Bahret v. Pa. State Police
| Decision Date | 16 May 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 500 M.D. 2015,500 M.D. 2015 |
| Parties | Joseph A. Bahret, Petitioner v. Pennsylvania State Police, Respondent |
| Court | Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court |
BEFORE: HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge HONORABLE DAN PELLEGRINI, Senior Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
Before this Court in our original jurisdiction are the preliminary objections in the nature of demurrers of the Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) to Joseph A. Bahret's (Bahret) petition for review seeking mandamus and preliminary and final injunctive relief. Bahret requests exemption from registering as a lifetime offender under the Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA)1 because he did not receive timely notice of his duty to register, and his period of registration would have ended before he received notice. Upon review, we overrule the preliminary objections.
According to the averments in his petition for review (Petition), in July 2000, Bahret was charged with incest, 18 Pa. C.S. §4302, indecent assault, 18Pa. C.S. §3126(a)(8), and corruption of minors, 18 Pa. C.S. §6301(a). Pet. at ¶2. At the time of his charges, the first version of Megan's Law2 was in effect. Megan's Law II3 was in effect at the time of his convictions. Under Megan's Law II, formerly 42 Pa. C.S. §9795.2(a)(1), offenders "shall be required to register ... with [PSP] upon release from incarceration, upon parole from a State or county correctional institution or upon the commencement of a sentence of intermediate punishment or probation."
In November 2000, Bahret pled guilty to incest and corruption of minors. Bahret avers that he received no notice of his duty to register as a sex offender under Megan's Law II at the time he entered a guilty plea. In January 2001, the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas (trial court) sentenced Bahret to 9-23 months incarceration in Dauphin County Prison. Pet. at ¶5. Bahret alleges the trial court did not inform him of his duty to register as a 10-year registrant at the time of his sentencing in accordance with Megan's Law II, formerly 42 Pa. C.S. §9795.3.
Bahret served his sentence and was released on parole on August 10, 2001. Bahret avers the Department of Corrections (DOC) did not inform him of his duty to register as part of his parole requirements. Pursuant to Megan's Law II, his 10-year registration period began to run on that date. Significantly, had Bahret registered upon his release, he would have completed his 10-year registration period on August 10, 2011.
SORNA, commonly known as Megan's Law IV, was enacted on December 20, 2011; it went into effect one year later. SORNA applies to "an individual who ... was required to register with [PSP] ... prior to December 20, 2012, and did not register." 42 Pa. C.S. §9799.13(3)(ii). Under SORNA, an individual convicted of incest is designated as a Tier III sex offender, and is subject to lifetime registration requirements. 42 Pa. C.S. §9799.13(3).
For the first time, on January 4, 2012, Bahret received notice regarding his duty to register as a sex offender. PSP sent Bahret a letter advising him: "Pennsylvania Megan's Law requires that you register as a Sexual Offender." Pet. at Ex. 2 (Letter). Subsequently, PSP sent letters in 2013 and 2015, again notifying Bahret of his duty to register. He has not registered to date.
In 2015, Bahret filed the Petition seeking mandamus and injunctive relief. Bahret claims exemption from SORNA under the circumstances involving unreasonable delay and resulting prejudice more than a decade post-conviction. He argues the lack of notice as to any duty to register under Megan's Law precludes the Commonwealth from imposing lifetime registration almost 11 years later. He avers imposing a registration requirement now prejudices him, his family and his fundamental right to reputation. Because the law at the time of his sentencing only required a 10-year registration period, which period would have expired before SORNA took effect, he contends SORNA does not apply to him. Bahret seeks a writ prohibiting PSP and other law enforcement agencies in the Commonwealth from placing his name on the registry of Megan's Law offenders. He also seeks to enjoin PSP from applying SORNA registration requirements as to him.
In response, PSP filed preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer averring that Bahret failed to state a claim as a matter of law. Specifically, PSP states five objections: (1) the mandamus claim is time-barred; (2) the mandamus claim is legally insufficient; (3) Bahret fails to state a claim for which relief may be granted because he is subject to SORNA; (4) laches may not be invoked against the Commonwealth; and, (5) noncompliance with the Pa. R.C.P. No. 1531(b) requirement of filing an injunction bond precludes injunctive relief.
