Bailen v. Deitrick

• Citation: 84 F.2d 375
• Decision Date: 03 June 1936
• Docket Number: No. 3124.,3124.
• Parties: BAILEN v. DEITRICK et al.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (1st Circuit)

84 F.2d 375 (1936)

BAILEN v. DEITRICK et al.

No. 3124.

Circuit Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

June 3, 1936.

Herman Snyder, of Boston, Mass., for appellant.

Brenton K. Fisk, of Boston, Mass. (Andrew J. Aldridge, of Boston, Mass., on the brief), for appellees.

Before BINGHAM, WILSON, and MORTON, Circuit Judges.

BINGHAM, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal from a decree of November 20, 1935, of the federal District Court for Massachusetts dismissing the plaintiff's bill in equity on the defendants' motion to dismiss.

The suit in equity was begun in the superior court for Massachusetts on June 28, 1935. The defendants in the action are the Federal National Bank of Boston, a national banking association located there, and Frederick S. Deitrick, the receiver of the bank, whose citizenship and residence is not shown. On the application of the receiver, the bank not joining therein, the cause was removed to the federal District Court, on the ground that the bank was not a necessary party.

After removal, the plaintiff filed a motion to remand the cause to the state court, stating that no federal question was presented by the bill, and that the receiver, who alone had removed the cause, was only a nominal party. At the same time the receiver moved to dismiss the bill for the reason that, upon its face, it appeared to be wholly without equity. The motion to remand was denied, and the motion to dismiss granted.

The first question raised is whether the plaintiff's motion to remand should have been granted; the receiver being the only party to the removal of the cause.

It is the established rule that, where a suit brought in a state court against several defendants is subject to removal and its removal is applied for, all the defendants who are necessary and not merely nominal parties must be joined in the removal proceedings. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co. v. Martin, 178 U.S. 245, 20 S.Ct. 854, 44 L.Ed. 1055; Gableman v. Peoria, etc., Railway Co., 179 U.S. 335, 21 S.Ct. 171, 45 L.Ed. 220; Consolidated Independent School District v. Cross (D.C.) 7 F.(2d) 491.

Was this cause subject to removal? As it was a suit brought in the Massachusetts state court and involved the winding up of the affairs of a national bank, of which original jurisdiction is conferred upon the District Court 28 U.S.C.A. § 41 (16); Studebaker Corporation v. First National Bank of Florence (D.C.) 10 F.(2d) 590, it was subject to removal under 28 U.S.C.A. § 71, on a proper application, if the defendants were nonresidents of the state in which the action was brought. And if the bill alleged that the amount in controversy exceeded $3,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and disclosed a substantial federal question arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States, it was removable by the defendants whether they were citizens of the state in which the action was brought or not.

It is unnecessary to decide whether the cause was removable on the first rather than the second ground above stated, for in either case, as we shall later point out, we are of the opinion that the bank was a necessary party to the cause and should have been joined in the removal proceeding.

The plaintiff by his bill does not seek to avoid the payment of assessments imposed upon him by the comptroller as a stockholder in the defendant bank, for he alleges that he has paid them, and the defendants' motion, like a demurrer, admits this to be true. What he seeks is to rescind the contracts under which the defendant bank sold him shares of its stock, on the ground of fraud practiced upon him by the bank and its officers, and to have the certificates of stock treated as canceled. The proceeding, therefore, as to these particular matters, is one in which the bank, in the very nature of things, is a necessary party, and if the plaintiff is entitled because of the fraud practiced upon him to a rescission of the contracts of purchase and a cancellation of his stock certificates, he could obtain such relief only by a suit in equity in which the bank, at least, was a party. Lantry v. Wallace, 182 U.S. 536, at page 548, 21 S.Ct. 878, 883, 45 L.Ed. 1218. In that case, the stockholder was sued in an action at law by the receiver of a national bank to recover an assessment on his stock, and in his answer sought to avoid his stock liability by having his contract of purchase rescinded and his stock certificates canceled, and, as a consequence, to be relieved of all responsibility for the payment of assessments as a shareholder of the bank. In discussing the defendant stockholder's position, the court said:

"Clearly such a defense is of an equitable nature, and could not be recognized and sustained except in some proceeding to which the bank, at least, was a party. If the defendant was entitled, under the...