Bailey v. Galpin

• Decision Date: 25 March 1889
• Citation: 40 Minn. 319
• Parties: CHARLES M. BAILEY and others <I>vs.</I> BETSEY F. GALPIN.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

40 Minn. 319

CHARLES M. BAILEY and othersvs.

BETSEY F. GALPIN.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

March 25, 1889.

Appeal by defendant from an order of the district court for Hennepin county refusing a new trial after a trial by Lochren, J., and judgment ordered for plaintiffs.

Wm. B. McIntyre, for appellant.

Cross & Carleton, for respondents.

VANDERBURGH, J.

This is an action under the statute to determine the adverse claim of the defendant. The complaint contains general allegations of plaintiffs' title and ownership, and that the premises are vacant and unoccupied; that the defendant claims some estate or interest adverse to them, and asks judgment determining it. The defendant appears and answers, denying the plaintiffs' title, and alleging that she acquired title to the land in question by deed from Sykes & Andrews, the owners thereof, on the 11th day of August, 1883, which was recorded on the 23d of the same month. The plaintiffs, in their reply, deny the allegations of new matter in the answer, and thus a complete issue on the question of the legal title was framed by the pleadings. The pleadings did not take the form of a bill and answer in chancery, and, since the answer does not disclose that both parties claim by deed under the defendant's grantor, and that the defendant's was prior in point of time, there was nothing in it necessarily calling for any allegations showing the bona fides and superior equities of the plaintiffs under a later deed from defendant's grantors. The parties respectively claim to be the holders of the legal title. Barber v. Evans, 27 Minn. 92, (6 N. W. Rep. 445.) Upon the trial, however, the plaintiffs voluntarily assumed the burden of proving that they were bona fide purchasers without any actual notice of defendant's deed, or of any claim thereto by her, and the court so finds; and this fact must be assumed in disposing of the case in this court.

The record also discloses the following facts in respect to the state of the title: Both parties claim under Sykes & Andrews, the former owners. On the 11th day of January, 1884, the plaintiff Bailey purchased of them the lot in question, viz., lot 12, in block 8, and 11 other lots, described in their deed to him of that date as being "all in Menage's supplement to East Side addition to Minneapolis, according to the plat thereof of record and on file in the office of the register of deeds of said county." A full consideration was paid by Bailey therefor, and the deed was duly recorded upon the next day. Afterwards Bailey conveyed an undivided two-thirds of the lots so purchased to the other plaintiffs. Plaintiffs are the owners of the lot in controversy (lot 12, in block 8, above described) unless defendant acquired title thereto under the prior deed to her, executed and recorded as set forth in the answer, but in which the plaintiffs claim the description was fatally defective, so that the record thereof was not constructive notice of any title or claim of the defendant to the lot in question described in the deed to them. The description in defendant's deed, which, as before stated, was recorded before the execution of the deed to Bailey, is as follows, viz.: "Lot 12, Bl. 8, Menage's supplement to Minneapolis, according to the plat now on file or of record in the office of the register of deeds in and for said county." As a matter of fact the defendant intended to purchase the lot in question on the date of her deed, and paid for the same, and the grantors, Sykes & Andrews, intended by their deed to her to convey the same lot. The trial court held that the description in the defendant's deed was insufficient to pass the legal title to the lot, although, prior to the plaintiffs' purchase, she had an equity entitling her to a reformation of the deed; and that plaintiffs acquired the legal title; and that the record of defendant's deed, failing to describe the lot, was not constructive notice of her equitable title or claim.

If the plaintiffs had neither actual nor constructive notice, the equities being equal, they, as holders of the legal title, must of course prevail. The legal title to land does not pass by deed unless so described that it can be identified or located by referring to or following out the description as given, and the effect of the record as constructive notice merely cannot be aided or supplemented by proof of the actual intentions of the parties to the deed, not disclosed by the record. Tice v. Freeman, 30 Minn. 389, (15 N. W. Rep. 674;) Parret v. Shaubhut, 5 Minn. 258, (323, 331,) (80 Am. Dec. 424.) If the description is sufficient to identify the land, the form adopted is immaterial, whether it be by reference to a plat, or well known objects, or names or monuments, or by metes and bounds. And where there are several different and complete descriptions of the same land, whether as appearing upon different plats or otherwise, the record of conveyances by either form will be constructive notice, and will bind the title. Ames v. Lowry, 30 Minn. 283, (15 N. W. Rep. 247.) And so, where the deed or record, in addition to a correct or sufficient description, contains false particulars, the rule is, if there are certain particulars once sufficiently ascertained, which designate the thing intended to be granted, the addition of a circumstance false or mistaken will not vitiate the grant. Thorwarth v. Armstrong, 20 Minn. 419, (464;) Russell v. Hayden, supra, p. 88; Slosson v. Hall, 17 Minn. 71, (95.) It is true that in some instances, where the subject of the grant is identified, mistakes or omissions in the details of the description may be helped by construction. But in such cases the intention of the parties is reasonably clear from the face of the record. Hoffman v. Riehl, 27 Mo. 554; Merrick v. Wallace, 19 Ill. 486, 497. In Partridge v. Smith, 2 Biss. 183, this rule is extended further, perhaps, than is consistent with sound principles, or the current of authority. So, if the description is sufficient to ascertain the estate, although the estate cannot agree with all the particulars, it will pass. But if the description in the deed is so defective and inaccurate that the subject of the grant is not properly identified or indicated, so that a reformation of the instrument is required, the legal title will not pass. Roberts v. Grace, 16 Minn. 115, (126, 134.)

Here the description is confessedly defective on its face. It is not aided by the addition of particulars containing a...