Bah v. Bah

Decision Date15 December 1983
Citation668 S.W.2d 663
PartiesThierno Abubaker BAH, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Sarah Frances Oden BAH, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtTennessee Court of Appeals

Steve Cobb, Nashville, for plaintiff-appellee.

Joe M. Haynes, Haynes & Associates, Goodlettsville, for defendant-appellant.

OPINION

CONNER, Judge.

This is a custody dispute incident to a divorce action. On February 14, 1983, the husband, plaintiff-appellee, Thierno Abubaker Bah, was awarded a divorce based on "cruel and inhuman treatment" from the defendant-appellant, Sara Frances Oden Bah, 1 as well as custody of their then 2 1/2 year old child, Thierno Abdoul-Aziz Bah.

Mrs. Bah appeals only the award of custody. She raises two issues. They are:

I. Whether the trial court erred in rejecting the "tender years" doctrine?

II. Whether the trial court erred in finding that the best interests of the child were served by full custody of the father?

Sitting without a jury, the trial judge made certain findings of fact. We recite those material to this appeal:

1. Sarah Frances Oden Bah has, by her own admission and from the testimony of witnesses, committed adultery.

....

3. Both parties initially participated in the rearing of their child, Thierno Abdoul-Aziz Bah, and both parties exhibited parenting skills.

4. After difficulties developed in the marriage, this situation changed and Mrs. Bah began to behave in a manner which has jeopardized the welfare of the parties' child.

5. Mrs. Bah has behaved in an immature and irresponsible manner, has exhibited emotional instability, and has disrupted the life of the parties' child for insignificant reasons. She admitted that she is emotional and she becomes fearful over rather insignificant incidents. She exhibited a fear of staying in her own home because of strange occurances (sic) which she did not bother to report to the manager of her apartment complex and did not report to the police.

6. Mrs. Bah disrupted the life of the parties' child by moving out of her separate home and back into that of her mother. Her mother's home situation and atmosphere, though not completely her fault, makes it not in the best interest and welfare of the child morally to place him there. The mother has taken several of her daughters in to live with her from time to time. One daughter lives in the home with three illegitimate children while another daughter also has three illegitimate children.

7. From all of the testimony, the Court finds that it would jeopardize the welfare of the child to vest custody with Mrs. Bah.

8. Mr. Bah has exhibited himself to be a more responsible parent who has provided a home for himself and the parties' child. He has shown himself to be more mature.

9. Both parties are employed.

10. Mr. Bah is Islamic while Mrs. Bah is of the Christian faith, a difference which the parties were aware of at the time of their marriage.

11. Mrs. Bah is a citizen of the United States while Mr. Bah is not.

All of these findings of fact are justified by proof in the record.

The matter is to be reviewed by us de novo with a presumption of correctness of the ruling of the trial judge. T.R.A.P. 13(d). We are not unmindful of Riddick v. Riddick, 497 S.W.2d 740 (Tenn.App.1973), which states that the presumption is eliminated in child custody cases and the review is strictly de novo. Id. at 742. However, that case was decided prior to the passage of the T.R.A.P. rules and no exception from the normal review in non-jury matters is made therein for custody cases. In any event, Riddick holds that:

[T]his Court will, however, give great weight to the decision of the trial court because the judge saw the witnesses face to face and heard them testify; this rule being based upon the assumption that the trial judge did not act arbitrarily or willfully but with regard to what is right and equitable, considering first the child's best interest as directed by his reason and conscience toward the child's welfare.

Id. (emphasis supplied).

Obviously, in all custody cases the review which we must conduct will be the most careful humanly possible. Or stated differently, neither trial nor appellate judges have any responsibility greater than to attempt to correctly adjudicate child custody disputes. However, as recognized in Riddick, the trial judge, not the appellate court, has the opportunity to observe the witnesses. All we can review is the cold printed word and the exhibits.