The parties briefed the issues; thus, the preliminary objections are ready for disposition.
To state a claim in mandamus, the petitioner must establish "a clear legal right to relief, a corresponding duty in the respondent and the lack of any other adequate and appropriate remedy." Smires v. O'Shell, 126 A.3d 383, 387-88 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015). Mandamus cannot lie "to compel performance of a discretionary act or to govern the manner of performing [the] required act." Coppolino v. Noonan, 102 A.3d 1254, 1263 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014), aff'd, 125 A.3d 1196 (Pa. 2015) (quoting Volunteer Firemen's Relief Ass'n of City of Reading v. Minehart, 203 A.2d 476, 479 (Pa. 1964)). Additionally, mandamus is not available to establish legal rights; rather, it is a remedy to enforce rights that are already established. Rummings v. Commonwealth, 814 A.2d 795 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002).
In order to establish a claim for preliminary injunctive relief, a petitioner must aver facts that support the following prerequisites:
Greater Nanticoke Area Educ. Ass'n v. Greater Nanticoke Area Sch. Dist., 938 A.2d 1177, 1184 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007).
In reviewing preliminary objections, "we must consider as true all well-pleaded material facts set forth in the petition for review and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from those facts." Meggett v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 856 A.2d 277, 279 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004). "Preliminary objections should be sustained only in cases [in which it is] clear and free from doubt that the facts pleaded by appellant are legally insufficient to establish a right to relief." Werner v. Zazyczny, 681 A.2d 1331, 1335 (Pa. 1996). Moreover, "[a] petitioner is under no burden to prove his cause of action at this preliminary stage." Konyk v. Pa. State Police, 133 A.3d 96 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (emphasis in original).
First, PSP argues Bahret's claim is precluded by the statute of limitations under 42 Pa. C.S. §5522(b)(1). PSP's argument is predicated on applying a six-month statute of limitations to mandamus claims. In support, PSP cites our decision in Curley v. Smeal, 41 A.3d 916 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012) (Curley I), aff'd but criticized, 82 A.3d 418 (Pa. 2013) (per curiam) (Curley II).
Recently, this Court expressly overruled our holding in Curley I, and questioned whether the six-month statute of limitations in Section 5522(b)(1) applies to mandamus actions. Morgalo v. Gorniak, ___ A.3d ___, (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 489 M.D. 2013, filed March 8, 2016) (en banc), Slip Op. at 8. In Morgalo, we recognized our Supreme Court's criticism of holding mandamus claims to a six-month limitations period. See Curley II. We abrogated Curley I in part based on the then-Chief Justice's concurring opinion, questioning that mandamus "would lend itself to a period of limitations analysis; since mandamus action alleges a failure to act, there is no action to trigger a specific limitations period." Curley II, 82 A.3d at 419 (Castille, C.J., concurring op.). Therefore, Curley I offers dubious authority for establishing a six-month limitations period for mandamus claims.
Additionally, and regardless, this Court recently rejected PSP's preliminary objection to a mandamus claim on the same ground in Taylor v. Pennsylvania State Police, 132 A.3d 590 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (en banc). There, the petitioner filed a petition seeking a writ in mandamus and a request for injunctive relief alleging SORNA's lifetime registration requirement constituted animpermissible ex post facto4 punishment and violated due process. Taylor claimed he was subject to only a 10-year registration period under Megan's Law II. PSP objected that Taylor's claim was time-barred because he filed the action more than six months after SORNA became effective.
We overruled PSP's preliminary objection on the ground that Taylor's claim did not sound solely in mandamus. In so doing, we recognized Taylor's claim, while titled as a mandamus claim, actually sought declaratory and injunctive relief. We reasoned he was not barred from pursuing a claim based on his mischaracterization of the type of action as one subject to a six-month limitation.
For these same reasons, we overrule PSP's objection here. Bahret claims a deprivation of due process in receiving late notice of a duty to register, arguing he is not subject to SORNA based on lack of proper notice and laches. Bahret also asserts grounds for injunctive relief. Because these claims are not limited to mandamus, they are not time-barred on that basis.
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