Bailey v. Selden
Court | Supreme Court of Alabama |
Writing for the Court | HEAD, J. |
Citation | 112 Ala. 593,20 So. 854 |
Decision Date | 12 November 1896 |
Parties | BAILEY v. SELDEN. |
20 So. 854
112 Ala. 593
BAILEY
v.
SELDEN.
Supreme Court of Alabama
November 12, 1896
Appeal from chancery court, Perry county; W. H. Tayloe, Chancellor.
Suit by Bettie Selden Bailey and others against Joseph Selden and others. From a decree for respondent Selden, complainant Bailey appeals. Affirmed.
R. H. Clarke, J. H. Stewart, Seay & De Graffenried, and J. W. Bush, for appellant.
Pettus & Pettus, for appellee.
HEAD, J.
George W. H. Minge, who died in 1880, a resident citizen of Marengo county, in this state, left his last will, which was duly established. Its dispositions touching the property now in controversy, to wit, the Fair Hope plantation, in Perry county, Ala., "together with all the personal property contained thereon, which is now occupied by my son-in-law, Capt. Joseph Selden," were that said plantation and personal property were devised and bequeathed to the testator's widow, Mary H. Minge, for life, with vested remainder in fee to the testator's granddaughters, Mary M. Selden and Maria L. Selden, with the provision, however, that a "reasonable and economical maintenance and support out of the property" was devised and bequeathed to the said Joseph Selden, and that "the said plantation shall be his home during his natural life," and with the further provision that, during the lifetime of the widow, the testator's grandchildren G. Minge Selden, John A. Selden, and Bettie Selden should receive from the proceeds of the property "their education, maintenance, and support," and the property was expressly charged therewith. These dispositions appear to be simple and easily understood. The widow was invested with the legal and beneficial estate in possession, clothed with adequate legal remedies for reduction to and maintenance of her actual possession during her life, subject, however, to the trust that she should permit Joseph Selden to make the plantation his home during his life, and award to him out of the property, real and personal, a reasonable and economical maintenance and support, and to the further trust that she should award to the three named grandchildren, from the proceeds of the property, their education, maintenance, and support. In its legal sense, the possession of the property did not belong to Joseph Selden. It belonged to Mrs. Minge, the life tenant, whose duty it was to permit him to have his home upon the place. He could not disseise her, without subjecting himself to a possessory action at law, at her suit. The primary source of fulfillment of these trusts for maintenance would, in equity, be the rents, incomes, and profits of the property; and, these proving inadequate, the corpus, or a part thereof, might, in a judicious manner, be so appropriated. The widow, acting in good faith, and with just and reasonable judgment and discretion, in the observance and execution of the beneficial interests, secured to herself and her cestuis que trustent by the will, and with just regard to the ultimate rights of the remainder-men, was absolute in her right to the possession, management, and control of the property, and the discharge of the trusts imposed upon her. If she should abuse the trust declared for Joseph Selden, he was clothed with ample remedies for redress in a court of equity. So, also, was that forum open to the three grandchildren named for redress of any abuse of the trust declared for them. The remainder-men were invested with the usual equitable remedies which pertain to estates of that character for the preservation and protection of their ultimate interests. The estate of Mrs. Minge, the widow, being legal and in possession, her remedies, in whatever form her rights of possession and enjoyment growing out of the dispositions of the will might be invaded, were necessarily legal. We do not say that conditions may not arise which would entitle her to the aid of a court of [20 So. 855] equity in the administration of her trusts, as, for instance, it might be, if she should need the aid of that court in the application of the corpus of the property to the purposes of the trusts. These several rights and remedies of the several classes of persons referred to are independent and distinct. The remedies of Joseph Selden do not concern the three grandchildren nor the remainder-men. He and the remainder-men have nothing in common with the grandchildren, nor have he and the latter any interest in common with the remainder-men. In the enforcement of their respective beneficial or ultimate interests in equity, Mrs. Minge, the trustee and tenant of the particular estate, must needs be the prime adversary party; for it is upon her dereliction alone that a resort to equity by them could be justified. So long as she remains faithful to her duties, exercising in the administration and protection of the property the powers with which the law clothes her, there could be no resort by them to a court of equity. Mrs. Minge was by the will named, and she qualified, as executrix; but there are no rights of creditors involved in the litigation, and the rights of the parties litigant do not pertain to the executorial office or functions. That character may, therefore, be left out of view.
