy, to quiet his title against two tax deeds and a quitclaim deed. The disposition of the tax deed from the city of Seattle, and the quitclaim deed, seems to be left to be controlled by the disposition of the case made upon the tax deed executed by the sheriff of King county to the respondent August 27, 1878. The appellant deraigned complete title from the United States to himself through sundry mesne conveyances, the deed to him having been executed February 7 1889, at which time he went into possession of the lots in question, viz. lots 7, 8, and 9, block 22, Edes & Knight's addition to the city of Seattle. The chain of title showed that one Elizabeth B. Bonnell took title to the land by a deed October 8, 1870, and the conveyance from her was executed January 29, 1889. Respondent produced a tax deed from the treasurer of King county, dated August 27, 1878 purporting to convey the lands in dispute, and other lands for taxes unpaid thereon for the year 1875, assessed for that year to one N. B. Knight. This deed was recorded in the office of the auditor of King county on the 30th day of April, 1879. Under objection this deed was admitted in evidence, but appellant maintains that it was a void deed, under the evidence in the case. The first proposition to sustain this contention is that the property was not assessed to the owner thereof, Elizabeth B. Bonnell, or to an unknown owner. The act of 1871 (Acts 1871, p. 36) contains the following provisions in regard to the assessment of property for taxation: Section 23 contains the form of an assessment roll for real property, and section 17 prescribes that the assessor shall set down in the roll, in separate columns, according to the best information he can obtain-First, the names of all the taxable persons in his county; second, a description of each tract or parcel of land to be taxed, etc., corresponding with the form of the roll given in section 23. Section 33 was as follows: "The sheriff shall proceed to call once on each person named in the transcript, if he can be found in the county, and collect the taxes charged, as provided in this act, and if not then paid, or the person be not found, shall levy the same on the goods and chattels and other personal property of such person, and give six days' notice of the time and place of sale, and the property to be sold, by posting up advertisements in four public places in the county, and sell the same at public auction, and if such property shall sell for more than the taxes, costs, and damages, the surplus shall be paid to the owner thereof," etc. After thus calling upon each person named in the transcript, the sheriff was required to make his return to the auditor, showing a list of taxes remaining unpaid; and thereupon the auditor was required to make up lists of lands, city and town lots, returned as delinquent, with the amount of taxes due thereon, and deliver one list to the sheriff, who was authorized to proceed and sell the property described in the list. Section 43 provided for the correction of the name of any person taxed, if any error therein were discovered, and the person be taxable. Section 38 declared that the certificate of purchase should be held to convey all right, title, and interest of the person in whose name such land or town lots should have been taxed; and section 43 also provided a most liberal means for the taxation of any land found to have been omitted. From these provisions, we think it is clear that it was the intention of the law of 1871 that somewhat unusual care should be taken in the matter of assessing real estate to the owners thereof. In this instance the property taxed was unoccupied land, and it was made the duty of the assessor, if the owner of such land was unknown, to assess the property as unoccupied land, owner unknown. As has been seen, Elizabeth B. Bonnell had been the owner of this property since 1870, and it is made reasonably certain by the evidence that she was not a resident of King county, or of the Territory of Washington.
Were there nothing in the case but the recital of the deed that the property had been assessed to Knight as owner, the presumption of the regularity of all former proceedings would carry the presumption that the assessment to him had been properly made by the officer. But the record shows that, although Knight had been the owner, he had conveyed by a recorded deed in 1870; that for the years 1873 and 1874, at least, the lots had been assessed to Mrs. Bonnell; and that Mrs. Bonnell did not convey until 1889; and this showing was sufficient to rebut the presumption which the deed raised.
Respondent maintains that the act of the assessor in inserting the name of Knight was a mere irregularity, and cites in support of his position Cooper v. Jackson, 71 Ind. 244; Stilz v. Indianapolis, 81 Ind. 582; Peckham v. Millikan, 99 Ind. 352; Town Co. v Davis, 44 Iowa, 631. But a reference to the statute under which the Indiana cases were cited...
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