Baggs's Appeal

• Decision Date: 05 January 1863
• Citation: 43 Pa. 512
• Parties: Baggs's Appeal.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 512

43 Pa. 512

Baggs's Appeal.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

January 5, 1863.

APPEAL from the Orphans' Court of Allegheny county.

Purviance & Shiras for appellants.—The only point to be determined by this court, is the constitutionality of the act giving the Orphans' Court power to grant this review.

The Act of October 1840 did not confer, but took away power from the Orphans' Court. The present act restores, for the purposes of this case, the power taken away by the Act of 1840, to grant a review after the expiration of five years. It does not direct the performance of a judicial function in a particular way. It does not rest on the doctrine of Bradlee and Brownfield, that the legislature posseses a mixed jurisdiction, partly legislative and partly judicial. It simply removes a barrier which prevents the court from granting such relief as justice and equity may require; in which respect it differs from De Chastellux v. Fairchild, 3 Harris 18. The act interferes with no vested rights. The administrator, standing in the position of trustee, could have none against the appellee. And Elizabeth Baughman, the original distributee, is liable on her refunding bond to the administrator, to refund to meet any other debt or demand that may be recovered against the estate or for the payment of legacies: Thomas v. Riegle, 5 Rawle 206. It must be a clear and unequivocal case which will justify the court in declaring an Act of Assembly unconstitutional: Kilpatrick v. Commonwealth, Legal Intelligencer, October 29th 1858; Eaken v. Raub, 12 S. & R. 330; 3 Yeates 493; 12 S. & R. 330; 8 W. & S. 386; 1 Binney 416; 4 Id. 123; 3 S. & R. 178; 4 W. & S. 418.

Where a right exists without a remedy, the legislature may lawfully provide one: 2 Watts 443; 9 Barr 110 and 446; 3 Harris 172; 7 Watts 301; 9 Barr 467; 10 S. & R. 97; 15 Id. 72; 17 Id. 64; 10 Id. 101; 16 Id. 37; 1 Watts 330; 3 Wh. 84; 5 Barr 145; 9 Id. 99; 2 Harris 157; 3 Id. 165.

Penny & Sterrett, for appellees, cited and relied on the cases in 4 W. & S. 469, 6 Barr 141, and 7 Harris 431, as to the ordinary powers of the Orphans' Court to authorize a bill of review. And on the question of the constitutionality of the Act of April 22d 1857, they cited O'Conner v. Warner, 4 W. & S. 227; Irvine's Appeal, 4 Harris 266; and De Chattellux v. Fairchild, 3 Id. 18.

The opinion of the court was delivered, January 5th 1863, by LOWRIE, C. J.

This is a bill of review in the matter of the account of J. H. Baughman, administrator of Andrew Hendrickson, in which the petitioners claim a share of the estate of the decedent as next of kin. It was presented thirteen years after his death, and eleven years after the estate had been distributed and finally settled by the decree of the court. It is therefore barred by the Act of 8th April 1833, § 19, relating to the distribution of intestates' estates, and requiring such claims to be presented within seven years after the intestate's death; by the Act of 13th October 1840, § 1, requiring that bills of review shall be brought within five years after the final decree; and without this, by the limitation of seven years for writs of error, which is received as a binding analogy for bills of review, when there is no positive rule given by the legislature.

The petitioners lived in a distant part of the state, and did not hear of the intestate's death until long after those periods had elapsed; but it is not pretended that these facts are sufficient to relieve their case from these limitations of the right of action. It stands therefore decreed in due course of law, and according to the general law of the land, finally decreed that this administrator has faithfully and fully performed all his duties as administrator, and that he and his sureties are finally discharged from all further accountability in relation to this estate. How do the petitioners attempt to evade this decree?

They found their petition or bill of review entirely on an Act of Assembly, passed 22d April 1857, near twelve years after the final decree, which makes it the duty of the court, on the petition of any party interested, to grant a review of the account, and of the decree of distribution, with the same effect as if application had been made within five years after the decree. This is a very clear and peremptory legislative injunction, unevadable by any skill of interpretation. Yet it does not affect the proviso of the Act of 1840, which limits the bill of review to cases where the balance has not been actually paid by the accountant, as was the fact here. This proviso might produce injustice in some cases, if there could be no bill of review, as against the distributees, in case of payment to them; but we pass this. The Orphans' Court obeyed the legislative injunction by granting the review, and, on final hearing, dismissed the bill on the ground that the case was entirely a judicial one, and the legislature had no authority to interfere.

This principle seems to us just as plain as the injunction of the Act of Assembly, and much more authoritative; for it is part of our frame of government on which the legislature itself depends. There can be no constitutional objection to the commands of the legislature, or of any one else, to the courts to hear any motion or petition that any party may choose to present; but if the courts are the judicial authority of the land, no one has any authority to direct them what disposition they shall make of any case or question that comes before them. And any commands about such matters, other than those contained in the general law of the land, are quite useless; for the courts are, by the constitution, open to everybody appearing in any regular way. And they hear everybody that comes; though in cases very plain or very absurd they may not hear them long, and may dismiss their motion or petition without hearing the other side.

There ought to be no arbitrary governmental dealing with private rights; to prevent this is one of the principal purposes of the separation of legislative and...