Bailey v. Espn, Inc.

• Decision Date: 29 July 2015
• Docket Number: Case No. 3:14-cv-01509 (VAB)
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
• Parties: ANTHONY BAILEY, Plaintiff v. ESPN, INC., Defendant.

ANTHONY BAILEY, Plaintiff v. ESPN, INC., Defendant.

Case No. 3:14-cv-01509 (VAB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

July 29, 2015

RULING AND ORDER

Plaintiff, Anthony Bailey, brings this action against ESPN, Inc., Plaintiff's former employer. Specifically, Mr. Bailey seeks damages relating to the termination of his employment by ESPN, asserting causes of action in nine separate counts in his Amended Complaint (the "Complaint"). Defendant now moves to dismiss seven counts of the Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), Fed. R. Civ. P., for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. [Doc. No. 23]. For the reasons set forth below, the Court hereby GRANTS in part and DENIES in part this motion.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), Fed. R. Civ. P., is designed "merely to assess the legal feasibility of a complaint, not to assay the weight of evidence which might be offered in support thereof." Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Color Tile, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, LLP, 322 F.3d 147, 158 (2d Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). When deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court must accept the material facts alleged in the complaint as true, draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, and decide whether it is plausible that the plaintiff has a valid claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007); In re NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig., 503 F.3d 89, 95 (2d Cir. 2007).

A plaintiff's "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level," and assert a cause of action with enough heft to show entitlement to relief and "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570. A claim is facially plausible if "the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Although "detailed factual allegations" are not required, a complaint must offer more than "labels and conclusions," or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action," or "naked assertion[s]" devoid of "further factual enhancement." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557 (2007). Plausibility at the pleading stage is nonetheless distinct from probability, and "a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of [the claims] is improbable, and . . . recovery is very remote and unlikely." Id. at 556 (internal quotation marks omitted).

II. DISCUSSION

ESPN moves to dismiss Counts One, Two, Five, Six, Seven, Eight, and Nine of the Complaint. For the following reasons, the Court grants the motion to dismiss Count Eight and Count Nine, denies the motion to dismiss Count Five and Count Seven, and grants in part and denies in part the motion to dismiss Count One, Count Two, and Count Six.

A. Claim for Tortious Interference with Business Expectancy/Contractual Obligations (Count Nine)

Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff's claim for tortious interference and Plaintiff does not oppose this portion of Defendant's motion. Therefore, the Court dismisses Count Nine of the Complaint.

B. Claim for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (Count Eight)

Mr. Bailey alleges that the ESPN's actions were intentional and extreme and outrageous in nature, were intended to and did cause him severe emotional distress, and caused him to incur damages. He further alleges that ESPN knew or should reasonably have known that its actions would cause him severe emotional distress. ESPN argues that this claim should be dismissed because Mr. Bailey has failed to allege facts that constitute extreme and outrageous conduct. The Court agrees.

Under Connecticut law, four elements must be established to prevail under a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress: "(1) that the actor intended to inflict emotional distress or that he knew or should have known that emotional distress was the likely result of his conduct; (2) that the conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) that the defendant's conduct was the cause of the plaintiff's distress; and (4) that the emotional distress sustained by the plaintiff was severe." Appleton v. Bd. of Educ. of Town of Stonington, 254 Conn. 205, 210 (Conn. 2000) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "In order to state a cognizable cause of action, Plaintiff must not only allege each of the four elements, but also must allege facts sufficient to support them." Golnik v. Amato, 299 F. Supp. 2d 8, 15 (D. Conn. 2003). "Mere conclusory allegations are insufficient as a matter of law to support a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress." Huff v. W. Haven Bd. of Educ., 10 F. Supp. 2d 117, 122 (D. Conn. 1998).

