Huff v. West Haven Bd. of Educ.
| Decision Date | 19 March 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. Civ. 3:97CV584(PCD).,Civ. 3:97CV584(PCD). |
| Citation | 10 F.Supp.2d 117 |
| Parties | Millicent HUFF, Plaintiff, v. WEST HAVEN BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
W. Martyn Philpot, Jr., Laura Lee A. Dorflinger, Law Office of Martyn Philpot, New Haven, CT, for plaintiff.
Floyd Joseph Dugas, Richard J. Buturla, Warren L. Holcomb, Berchem, Moses & Devlin, P.C., Milford, CT, for defendants.
RULING ON MOTION TO DISMISS
Plaintiff alleges race discrimination by Defendants in denying her employment in the West Haven school system, in violation of the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution Article One, Section One of the Connecticut Constitution, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, § 1983 and Conn. Gen.Stat. § 10-235.1 Plaintiff also alleges state law claims for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress.2 Defendants move to dismiss.
The following facts are presumed to be true for purposes of this motion. Plaintiff, an African-American female, submitted numerous applications during 1992-1993 for permanent employment with the West Haven school system, including positions involving social work, drug counseling, administration and clerical work. Amended Complaint ¶¶ 9-10. Plaintiff had worked as a substitute "production worker" at the West Haven High School and in the Food Services Division. Id. ¶ 11. She claims that she was "more than qualified" for the positions for which she applied but was rejected for less qualified white applicants. Id. ¶¶ 11-12.
Plaintiff received only one interview in response to her applications. Id. ¶ 13. The interviewer failed to determine the time it took Plaintiff to complete a typing test even though the purpose of the test was to assess the "accuracy and time relative to her typing skills...." Id. Plaintiff alleges that the West Haven Board of Education (the "Board") policy or custom is to deprive "individuals, such as plaintiff, of their constitutional rights." Id. ¶ 14.
A motion to dismiss should be granted only when "it appears `beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.'" Goldman v. Belden, 754 F.2d 1059, 1065-66 (2d Cir.1985) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). "In determining the motion the Court shall consider only those facts that appear on the face of the complaint." Williams v. Avco Lycoming, 755 F.Supp. 47, 49 (D.Conn.1991) (citation omitted). All facts alleged in the complaint are presumed to be true and are considered most favorably to the non-movant. Id.
To state a claim under § 1983, Plaintiff must allege a constitutional deprivation by "persons" acting under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's claim under § 1983 because the Board and its members are not "persons."3
Defendants' position is without merit. Almost twenty years ago the Supreme Court held that "Congress did intend municipalities and other local government units to be included among those persons to whom § 1983 applies." Monell v. Dep't of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) (emphasis in original).4 Local government bodies may be sued directly under § 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where the allegedly unconstitutional action was the result of an official policy or custom. Id. at 690-91, 98 S.Ct. 2018. Monell did not exclude school boards. See id. at 696-97, 98 S.Ct. 2018.5
Defendants erroneously rely on Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989). Will held that "neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are `persons' under § 1983." Id. at 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304. Will was based, in part, on the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity. Id. at 63-67, 109 S.Ct. 2304. The Supreme Court expressly distinguished Monell:
Monell itself is not to the contrary. True, prior to Monell the Court had reasoned that if municipalities were not persons then surely States also were not. And Monell overruled Monroe, undercutting that logic. But it does not follow that if municipalities are persons then so are States. States are protected by the Eleventh Amendment while municipalities are not, and we consequently limited our holding in Monell `to local government units which are not considered part of the State for Eleventh Amendment purposes.' Conversely, our holding here does not cast any doubt on Monell, and applies only to States or governmental entities that are considered `arms of the State' for Eleventh Amendment purposes.
