Baggett v. Gates

• Decision Date: 23 August 1982
• Citation: 649 P.2d 874,32 Cal.3d 128,185 Cal.Rptr. 232
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 649 P.2d 874 Lawrence L. BAGGETT et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Daryl GATES, as Chief of Police, etc., et al., Defendants and Appellants. David B. ZELHART, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Daryl GATES, as Chief of Police, etc., et al., Defendants and Appellants. L.A. 31533.

Page 232

185 Cal.Rptr. 232

32 Cal.3d 128, 649 P.2d 874

Lawrence L. BAGGETT et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Daryl GATES, as Chief of Police, etc., et al., Defendants and Appellants.

David B. ZELHART, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Daryl GATES, as Chief of Police, etc., et al., Defendants and Appellants.

L.A. 31533.

Supreme Court of California.

Aug. 23, 1982.

Cecil W. Marr, Robert J. Loew and Loew & Marr, Los Angeles, for plaintiffs and appellants.

William H. Sortor, David P. Clisham and Carroll, Burdick & McDonough, San Francisco, as amici curiae on behalf of plaintiffs and appellants.

Ira Reiner and Burt Pines, City Attys., Frederick N. Merkin, and Catharine H. Vale, Asst. City Attys., for defendants and appellants.

Burke, Williams & Sorensen, Royal M. Sorensen, Los Angeles, and Virginia R. Pesola, Santa Monica, as amici curiae on behalf of defendants and appellants. BYRD, Chief Justice.

The primary issue presented by this case is whether the Public Safety Officers' Procedural Bill of Rights Act (Bill of Rights Act) applies to chartered cities. (See Gov.Code, §§ 3300-3311.)

I.

Plaintiffs, Lawrence Baggett, David Butler, John Spencer and David Zelhart, are police officers employed by the Los Angeles Police Department (Department). Defendants are the chief of police, the board of police commissioners and the City of Los Angeles.

Under the Department's salary structure, known as the Jacobs Plan, each of the several civil service job classes--i.e., police officer, sergeant, lieutenant, captain and deputy chief--may have more than one "paygrade" or salary level. (L.A.Admin.Code, § 4.140(n).) Officers "appointed ... to a class having more than one pay grade may be assigned and reassigned within that class" in accord with the regulations promulgated by the board of police commissioners. (Ibid.) These regulations are set forth in the Los Angeles Police Department Manual (Department Manual).

The paygrades within the civil service class of police officer, the class held by plaintiffs here, are police officers I, II, and III. (See L.A.Admin.Code, § 4.140(n).) Police officer I is the entry-level paygrade. Police officer II applies to officers who have completed one and one-half years of service. Police officer III applies to officers assigned to certain specialized positions involving increased responsibilities or calling for special qualifications. Such assignments are called "advanced paygrade assignments" and are compensated at higher rates. (See generally, 3 Department Manual, § 763 et seq.)

The Jacobs Plan also provides for additional compensation, over and above that attached to class and paygrade, for those officers assigned to positions involving particularly hazardous duties. (L.A.Admin.Code, § 4.159(g)(2), pt. B.)

Until July 1979, plaintiffs worked in the firearms and explosives unit of the Department's scientific investigation division. All four of them had been assigned to the unit for a number of years and had acquired extensive, specialized training and experience in the handling of firearms and explosives. Since positions in this unit are classified as "advanced paygrade assignments" and as particularly hazardous, plaintiffs received extra compensation for both. That is, they were compensated at the rate of a "Police Officer III + 3." The extra salary received totaled approximately $5,000 per year.

In July 1979, the Department received information that plaintiffs and several others had engaged in misconduct during work hours. The alleged misconduct included: drinking while on duty or while on police premises; shooting pellet and/or BB rifles inside police premises and into the streets; mishandling evidence, including explosives; and various "pranks." Shortly thereafter, the Department's internal affairs division began an investigation.

Early in the course of the investigation, each plaintiff was interrogated at some length. The Department told plaintiffs of the nature of the investigation prior to questioning them. They were also warned that it could lead to formal charges of misconduct. ¹

Each officer was asked to consent to a search of his home. Baggett and Butler did so, but only Baggett's home was searched. Spencer and Zelhart refused to give their consent. The Department searched plaintiffs' personal desks on July 11, 1979. No effort was made to obtain plaintiffs' consent to these searches.