"Whether a defendant's conduct is sufficient to satisfy the requirement that it be extreme and outrageous is initially a question for the court to determine. Only where reasonable minds disagree does it become an issue for the jury." Appleton, 254 Conn. at 210 (citations omitted). "The general rule is that there is liability for conduct exceeding all bounds usually tolerated by adecent society, of a nature which is especially calculated to cause, and does cause, mental distress of a very serious kind." Golnik, 299 F. Supp. 2d at 15 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

'Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, "Outrageous!"'

Appleton, 254 Conn. 205, 210-11 (quoting 1 Restatement (Second), Torts § 46, cmt. (d), p. 73 (1965)). Connecticut courts have been reluctant to allow claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, even in cases involving significant employment-related activities, and in applying Connecticut law, federal courts in this District have interpreted the extreme and outrageous requirement strictly. See Golnick, 299 F. Supp. 2d at 15-16 (collecting cases); Lopez-Salerno v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., No. 3:97-cv-273, 1997 WL 766890, at *7, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19724, at *19-21 (D. Conn. Dec. 8, 1997) (same).

"There is no bright line rule to determine what constitutes extreme and outrageous conduct sufficient to maintain an action as the court must look to the specific facts and circumstances of each case in making its decisions." Menon v. Frinton, 170 F. Supp. 2d 190, 198 (D. Conn. 2001) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). However, "[c]ertain principles have emerged in the context of employer/employee relationships which guide the analysis. A court evaluates whether '. . . the employer's conduct, not the motive behind the conduct, [is] extreme or outrageous.'" Armstead v. Stop & Shop Companies, Inc., No. 3:01-cv-1489, 2003 WL 1343245, at *5, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4107, at *14 (D. Conn. Mar. 17, 2003) (citations omitted) (alterations in original). Thus, claims of employer misconduct that challenge motive or intent are dismissed unless the manifesting conduct is itself outrageous or extreme.Furthermore, "[e]ven conduct which is unlawful may not be labeled 'extreme and outrageous' unless it has a natural tendency to have an extraordinarily negative effect upon the emotional well-being of any person who is exposed or subject to it." Hamilton v. Town of Hamden, No. 3:08-cv-164, 2008 WL 4999301, at *10, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94242, at *26 (D. Conn. Nov. 19, 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Viewing the allegations in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, the Court finds that the conduct of the Defendant, as alleged in the Complaint, does not constitute extreme and outrageous conduct under the law. Mr. Bailey alleges that ESPN first computed the amount of bonuses and benefits to which he was entitled, and then almost immediately terminated him without cause in order to avoid paying him. The termination itself is not a sufficient basis for an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. See Craig v. Yale Univ. Sch. of Med., 838 F. Supp. 2d 4, 10 (D. Conn. 2011) ("Generally, personnel actions . . . that fall[] within the reasonably expected 'vicissitudes of employment,' . . . even if unlawful, are usually not deemed extreme and outrageous conduct."). Neither is ESPN's alleged motive of depriving Mr. Bailey of the payments and benefits that were shortly to become due to him. See Parsons v. United Technologies Corp., Sikorsky Aircraft Div., 243 Conn. 66, 88-89 (1997) ("The mere act of firing an employee, even if wrongfully motivated, does not transgress the bounds of socially tolerable behavior."). Moreover, Plaintiff has pointed to no case law holding an employer liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress for terminating an employee shortly after calculating the amount of compensation to which the employee was about to become entitled.

Finally, there are cases in which similar conduct was found not to satisfy the requirement of extreme and outrageous conduct. E.g., Lopez-Salerno, 1997 WL 766890, at *7, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19724, at *19 (finding termination of plaintiff "just as she should have becomeeligible for long term disability benefits" not to be extreme and outrageous conduct); Emanuele v. Boccaccio & Susanin, Inc., No. CV 90-0379367 S, 1992 WL 79823, at *3-4, 1992 Conn. Super. LEXIS 992, at *8-10 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 10, 1992) (finding allegations that plaintiff was terminated for false and non-existent reasons to deprive her of benefits and compensation, and in contravention of employer's procedure, insufficient to establish employer's conduct as extreme...