Whatever our misgivings about the standard of review expressed in Riddick, we are in agreement that the child's best interest is the paramount consideration. It is the polestar, the alpha and omega. We think Judge Avery said it best in Bevins v. Bevins, 53 Tenn.App. 403, 383 S.W.2d 780 (1964):

The real matter to be considered is what is the best thing to do with these children that they may be left in a home where they are nurtured, loved, appreciated and where the environment is such that is conducive not only to the physical welfare of the child, but to its emotional and moral welfare, and where it can have the instructions from those who have control over it to inspire it to activities so as to develop a personality prepared for a life of service, and to successfully compete in the society which the child faces when an adult.

53 Tenn.App. at 410-11, 383 S.W.2d at 783 (emphasis supplied).

This is and must remain the true test for the award of custody. To arrive at the point of deciding with whom to place a child in preparation for a caring and productive adult life requires consideration of many relevant factors, including but certainly not limited to the age, habits, mental and emotional make-up of the child and those parties competing for custody; the education and experience of those seeking to raise the child; their character and propensities as evidenced by their past conduct; the financial and physical circumstances available in the home of each party seeking custody and the special requirements of the child; the availability and extent of third-party support; the associations and influences to which the child is most likely to be exposed in the alternatives afforded, both positive and negative; and where is the greater likelihood of an environment for the child of love, warmth, stability, support, consistency, care and concern, and physical and spiritual nurture.

The mother asserts that in the instant case the "presumption that a child of tender years should be placed with its mother" was not given proper emphasis by the trial court. Mrs. Bah asserts that this principle should have "swung the pendulum of custody" in her favor and that therefore a reversal is required. Clearly, the doctrine was considered below for at the conclusion of the proof and in rendering a decision the trial judge said: "The Court is very well aware of the Weaver case." Weaver v. Weaver, 37 Tenn.App. 195, 261 S.W.2d 145 (1953), sets forth the tender years doctrine in these terms:

A mother, except in extraordinary circumstances, should be with her child of tender years. The courts have repeatedly recognized this as a primary doctrine.

Normally, such a child will not be taken away from its mother unless it is demonstrated that to leave the child with its mother would jeopardize its welfare, both in a physical and in a moral sense.

This court believes that the so-called "tender years doctrine" is a factor--but only one factor--to be considered in the overall determination of what is in the best interests of the child.

We adopt what we believe is a common sense approach to custody, one which we will call the doctrine of "comparative fitness." The paramount concern in child custody cases is the welfare and best interest of the child. Mollish v. Mollish, 494 S.W.2d 145, 151 (Tenn.App.1972). There are literally thousands of things that must be taken into consideration in the lives of young children, ...

To continue reading

Request your trial
180 cases
  • Earls v Earls
    • United States
    • Tennessee Court of Appeals
    • May 31, 2000
    ...See Nichols v. Nichols, 792 S.W.2d 713, 716 (Tenn. 1990); Rogero v. Pitt, 759 S.W.2d 109, 112 (Tenn. 1988); Bah v. Bah, 668 S.W.2d 663, 666 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983); see also Tenn. Code Ann. ' 36-6-106 The comparative fitness analysis is not intended to ascertain which parent has been perfect ......
  • In re C.K.G.
    • United States
    • Tennessee Supreme Court
    • October 6, 2005
    ...interests in light of the comparative fitness of the parents, see Parker v. Parker, 986 S.W.2d 557, 562 (Tenn.1999); Bah v. Bah, 668 S.W.2d 663, 665-66 (Tenn.Ct.App.1983), and must take into consideration numerous factors insofar as they are applicable, such as the (1) The love, affection a......
  • In re Estate of Ladd
    • United States
    • Tennessee Court of Appeals
    • April 30, 2007
  • Swett v. Swett
    • United States
    • Tennessee Court of Appeals
    • June 27, 2002
    ...and the courts have identified the factors that the trial courts should consider. Tenn. Code Ann. 36-6-106(a) (2001); Bah v. Bah, 668 S.W.2d 663, 666 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983). Courts customarily devise initial custody and visitation arrangements by engaging in a comparative fitness analysis th......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT