Bailey v. Hagen
| Decision Date | 27 October 1964 |
| Parties | Elsa BAILEY et al., Respondents, v. Marcus HAGEN et al., Appellants. |
| Court | Wisconsin Supreme Court |
Mittelstaed, Heide, Sheldon & Hartley (by W. A. Sheldon), Kenosha, for appellants.
Phillips & Richards, Kenosha, Antaramian & Antaramian, Kenosha, of counsel, for respondents.
We have no hesitancy in affirming the trial judge in his action setting aside the jury's verdict in finding the defendant negligent as to speed as a matter of law.
The court below instructed the jury that it was for it to determine whether Hagen had exercised ordinary care to so regulate his speed as was reasonably necessary to avoid collision with any object on the highway. The jury was also instructed that in the event the driver of the vehicle was suddenly confronted by an emergency, he was subject to exoneration under the accepted emergency doctrine of Wisconsin. The trial judge on motions after verdict concluded that the defendant should be found negligent with respect to speed as a matter of law, and therefore set aside the jury's finding of no negligence.
It is the contention of the appellants herein that the law to be applied in this case is the law of Illinois and that the law of Illinois, unlike that of Wisconsin, makes the question of speed in these circumstances a matter to be decided by the jury.
The appellant takes the position with which the Restatement, Conflict of Laws, p. 457, sec. 378, is in accord, that the law of the place of injury governs the law of the case. Certainly this would normally be true in an automobile accident case involving the rules of the road. The defendant, however, has failed to properly bring before the court the applicable provisions of Illinois law. The Wisconsin statutes, sec. 328.01, Stats., are determinative of the method of bringing to the court's attention the law of another state. Sec. 328.01, Stats., states:
It is to be noted that the answer of the defendant made no allegation that the court should take notice of the Illinois law in this action, nor did the defendant by any formal motion or presentation make such a request of the court. The statute requires that 'reasonable notice shall be given to the adverse parties either in the pleadings or otherwise.'
The first time that the applicability of Illinois law was brought to the attention of the court or adverse party appears to have been in defendant's motion for nonsuit after the submission of the plaintiff's case. The defendant again argued Illinois law in ths argument on a motion for a directed verdict. Sec. 328.01, Stats., is a portion of a uniform law, and it is incumbent upon this court to give recognition to decisions in other jurisdictions interpreting this law. Sec. 328.01(6), Stats. Other jurisdictions in which this matter has come before the court have made it plain that the interjection of foreign law merely in an oral argument or in the course of motions after the introduction of evidence is insufficient to compel the court to take judicial notice. It has been held that the action of a party giving notice to the court of foreign law has been insufficient in the following situations: Raising the issue in the reply brief (Boswell v. Rio De Oro Uranium Mines, Inc. (1961), 68 N.M. 457, 362 P.2d 991); merely referring to the foreign law in closing argument (Cliff v. Pinto (1948), 74 R.I. 369, 60 A.2d 704); and pleading the foreign law but offering no citations (Scott v. Scott (1951), 153 Neb. 906, 46 N.W.2d 627). See also 23 A.L.R.2d 1431.
Our Wisconsin courts can take judicial notice of the laws of another jurisdiction when such foreign law is pleaded. It is also apparent that foreign law by statute may be presented when there is reasonable notice 'otherwise' of the applicability of foreign law. We need not decide what other situations might make it possible for the trial court to notice the law of another jurisdiction. It is clear, however, that in this jurisdiction that the Illinois law was not properly brought to the attention of the court by referring to it for the first time in argument. Absent notice in the pleadings or reasonable notice in some other manner, Wisconsin courts must assume the law of the foreign state to be the same as ours. Any other rule would be prejudicial to a party prepared to try the...
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Williams v. Graber
...of the Act is not complied with when the attempt to involve the foreign law is not made until trial has begun. Bailey v. Hagen (1964), 25 Wis.2d 386, 130 N.W.2d 773 (defendant's attempt to invoke Illinois law for the first time after the close of plaintiff's case rejected for failure to pro......
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Vanderkarr v. Bergsma, 152
...he can see ahead * * *.' Barker Barrel Co. v. Fisher (1960), 10 Wis.2d 197, 200, 102 N.W.2d 107, 109. See also, Bailey v. Hagen (1964), 25 Wis.2d 386, 130 N.W.2d 773. However, this 'assured clear distance' rule was not properly applicable to this case. The plaintiff testified that he first ......
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Cibik v. Rural Mut. Ins. Co.
...when [s]he proceeds at a speed which [s]he cannot stop [her] vehicle within the distance [s]he can see ahead.' " Bailey v. Hagen, 25 Wis.2d 386, 392, 130 N.W.2d 773, 776 (1964) (citation omitted). Mrs. Cibik testified that she could only see oncoming traffic when it got within four car leng......
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C. I. T. Corp. v. Edwards
...in holding that the law of Colorado was not properly placed in issue and could not be relied on by the plaintiff. See Bailey v. Hagen, 25 Wis.2d 386, 130 N.W.2d 73; Cliff v. Pinto, 74 R.I. 369, 60 A.2d 704. Any other rule would be prejudicial to a party prepared to try his case on the law o......