Baggett v. State

• Decision Date: 14 July 1927
• Citation: 114 So. 236,94 Fla. 252
• Parties: BAGGETT v. STATE.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

114 So. 236

94 Fla. 252

BAGGETT v. STATE.

Florida Supreme Court, Division A.

July 14, 1927

Error to Circuit Court, Okaloosa County; A. G. Campbell, Judge.

Ollinger Baggett was convicted of arson, and he brings error.

Reversed.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

Conviction, unsupported by evidence, will be reversed on appeal. When an examination of the evidence as preserved in the record in a criminal cause convinces the appellate court that it was insufficient to support a verdict of guilt, and that it is wanting in any proof of guilt of the party charged, the judgment of conviction will be reversed.

Law presumes one charged with crime is innocent; state has burden to overcome presumption of innocence of crime by evidence showing guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The law presumes that a person charged with crime is innocent. The burden is upon the state in a trial of such charge to overcome the presumption by introducing evidence showing the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.

COUNSEL

M. F. Caldwell, Jr., of Milton, for plaintiff in error.

J. B. Johnson, Atty, Gen., and H. E. Carter, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff in error was convicted of arson and sentenced to 4 years in the state prison. There were four defendants jointly indicted. All were convicted, but a new trial was granted to two. The only assignment of error insisted upon is based upon the denial of the motion for a new trial as to plaintiff in error.

We cannot see that it would serve any useful purpose to discuss the testimony, which was very meager, vague, and unsatisfactory. Suffice it to say that a careful study of the testimony convinces us that it contains no proof of guilt. While the evidence raises a suspicion that plaintiff in error may have been guilty, it amounts to no more. The law presumes that he was innocent, and the burden was upon the state to overcome this presumption by introducing evidence showing his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In our opinion this was not done. The jury must have based its verdict on something outside of the evidence. Our conclusion is that this youth of 18 should not be sent to the penitentiary on the testimony adduced, and that the learned trial judge erred in denying the motion for new trial.

Reversed.

ELLIS, C.J., and STRUM and BROWN, JJ., concur.

WHITFIELD, P.J., and TERRELL and BUFORD, JJ., concur in the opinion.