Baerst v. State Bd. of Educ., 12224

• Decision Date: 21 July 1994
• Docket Number: No. 12224,12224
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: , 91 Ed. Law Rep. 612 John S. BAERST v. STATE BOARD of EDUCATION et al.

Page 76

642 A.2d 76

34 Conn.App. 567, 91 Ed. Law Rep. 612

John S. BAERST v. STATE BOARD of EDUCATION et al.

No. 12224.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued Jan. 13, 1994.

Decided May 31, 1994.

Certification Denied July 21, 1994.

David P. Burke, New Milford, for appellant (plaintiff).

Carroll T. Willis, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom, on the brief, were Richard Blumenthal, Atty. Gen., and Bernard F. McGovern, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee (named defendant).

Frank W. Murphy, with whom, on the brief, was Barbara L. Coughlan, Norwalk, for appellee (defendant New Canaan bd. of educ.).

Before EDWARD Y. O'CONNELL, LAVERY and SCHALLER, JJ.

SCHALLER, Judge.

The principal issue raised by this appeal is whether residency for purposes of entitlement to public school attendance by a child whose home sits astride a boundary line between two municipalities should be determined solely by considering the physical location of the dwelling or by taking into account the full constellation of interests related to the communities involved.

The plaintiff appeals from the judgment of the trial court, in an administrative appeal, sustaining the decision of the defendant state board of education. The board had denied the plaintiff's daughter, Virginia, the right to attend public schools in New Canaan because Virginia was not a resident of that town but was, instead, a resident of the city of Norwalk. We reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The procedural history of this case may be summarized as follows: In January, 1989, the plaintiff requested that the New Canaan school superintendent grant school accommodations for Virginia. This request was denied on the ground that a majority of the plaintiff's property taxes were not paid in New Canaan. The plaintiff's request for a hearing before the New Canaan board of education pursuant to General Statutes § 10-186(b) ¹ was granted. At the hearing held in April, 1989, the board upheld the superintendent's decision. The plaintiff further appealed the decision to the state board of education, which appointed a hearing board. In July, 1989, after the hearing board sustained New Canaan's decision, the plaintiff brought an appeal to the Superior Court. In May, 1991, the trial court concluded that the decision had been reached on procedural error and remanded the matter for rehearing. The rehearing was held in November, 1991. The second hearing board determined that Virginia was not entitled to attend school in New Canaan. In that decision, the hearing board concluded that the dispositive factor in the determination is the location of the habitable portion of the house. The plaintiff thereafter appealed that decision of the hearing board pursuant to General Statutes §§ 10-187 and 4-183, naming the New Canaan, Norwalk, and state boards of education as defendants. The trial court upheld the hearing board's decision, concluding that geography played the dominant role in the interpretation of title 10 statutes. This appeal has been brought under General Statutes § 51-197b. ²

The facts are undisputed. In 1985, the Baerst family moved from a house located wholly within New Canaan to their present home, located at 446 Brookside Drive, which is situated on a 2.32 acre parcel of land, two acres of which are in Norwalk and the remainder in New Canaan. The front door opens onto steps that are divided by the town line, and the side door is located in New Canaan. The road frontage is divided between Norwalk (179 feet) and New Canaan (220 feet). A majority of the real property taxes is paid to Norwalk for land and house, whereas only 5 percent for land only is paid to New Canaan. The family uses a New Canaan mailing address, to which the New Canaan post office delivers mail. In addition, the Baersts have used numerous New Canaan services such as emergency ambulance services, snow removal, and police services. The hearing board found the family members' social and community activities to be "overwhelmingly focused" on New Canaan organizations. The board further found that their daily lives are focused in the New Canaan community. A New Canaan address is listed on their auto registration and driver's licenses; also, they pay personal property taxes on automobiles to New Canaan, and are registered to vote, and have repeatedly done so, in New Canaan. They have residents' library cards from the New Canaan Public Library and participate in library activities. The Baerst children play predominantly with New Canaan residents.

