Bailey v. King

Decision Date14 February 1966
Docket NumberNo. 5-3769,5-3769
Citation398 S.W.2d 906,240 Ark. 245
PartiesRichard E. BAILEY, Appellant, v. R. George KING, Appellee.
CourtArkansas Supreme Court

Franklin Wilder, Ft. Smith, for appellant.

H. Clay Robinson, Ft. Smith, for appellee.

HARRIS, Chief Justice.

George King d/b/a Acme Industrial Laundry, appellee herein, employed appellant Richard E. Bailey, as a route salesman on July 2, 1963. The laundry is engaged in the business of renting linens and industrial uniforms to commercial customers, and the soiled linens and uniforms are picked up at regular intervals by the routemen, and replaced with clean ones. Every employee is assigned a list of customers that he is to service. Upon employment, Bailey executed an agreement, agreeing, in consideration of being employed, that, on termination of the employment, he would not 'directly or indirectly engage in the linen supply business * * * or any competitive business within the city of Fort Smith, Arkansas, or within a radius of 25 miles of the city of Fort Smith * * * for a period of one (1) year from the date when his employment under this contract ceases.' The form agreement also included 'cleaning and laundry,' but these words were stricken from the contract. On May 6, 1965, Bailey's employment was terminated by his employer, and appellant soon thereafter accepted employment with Tulsa Linen Service, a direct competitor of Acme's, and commenced soliciting former customers (whom he had called on for Acme), and obtained some of these as customers for the new employer. King instituted suit in the Sebastian Chancery Court to enforce the provisions of the contract, and, after the taking of evidence, the court entered a permanent injunction, enjoining Bailey 'from participating in the linen supply, rental of industrial uniforms and allied business within the city of Fort Smith * * * or radius of twenty-five miles around Fort Smith * * * for a period of one (1) year * * *' from the termination of his employment. From the decree, appellant brings this appeal. Appellant asserts that the contract is void as against public policy; that the contract is void because of lack of mutuality; and that there was no valid reason for issuance of the injunction.

The question of contractual restraint provisions has been passed upon by this court several times, and in McLeod v. Meyer, 237 Ark. 173, 372 S.W.2d 220, we pointed out that 'whether a restraint provision is reasonablde or unreasonable (and thus valid or invalid), is a matter to be determined under the particular circumstances involved.' In Little Rock Towel and Linen Supply Company v. Independent Linen Service Company of Arkansas, 237 Ark. 877, 377 S.W.2d 34, we held a contract, which provided that appellant would not, during his employment with appellee, or for a period of five years thereafter, be connected directly or indirectly with any other linen service company, or with any laundry anywhere within appellee's territory in Arkansas, to be void. It will be quickly noted, however, that the period of time was five years, and likewise, the appellant in that case was prohibited from engaging in the family laundry business as well as a linen supply service. We commented:

'* * * According to the proof there is a clear-cut distinction between a family laundry and a linen supply service. A family laundry is engaged principally in laundering clothing and household linen for residential customers. A linen service company deals principally with commercial customers. Such a company owns commercial uniforms, restaurant linen, barber supplies, and the like, which the company rents to its patrons. Its routemen make calls at frequent intervals for the purpose of collecting soiled linen and replacing it with an equal supply of clean linen.

'When Independent Linen and Bew [appellant] executed their agreement the company was engaged in the linen service business, but...

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13 cases
  • Progressive Techs., Inc. v. Chaffin Holdings, Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
    • May 2, 2022
    ...years before his termination. Noncompete Agreement , Appellant's Addendum at 12 ¶ 3(A) (emphasis added); see Bailey v. King , 240 Ark. 245, 398 S.W.2d 906, 908 (1966) ("It seems clear that this court is of the view that five years is an unreasonable length of time to restrict a former emplo......
  • Freeman v. Brown Hiller, Inc.
    • United States
    • Arkansas Court of Appeals
    • April 2, 2008
    ...has recognized that an action for damages is inadequate in a case involving the breach of a covenant not to compete. Bailey v. King, 240 Ark. 245, 398 S.W.2d 906 (1966). The test for determining the likelihood of success on the merits is whether there is a reasonable probability of success ......
  • Welsco, Inc. v. Brace
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Arkansas
    • September 17, 2012
    ...not to compete." Freeman, 102 Ark. App. at 80, 281 S.W.3d at 754. This determination relates back to the case of Bailey v. King, 240 Ark. 245, 398 S.W.2d 906 (1966), in which the Arkansas Supreme Court observed: "The breach of a covenant not to compete is, of course, of a continuing nature,......
  • Evans Laboratories, Inc. v. Melder
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • February 27, 1978
    ...court. United Insurance Agency v. Martin, 258 Ark. 916, 529 S.W.2d 871; McLeod v. Meyer, 237 Ark. 173, 372 S.W.2d 220; Bailey v. King, 240 Ark. 245, 398 S.W.2d 906; McCumber v. Federated Implement & Hardware Ins. Co., 230 Ark. 13, 320 S.W.2d 637. Perhaps no better test could be provided, be......
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