Id. at 70, 109 S.Ct. 2304 ().6
Defendants also erroneously rely on Lombard v. Bd. of Educ. of City of New York, 440 F.Supp. 577 (E.D.N.Y.1977), and Gentile v. Wallen, 562 F.2d 193 (2d Cir.1977). In Gentile, the Second Circuit relied on its earlier decision in Monell v. Dep't of Social Services of City of New York, 532 F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1976), and Kornit v. Bd. of Educ., 542 F.2d 593 (2d Cir.1976) (per curiam), vacated, 438 U.S. 902, 98 S.Ct. 3118, 57 L.Ed.2d 1144 (1978), in holding that there is no cause of action for damages against a school board or its members in then official capacity under § 1983. Gentile, 562 F.2d at 195. Those cases are no longer valid in light of the Supreme Court's reversal in Monell, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611.7
Later authority in this circuit recognizes as viable a cause of action against a school board and its members for damages in their official capacity under § 1983. See Terminate Control Corp. v. Horowitz, 28 F.3d 1335, 1348 (2d Cir.1994) (); Newman v. Bd. of Educ. of City School Dist. of New York, 594 F.2d 299, 303 (2d Cir.1979) ().8
Accordingly, Defendants' argument that the school board and its members are not "persons" subject to liability for damages under § 1983 is without merit, and Count One will not be dismissed on that basis.9
Plaintiff claims that Defendants' actions violated her constitutional due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.10 Defendants move to dismiss on the basis that Plaintiff has not alleged a protected property or liberty interest. Although it is unclear from Plaintiff's Amended Complaint whether she claims a property or liberty interest, Plaintiff has not sufficiently pled either.11
"Although the Constitution protects property interests, it does not create them." Donato v. Plainview-Old Bethpage Cent. School Dist., 96 F.3d 623, 629 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 1083, 137 L.Ed.2d 218 (1997). Property interests are created and defined "`by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law — rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.'" Id. (quoting Bd of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972)). Plaintiff must establish that she has a "constitutionally-protected `legitimate claim of entitlement'" to the positions which she sought, rather than "an unprotected unilateral expectation of employment" to have a protected property interest. See Donato, 96 F.3d at 629 (citations omitted)
The liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment includes the freedom "to engage in any of the common occupations of life." Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923). Certain actions by a potential employer in refusing to rehire an employee may implicate an employee's liberty interests. See Donato, 96 F.3d at 630 (citing Roth, 408 U.S. at 573, 92 S.Ct. 2701). The mere act of not rehiring an individual, however, does not infringe a protected liberty interest. Rather, the actions must be of the kind to effectively hinder the individual's ability to practice in her profession. Id. at 630-31. For instance, stigmatizing public comments regarding the employee's dishonest, illegal or immoral behavior might deprive the employee of the "freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities," id. at 630 (quotation omitted), thereby implicating a liberty interest.
Plaintiff alleges in her Amended Complaint that she was qualified for the positions for which she applied, Defendants refused to hire her based on her race and that Defendants' actions deprived her of liberty without due process of law. Plaintiff has not sufficiently pled a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest in a position with the school. Accordingly, Plaintiff's claim under the due process clause is dismissed.
To state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under Connecticut law, Plaintiff must allege (1) that Defendants intended to inflict emotional distress or knew or should have known that such distress was a likely result of their conduct; (2) that the conduct was extreme and outrageous, (3) that Defendants' conduct was the cause of the Plaintiffs distress, and (4) that the emotional distress sustained by the Plaintiff was severe. Petyan v. Ellis, 200 Conn. 243, 510 A.2d 1337 (1986).
The standard in Connecticut to demonstrate extreme and outrageous conduct is stringent. "[E]xtreme and outrageous" conduct is defined as that which "exceed[s] all bounds usually...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Emma v. Schenectady City School Dist.
...109 S.Ct. 2702, 105 L.Ed.2d 598 (1989); Terminate Control Corp. v. Horowitz, 28 F.3d 1335, 1348 (2d Cir.1994); Huff v. West Haven Bd. of Educ., 10 F.Supp.2d 117, 121 (D.Conn.1998); Zappala v. Albicelli, 980 F.Supp. 635, 638-39 (N.D.N.Y.1997). 15. Plaintiff's claims, when viewed in the aggre......
-
Russo v. City of Hartford
...in Connecticut for this cause of action is stringent. Russo v. City of Hartford, 184 F.Supp 2d. 169, 188 (citing Huff v. West Haven Bd. of Ed., 10 F.Supp.2d 117 (D.Conn.1998)). There is no evidence before this court which comes even arguably close to satisfying this standard in connection w......
-
Miner v. Town of Cheshire
...the employer's conduct, not the motive behind the conduct, that must be extreme or outrageous. See, e.g., Huff v. West Haven Board of Education, 10 F.Supp.2d 117, 123 (D.Conn.1998). An employer's adverse yet routine employment action, even if improperly motivated, does not constitute extrem......
-
Russo v. City of Hartford, s. CIV.A. 397CV2380(JCH), CIV.A. 300CV2382(JCH), CIV.A. 300CV1794(JCH).
...510 A.2d 1337 (1986)). The standard in Connecticut to demonstrate extreme and outrageous conduct is stringent. Huff v. West Haven Bd. of Educ., 10 F.Supp.2d 117, 122 (D.Conn.1998). "`[E]xtreme and outrageous' conduct is defined as that which `exceed[s] all bounds usually tolerated by decent......