On July 12, 1979, the commanding officer of the scientific investigation division, Captain Brennan, placed Officers Baggett, Spencer and Zelhart on temporary loan to other divisions within the Department. Officer Butler was placed on temporary loan outside the division when he returned from vacation on August 2, 1979. While on temporary loan, plaintiffs received the same salary as before.

The investigation failed to substantiate some of the alleged acts of misconduct and revealed that the remaining acts had occurred over a year earlier. As a result, no formal charges were brought against plaintiffs. ² However, under the Department's regulations, "An officer below the rank of Lieutenant in an advanced paygrade position may be reassigned to a lower paygrade position within his classification when ... [such] officer clearly demonstrates his failure or inability to satisfactorily perform the duties of the position." (3 Department Manual, § 763.55.) ³ Based on the investigation, Captain Brennan concluded that plaintiffs' performance had been negligent and unsatisfactory. Accordingly, in December 1979, he formally recommended that plaintiffs be reassigned to lower-paying police officer II positions outside the firearms and explosives unit.

The Department approved Brennan's recommendation and notified plaintiffs that they would be reassigned to police officer II positions in January and February of 1980. ⁴ Their request for a hearing or administrative appeal was denied. Departmental regulations provide for a hearing only when a formal personnel complaint is also filed against an officer. (See 3 Department Manual, § 763.60; see also L.A.City Charter, § 202.)

Seeking to prevent their reassignment, plaintiffs filed a petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief in Los Angeles Superior Court. ⁵ Relying primarily on the Bill of Rights Act (Gov.Code, §§ 3300-3311), ⁶ plaintiffs contended that defendants could not reassign them to lower paying positions without affording them an administrative appeal as provided in section 3304, subdivision (b) of the act. ⁷

In their answer, defendants asserted that the act could not constitutionally be applied to a charter city such as Los Angeles. Defendants further asserted that plaintiffs had no right to an administrative appeal under the act. According to defendants the transfer or downgrading of plaintiffs did not constitute "punitive action" since it was not undertaken "for purposes of punishment."

After the hearing, the trial court granted plaintiffs the relief they requested. The court's judgment and order, entered July 23, 1980, directed issuance of a peremptory writ of mandate ordering defendants (1) to give plaintiffs an administrative appeal before taking any action which would reduce their salary and (2) to otherwise comply fully with the provisions of the Bill of Rights Act. In addition, the court permanently enjoined defendants "from transferring or reassigning any officer(s) from advanced paygrade assignments to duties at lower paygrades until such officer(s) have been afforded an opportunity for an administrative appeal." Subsequently, the court denied plaintiffs' motion for attorney fees.

Defendants appealed. Although agreeing that the act applies to charter cities, the Court of Appeal held that the right to an administrative appeal provided by section 3304, subdivision (b) arises only when an officer is reassigned to a lower paygrade assignment "solely or substantially for purposes of punishment."

Plaintiffs also appealed from the trial court's denial of their motion to recover attorney fees under section 1021.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

This court granted hearing to consider the case in connection with White v. County of Sacramento (1982) 31 Cal.3d 676, 183 Cal.Rptr. 520, 646 P.2d 191.

II.

The first issue this court must decide is whether application of the Bill of Rights Act to charter cities violates the home rule provisions of the California Constitution. (Cal.Const., art. XI, § 5.)

As its title suggests, the act sets forth a list of basic rights and protections which must be afforded all peace officers (see § 3301) by the public entities which employ them. It is a catalogue of the minimum rights (§ 3310) the Legislature deems necessary to secure stable employer-employee relations (§ 3301).

In brief, the act (1) secures to officers the right to engage in political activity, if they so desire, when off-duty and out of uniform, "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law" (§ 3302); (2) prescribes certain protections that must be afforded officers during interrogations which could lead to punitive action against them (§ 3303); ⁸ (3) gives officers the right to review and respond in writing to adverse comments entered in their personnel files (§§ 3305, 3306); (4) allows officers to refuse to submit to a lie-detector test (§ 3307); (5) prohibits searches of officers' personal storage spaces or lockers except when they are present, or have been notified, or give their consent, or a valid warrant is obtained (§ 3309); (6) limits the circumstances in which officers may be compelled to disclose their personal financial status (§ 3308); (7) gives officers the right to an administrative appeal when any punitive action is taken against them, or they are denied promotion on grounds other than merit (§ 3304); and (8) protects officers from retaliation for the exercise of their rights under the act (ibid.).

The general home rule provision of the Constitution gives chartered cities the power to "make and...