Bagley v. Moxley
Decision Date | 13 June 1990 |
Citation | 407 Mass. 633,555 N.E.2d 229 |
Parties | Gerald P. BAGLEY et al. 1 v. Michael F. MOXLEY. 2 * |
Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Anita S. Lichtblau (Marguerite T. Grant, Boston, with her), for plaintiffs.
Alan M. Cohen, for defendant.
Before LIACOS, C.J., and ABRAMS, NOLAN, LYNCH and O'CONNOR, JJ.
On April 27, 1987, the plaintiffs Gerald P. Bagley and Patricia A. Bagley, brought suit in the Superior Court in Suffolk County seeking to annul three related decisions of the board of appeal of the city of Boston which granted zoning variances to the Gordon Medford Realty Trust (Gordon Medford). These variances allowed Gordon Medford to begin construction of three multi-unit apartment buildings on land abutting property owned by the plaintiffs. On June 2, 1988, in response to a motion brought by Gordon Medford, a judge ordered the plaintiffs to post a $100,000 bond in order to continue with the case. See St.1956, c. 665, § 11. We shall refer to this case as Bagley I. The plaintiffs, rather than posting the requisite bond, stipulated to a dismissal of Bagley I with prejudice and without costs.
On August 13, 1987, the plaintiffs filed another complaint in the Superior Court. In that case (Bagley II ), the plaintiffs brought suit against Gordon Medford and the public improvement commission of Boston (commission) to challenge the commission's decision to open a section of land in West Roxbury and Hyde Park, known as Grew Avenue, to public travel. Gordon Medford intended to use Grew Avenue for access to and from the proposed apartment complex which was the subject matter of Bagley I.
In Bagley II, the plaintiffs claimed that they owned a section of Grew Avenue which lay adjacent to the plaintiffs' property. The plaintiffs argued that the commission's decision to open Grew Avenue for public travel was illegal because it constituted a taking of the plaintiffs' property without due process of law. The plaintiffs' complaint referred to a certificate of title issued in 1976, which, according to the plaintiffs, entitled them to ownership in fee simple of land "to the midline of Grew Avenue." In par. 10 of their complaint, the plaintiffs also stated that On September 3, 1987, the plaintiffs stipulated to a dismissal of Bagley II with prejudice and without costs.
Less than a month later, on October 2, 1987, the plaintiffs were again in Superior Court, this time with a complaint alleging ownership of the contested section of Grew Avenue by way of twenty-nine years of adverse possession. 3 This case, which is the subject matter of the present appeal, we refer to as Bagley III.
In their complaint in Bagley III, the plaintiffs claimed that between 1958 and 1987 they had Such activity, claimed the plaintiffs, constituted "nonpermissive, hostile, actual, open, notorious, adverse and exclusive" use of the land for a period sufficient to establish the plaintiffs as the rightful owners of the land due to their adverse possession.
The defendant, trustee of Cliffmont Realty Trust, filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint in Bagley III on the ground of the doctrine of res judicata. The defendant argued that the issue of the plaintiffs' adverse possession had been raised in Bagley II, which was dismissed with prejudice, and that the plaintiffs therefore were barred from attempting to relitigate this issue in Bagley III. On October 15, 1987, a judge of the Superior Court allowed the defendant's motion to dismiss, stating that "[t]he action brought by the plaintiff is barred as it raises the same claim raised by par. 10 of [the complaint in Bagley II ], which has been dismissed with prejudice, and it involves the same parties who are bound by that prior judgment." On September 16, 1988, the judge entered partial final judgment on the dismissal of the plaintiffs' complaint. 4 The plaintiffs appealed the entry of partial final judgment to the Appeals Court. We took the case on our own motion. We affirm the judgment.
The plaintiffs argue that no adverse possession claim was pleaded, litigated, or determined in Bagley II, and that therefore the judge erred in concluding that the doctrine of res judicata barred consideration of the adverse possession claim in Bagley III. Furthermore, the plaintiffs contend that their adverse possession claim may not be barred on the ground that, even though not raised in Bagley II, it should have been raised in Bagley II. Finally, the plaintiffs suggest that, even if there is merit to the argument that the doctrine of res judicata bars the adverse possession claim, this court should utilize its equitable powers so as to allow their complaint in Bagley III to proceed.
" 'Res judicata' is the generic term for various doctrines by which a judgment in one action has a binding effect in another." Heacock v. Heacock, 402 Mass. 21, 23 n. 2, 520 N.E.2d 151 (1988). This court has recognized that "[t]he doctrine[ ] of res judicata ... [is] most important in assuring that judgments are conclusive, thus avoiding relitigation of issues that were or could have been raised in the original action." Anderson v. Phoenix Inv. Counsel of Boston, Inc., 387 Mass. 444, 449, 440 N.E.2d 1164 (1982). Application of the doctrine may serve to "relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and, by preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage reliance on adjudication." Id., quoting Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94, 101 S.Ct. 411, 414-15, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980).
The phrase "res judicata" encompasses both the doctrine of "claim preclusion" and the doctrine of "issue preclusion." Heacock v. Heacock, supra 402 Mass. at 23 n. 2, 520 N.E.2d 151. Heacock, supra. See Cousineau v. Laramee, 388 Mass. 859, 448 N.E.2d 756 (1983); Anderson v. Phoenix Inv. Counsel of Boston, Inc., supra; Foster v. Evans, 384 Mass. 687, 694-696, 429 N.E.2d 995 (1981).
"The doctrine of claim preclusion makes a valid, final judgment conclusive on the parties and their privies, and bars further litigation of all matters that were or should have been adjudicated in the action." Heacock v. Heacock, supra 402 Mass. at 23, 520 N.E.2d 151. See Willett v. Webster, 337 Mass. 98, 102, 148 N.E.2d 267 (1958).
Neither the plaintiffs nor the defendant disputes that both Bagley II and Bagley III involved the same parties or their privies. See Franklin v. North Weymouth Coop. Bank, 283 Mass. 275, 280, 186 N.E. 641 (1933). Furthermore, the parties do not contest that, for the purposes of res judicata analysis, the dismissal with prejudice of Bagley II constituted "an adjudication on the merits as fully and completely as if the order had been entered after trial." Boyd v. Jamaica Plain Co-op. Bank, 7 Mass.App.Ct. 153, 157-158 n. 8, 386 N.E.2d 775 (1979). Therefore, the only issue before us is whether the plaintiffs' adverse possession claim was raised or should have been raised in Bagley II. See Heacock v. Heacock, supra 402 Mass. at 23, 520 N.E.2d 151.
The plaintiffs, in support of their argument that their adverse possession claim was not raised in Bagley II, point to the fact...
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