It was in view of this property, and these interests therein, that the bill in this cause was filed, on the 29th day of July, 1885. The complainants in the original bill were-First, the widow, Mary H. Minge; then, the remainder-men and their husbands, they having intermarried since the death of the testator; and, next, the three grandchildren for whose education, maintenance, and support the will provided. The other cestui que trust, Joseph Selden, was the sole party defendant. With the necessary formal allegations as to the will, the relations of the parties, and their interests, exhibiting a copy of the will, the bill averred, that the testator left other large property besides Fair Hope and the personal property thereon, which was also devised to the widow for life, and that, having plenty to supply her wants, she did not insist upon subjecting for her own use and benefit a portion of the income,...
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Reedy v. State, 6 Div. 260.
...of cause and effect, as to have been the product of it solely--which is the legal test. Parsons case, 81 Ala. 577, at pages 596, 597, 20 So. 854, 60 Am.Rep. 193. If for discussion it should be assumed, though the evidence tends to the contrary, that when the offense was committed Reedy was ......
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Town of Carbon Hill v. Marks, 6 Div. 924
...in a suit without alleging that he has requested the trustee to bring the same, and that the trustee has refused (Bailey v. Selden, 112 Ala. 593, 605, 20 So. 854; Blackburn v. Fitzgerald, 130 Ala. 524, 588, 30 So. 568; Arnett v. Bailey, 60 Ala. 435, 438), does not militate against the view ......
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Blackburn v. Fitzgerald
...rights, they must first move the trustee to act, or show some sufficient reason for the failure to do so. Bailey v. Selden, 112 Ala. 594, 20 So. 854; Arnett v. Bailey, 60 Ala. 435; Bridges v. Phillips, 25 Ala. 136, 60 Am. Dec. 495. In order to maintain such [30 So. 569] a bill by the benefi......
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Perdue v. Callan Assocs., Inc. (Ex parte Callan Assocs., Inc.), 1081683.
...sufficient reason for the failure to do so.” Blackburn v. Fitzgerald, 130 Ala. 584, 588, 30 So. 568, 568 (1901) (citing Bailey v. Selden, 112 Ala. 593, 605, 20 So. 854, 857 (1896) (“[C]omplainants had no right to institute proceedings in equity to enforce their equitable rights ... without ......
-
Reedy v. State, 6 Div. 260.
...of cause and effect, as to have been the product of it solely--which is the legal test. Parsons case, 81 Ala. 577, at pages 596, 597, 20 So. 854, 60 Am.Rep. 193. If for discussion it should be assumed, though the evidence tends to the contrary, that when the offense was committed Reedy was ......
-
Town of Carbon Hill v. Marks, 6 Div. 924
...in a suit without alleging that he has requested the trustee to bring the same, and that the trustee has refused (Bailey v. Selden, 112 Ala. 593, 605, 20 So. 854; Blackburn v. Fitzgerald, 130 Ala. 524, 588, 30 So. 568; Arnett v. Bailey, 60 Ala. 435, 438), does not militate against the view ......
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Blackburn v. Fitzgerald
...rights, they must first move the trustee to act, or show some sufficient reason for the failure to do so. Bailey v. Selden, 112 Ala. 594, 20 So. 854; Arnett v. Bailey, 60 Ala. 435; Bridges v. Phillips, 25 Ala. 136, 60 Am. Dec. 495. In order to maintain such [30 So. 569] a bill by the benefi......
-
Perdue v. Callan Assocs., Inc. (Ex parte Callan Assocs., Inc.), 1081683.
...sufficient reason for the failure to do so.” Blackburn v. Fitzgerald, 130 Ala. 584, 588, 30 So. 568, 568 (1901) (citing Bailey v. Selden, 112 Ala. 593, 605, 20 So. 854, 857 (1896) (“[C]omplainants had no right to institute proceedings in equity to enforce their equitable rights ... without ......