We note, at the outset, that the standard of review of administrative agency decisions is well established. " '[J]udicial review of administrative conclusions of law is limited to a determination of whether, in light of the evidence, those conclusions are unreasonable, arbitrary, illegal or an abuse of discretion.' " Foti v. Richardson, 30 Conn.App. 463, 466, 620 A.2d 840 (1993), citing Fleischman v. Board of Examiners in Podiatry, 22 Conn.App. 181, 184, 576 A.2d 1302 (1990). A broader standard of review, however, is warranted where, as in the present circumstances, we are presented with an issue of first impression involving the applicability of General Statutes § 10-220(a). In such instances, "it is the function of the courts to expound and apply governing principles of law." Foti v. Richardson, supra, 30 Conn.App. at 466, 620 A.2d 840, citing N.L.R.B. v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 291, 85 S.Ct. 980, 988, 13 L.Ed.2d 839 (1965). Further, "[o]ur review must comport with the well settled principles of statutory construction." Foti v. Richardson, supra, 30 Conn.App. at 466, 620 A.2d 840. "To determine the collectively expressed legislative intent, we look first to the language of the statute itself. If that language is plain and unambiguous, we go no further...." Sanzone v. Board of Police Commissioners, 219 Conn. 179, 187, 592 A.2d 912 (1991).

It is well established under Connecticut law that, with several specific exceptions, ³ residence is the critical factor determining where a child attends school. General Statutes § 10-184 mandates that a parent or other person having control of the child arrange for attendance at the "public school in the district wherein such child resides...." Section 10-186 places a duty on local and regional boards of education to provide school accommodations to eligible children residing in the school district.

The critical provision of General Statutes § 10-220(a) at issue in this case provides: "Each local ... board of education shall ... make such provisions as will enable each child of school age, residing in the district to attend some public day school for the period required by law...." (Emphasis added.) Construction of this provision turns on the meaning of the term "residing," which is not explicitly defined in title 10.

In determining that the Baerst family resided in Norwalk, rather than in New Canaan, the hearing board conducted a de novo hearing pursuant to § 10-186. The hearing board concluded essentially that Virginia Baerst did not reside in New Canaan for purposes of school accommodation because a majority of the house in which she lives is located in a municipality other than New Canaan. Thus, the actual physical location of the property was the governing factor for the board. In support of this determination, the board cited a series of out-of-state decisions supporting the so-called "majority approach" to the subject. ⁴

Although noting the absence of any Connecticut cases resolving the issue, the board did take note of several Connecticut cases addressing residency in somewhat different contexts. The board relied principally on Don v. Don, 142 Conn. 309, 311, 114 A.2d 203 (1955), in which our Supreme Court reasoned that "[a] resident of a place is one who is an actual stated dweller in that place," in reaching its conclusion that the plaintiff was a resident of Hartford County for the purpose of legally changing her name. The Supreme Court in Don relied on its decision in Yale v. West Middle School District, 59 Conn. 489, 491, 22 A. 295 (1890), in which the residence of a child living with her aunt, rather than her parents, for purpose of school accommodations, was at issue. Therein, the court determined that "[d]omicil ... is the actual or constructive presence of a person in a given place, coupled with the intention to remain there permanently; and as a minor cannot exercise an independent intent in this manner, a minor can have no domicil other than that of the parent or guardian. But the facts do show that she had a residence there in the ordinary and popular meaning of the word."

The board relied further on the 1 Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws § 18, comment (h) (1971), which notes in part that where a dwelling is cut by a boundary line, "[u]sually, the domicil will be in that political division where the major portion of the dwelling place is located, particularly if only an uninhabitable part lies in the other."

In upholding the hearing board's decision, the trial court, endorsed the hearing board's reasoning and also determined that the decision comported with the "general statutory scheme for allocating responsibility for education under Connecticut law. That scheme is based on geography, not affinities." The court rejected the plaintiff's claims based on intent in reliance on General Statutes § 10-253(d), ⁵ the best interest of the child, and constitutional entitlement to suitable education based on Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 627, 376 A.2d 359 (1977).

In support of his position, the plaintiff presses the following arguments: (1) the principal out-of-state cases support a fact based approach that takes into account the particular circumstances of each case rather than the "bright line" test adopted by the hearing board; (2) 1 Restatement (Second), supra, comment (h), specifically endorses an approach based on the "center of ... interests and activities" in rare boundary line cases similar...