Baie v. Nordstrom

• Decision Date: 14 October 1947
• Docket Number: 47106.
• Citation: 29 N.W.2d 211,238 Iowa 866
• Parties: BAIE v. NORDSTROM et al. SAME v. SNELL, Judge.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

29 N.W.2d 211

238 Iowa 866

BAIE v. NORDSTROM et al.

SAME v. SNELL, Judge.

No. 47106.

Supreme Court of Iowa

October 14, 1947

Clark & Clark, of Ida Grove, for appellant.

Herrick & Ary, of Cherokee, and Arthur L. Johnson, of Ida Grove for appellees and defendant Bruce M. Snell.

GARFIELD Justice.

The record on appeal, settled by stipulation of counsel and order of the trial court, apparently includes practically the entire transcript of the testimony in question and answer form. Rule 340, Rules of Civil Procedure, contemplates that the record on appeal shall consist of an 'abstract of so much of the record in that (trial) court, including pleadings, evidence * * * as is material to the appeal' and that testimony appear 'in condensed or narrative form' unless a party deems some portion 'to be of particular importance,' in which event such part may be set out in question and answer form. Since the practice followed in this case has become quite common, we find it necessary again to caution attorneys and trial courts to comply with the rule. See Brown et al. v. Schmitz et al., 237 Iowa 418, 22 N.W.2d 340, 341.

Plaintiff owns a 240-acre farm in Ida County which he leased in writing in December, 1945, to defendant Wendell Nordstrom for the farming year to commence March 1, 1946. In September, 1946, plaintiff gave defendants Nordstrom and wife written notice under sections 562.6, 562.7, Code 1946, that the tenancy would terminate on March 1, 1947. Defendants then claimed the right to occupy the farm under an oral lease for the year commencing March 1, 1947. Whereupon in December 1946, plaintiff brought suit in equity to quiet his title to the farm subject to defendants' right of possession until March 1, 1947.

Defendants interposed the defense that shortly before the notice of termination of tenancy was given plaintiff orally agreed to lease them the farm for another year commencing March 1 1947. Following trial, the court found defendants' claim of oral lease established and dismissed plaintiff's petition. Plaintiff seeks, both by certiorari and appeal, to review this adjudication.

Certiorari lies only when authorized by statute or where an inferior tribunal is alleged to have exceeded 'its, or his proper jurisdiction or otherwise acted illegally.' Rule 306, Rules of Civil Procedure. No such statute, excess of jurisdiction or other illegality is asserted. It is plain plaintiff is entitled to no relief by way of certiorari.

Upon plaintiff's appeal, we are content with the trial court's decree.

Section 562.6 provides that a farm 'tenancy shall continue for the following crop year upon the same terms and conditions as the original lease unless written notice for termination is given by either party to the other, whereupon the tenancy shall terminate March 1 following; * * *.' Since plaintiff gave the written notice for termination as contemplated by the statute, the tenancy created by the written lease entered into in December, 1945, did not continue, by virtue of the statute, for the year commencing March 1, 1947.

There is nothing in the statute, however, which prevents the making of a new lease for an additional term. And where such new lease has been made one party, without the other's consent, cannot avoid it by giving notice of termination under section 562.6. The statute was not intended to, and does not, interfere with the right of landlord and tenant to contract with reference to possession of the premises.

We have held the parties may terminate a tenancy by agreement as well as by notice of termination under the statute. Crittenden v. Jensen, 231 Iowa 445, 1 N.W.2d 669. See also Laughlin v. Hall, 236 Iowa 990, 20 N.W.2d 415; Riggs v. Meka, 236 Iowa 118, 17 N.W.2d 101; Evans v. Davies, 232 Iowa 1207, 7 N.W.2d 780. Logic compels the holding that parties may agree to a continuance of the tenancy and that failure to give the statutory notice of termination is not the only way in which the tenancy may be continued for the following crop year.

It is scarcely necessary to observe that oral leases for a term not exceeding a year are valid. Code section 622.32, par. 3. Likewise, an existing lease may be extended or renewed by parol for a term not exceeding a year. 37 C.J.S., Frauds, Statute of, § 113. And an oral lease for a term of not more than a year is valid even though the term is to commence at a future time. Sobey v. Brisbee, 20 Iowa 105; Jones v. Marcy, 49 Iowa 188; 37 C.J.S., Frauds, Statute of, § 112a; 49 Am.Jur., Statute of Frauds, section 195.

There is no merit to plaintiff's contention that evidence of the oral lease was an attempt to vary or contradict the terms of the written lease. 32 Am.Jur., Landlord and Tenant, section 133; Boos v. Dulin, 103 Iowa 331, 335, 336, 72 N.W. 533. The parol evidence rule generally has no application to a subsequent oral agreement between parties to a written instrument even though it may alter or abrogate the writing. 32 C.J.S., Evidence, § 1004. See also Berg v. Kucharo Const. Co., Iowa, 21 N.W.2d 561, 567.

We think the case involves primarily only the fact question of whether the oral agreement claimed by defendants has been established. Giving to the trial court's decision the weight to which it is entitled, we are satisfied with the proof.

We conclude from the evidence that plaintiff was unnecessarily concerned about payment of the rent for 1946 and was not entirely satisfied with defendant Nordstrom's operation of the farm. In the early part of September, 1946, plaintiff consulted the president of the bank which had been financing Nordstrom and which held a chattel mortgage on his property. The banker assured plaintiff his rent would be paid and promised to go to the farm, look the situation over, and then see plaintiff. On September 14 the banker and Nordstrom called on plaintiff. 'Mr. Baie asked Mr. Nordstrom if he had done any...