Bagg v. Detroit

• Decision Date: 14 May 1858
• Citation: 5 Mich. 66
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: A. Smith Bagg v. The City of Detroit

5 Mich. 66

A. Smith Bagg v. The City of Detroit

Supreme Court of Michigan

May 14, 1858

Heard May 7, 1858

Case reserved from Wayne Circuit Court, in chancery.

Motion to dismiss denied.

Mr. C I. Walker moved to dismiss the case, for want of jurisdiction. He contended that the statute did not authorize the Circuit Judges to reserve questions for the opinion of this court in chancery causes, and stated, as matter of fact that, although the late Supreme Court took cognizance of and passed upon such cases, the power to do so had been doubted by at least a portion of the judges, and that the point had never been directly decided by that court, or raised in it.

G. V N. Lothrop, contra.

OPINION

Campbell J.:

This is a motion to dismiss the case reserved, for want of jurisdiction. The objection made is that this court has no jurisdiction to hear questions reserved in equity causes.

The statute under which this court obtains its jurisdiction, is found in 2 Compiled Laws, page 996, section 3422, and provides that, "if in any civil cause or criminal prosecution in any Circuit Court, any question of law shall arise, which, in the opinion of the Circuit Judge, should be reserved for the opinion of the Supreme Court, he shall report the case, so far as may be necessary to present such question of law, and transmit the same," etc. This law is in substance the same with the first law on the subject, except that in the present law, the term "civil cause" is used in place of the term "civil suit," which was the phrase of the former law.

The term "civil cause" has no technical meaning, and may embrace any kind of civil controversy. Whether it embraces equity causes here, does not, therefore, depend on any verbal nicety.

The phrase being broad enough to include such cases, they will be considered as included, unless some reason presents itself to remove them from the reach of the statute. Although the consideration of reserved questions in equity is not altogether convenient or desirable in all cases, yet we can not, on that account alone, decline jurisdiction, if the law has imposed it. These considerations may have more or less weight in arriving at the legislative intent.

The chief objection urged to the jurisdiction in equity cases is, that it not only brings up facts and testimony upon which many questions may arise, but it leaves it in the power of parties, after the opinion of this court is certified to the court below, to bring the whole matter up again by appeal. The latter objection, however applies equally to points reserved in common law cases, for there is an equal opportunity to bring up the same questions by bill of exceptions on writ of error. We can not, in either case, prevent any party from prosecuting such remedies as the law gives him. When parties bring before us questions which we have already decided before in the same controversy, we can always determine whether we desire more light upon the matters decided.

The other objection is one which is founded upon a misapprehension of what is the true meaning of the statute upon the method of reservation, and we avail ourselves of this opportunity to express our views upon the true construction of the law in this respect, and the considerations which will govern our action under it.

In the case of The People v. Adwards, decided by this court at the January term of the present year (ante, p. 22), we declined considering any reserved question which was not strictly a question of law. Such is, in our view, the true meaning of the statute. We are not at liberty to take up mixed questions of law and fact, or to give our opinion on matters that are addressed to the discretion of the Circuit Courts. And where the question presented is merely one of law, there is no more difficulty in reaching or deciding it in a chancery case than in a case at law. And we can well perceive how, in the earlier proceedings in equity cases, questions may arise which may give entirely different directions to the subsequent steps, according to the mode of their settlement.

No citation of authorities was made upon the argument but we find in the practice of the Federal Courts a proceeding so similar that, if not the pattern of our legislation, it may serve very well as a guide in its construction. The laws of the United States provide that whenever any question shall occur before a Circuit Court, upon which the opinions of the judges shall be opposed, the point on which the disagreement shall happen shall be stated and certified for the opinion of the Supreme Court. This law has been applied to chancery cases as well as questions of law. And we propose to refer to some of the decisions upon certified cases under it, which, in our opinion; furnish much light upon our own course.

It is held uniformly that if the judges divide upon a question of discretion merely, the case will not be heard: United States v. Chicago, 7, How., 185; Davis v. Braden, 10 Pet. 286; United States v. Daniel, 19 U.S. 542, 6 Wheat. 542; Grant v. Raymond, 6 Pet. 218; Smith v. Vaughan, 10 Pet. 366; Packer v. Nixon, 10 Pet. 408.

The questions certified must be questions of law, not questions of fact, and not questions which involve or imply conclusions or judgment by the judges upon the weight or effect of testimony or facts adduced in the cases: Dennistoun v. Stewart, 59 U.S. 565, 18 HOW 565; Ogilvie v. Knox Ins. Co., 59 U.S. 577, 18 HOW 577; Adams v. Jones, 12 Pet. 207; Wilson v. Barnum, 49 U.S. 258, 8 HOW 258.

If the whole case, although broken into different points, appears to have been certified, it will be dismissed for want of jurisdiction: Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 7 HOW 1; Webster v. Cooper, 51 U.S. 54, 10 HOW 54; White v....