Reedy v. State
| Citation | 20 So.2d 528,246 Ala. 363 |
| Decision Date | 11 January 1945 |
| Docket Number | 6 Div. 260. |
| Parties | REEDY v. STATE. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Alabama |
Rehearing Denied Feb. 1, 1945.
W E. Brobston, of Bessemer, for appellant.
Wm N. McQueen, Acting Atty. Gen., and John O. Harris, Asst Atty. Gen., for the State.
The following charges were refused to defendant:
'1. A failure of assaulted party to make complaint recently after alleged rape, opportunity being present, casts a suspicion on the bona fides of the charge but does not disprove it.
'2. If the jury believe prosecutrix had opportunity to make complaint of alleged assault and failed to do so at the first reasonable opportunity casts a suspicion on the bona fides of the charge.
'25 Gentlemen of the jury, if the defendants or either of them has proven to your reasonable satisfaction that he is a person of unsound mind, then you cannot convict that defendant as charged in the indictment.'
Daniel F. Reedy appeals from a death sentence following conviction of rape.
The main question presented for consideration arises under the issue of insanity which was interposed by the usual special plea, so only reference to the facts as are necessary to this consideration will be indulged in.
Reedy and his codefendant, Hockenberry, nineteen and twenty years of age respectively, after having 'mugged and slugged' (Reedy's expression) the hospital guard, escaped from the Gallinger Municipal Hospital, Washington, D. C., February 1, 1944, stole an automobile and made their way through several southern states to New Orleans, Louisiana, and back through Mississippi to Birmingham, Alabama, where on February 11, 1944, they abducted Mrs.
Pearl Brasher, transported her in her own automobile to an isolated place near Bessemer, Alabama, and there robbed and raped her, then murderously attacked her with knives and left her for dead. Their eleven days' peregrination thus detailed was attended with a trail of various crimes, such as automobile thefts and purse-snatching to accommodate their desire for travel, and assaults and attempted assaults on females to satisfy their natural lust in this regard. This all appears from their several voluntary confessions made after their arrest, February 12th.
Other than the various criminal acts--certainly indicative of abnormality, but not uncommon to some criminals--there is nothing in the record evidencing the slightest tinge of mental unsoundness, except the testimony, later to be discussed, of experienced Washington psychiatrists, who knew the two while in the hospital there. On the contrary, the entire evidence, including the several confessions, other than this expert testimony, points clearly to their sanity, and reflects only the action of two young anti-socials on a rampage of crime and lust, perpetrated with superior dexterity, evincing the usual high cunning of the habitual criminal.
It is contended for this defendant that error prevailed in the action of the trial judge in refusing to appoint a sanity commission or to order a sanity hearing for him as is provided by § 428, Title 15, Code of 1940. Application to this end was made by defendant prior to trial and also pending it upon resting the case, thereby invoking the ruling complained of.
The pertinent provision of said section, 'if any person * * * under indictment * * * appears to be insane, the judge * * * must institute a careful investigation' into such person's sanity, is not mandatory but invokes discretionary action on the part of the judge. Such has been the holding as to§ 425 of said Title (substantially an analogous statute) where the provision is that 'it shall be the duty of the presiding judge' to have the defendant transmitted to the Alabama Insane Hospital for observation, examination, etc. Burns v. State, Ala.Sup., 19 So.2d 450(16).
Like construction has been placed upon § 426 of said Title where he duty is enjoined upon the trial court to inquire into the sanity of any person held in confinement under a felony indictment. Whitfield v. State, 236 Ala. 312, 182 So. 42; Rohn v. State, 186 Ala. 5, 65 So. 42; Granberry v. State, 184 Ala. 5, 63 So. 975.
The holding, therefore, must be that action under said § 428, looking to a preliminary inquiry into the defendant's mental condition, is vested in the sound discretion of the court.
But it is asserted that the court grossly and erroneously abused his discretion in this regard. Counsel argue that the insanity of the defendant was so clearly established by the depositions of the Washington alienists, which were submitted to the judge in support of the application for a sanity hearing, it was his manifest duty to order the inquiry.
This contention is unsustainable, other reasons aside, because inquiry into the defendant's mental condition is invited under the section if he presently 'appears to be insane' after having been indicted. The record is entirely devoid of proof supporting such a thesis. On the contrary, the depositions referred to establish that when Reedy escaped from the hospital he was not of unsound mind, could distinguish between right and wrong as applied to rape and similar offenses (R. 250) and 'was responsible for his acts' (R. 251). We cannot assume without proof that his condition was otherwise eleven days later when the crime was committed or, thereafter, at the time of trial.
Similar rationale should dispose of the argument for error in the refusal of a directed verdict and the denial of a new trial, premised on the contended insanity of the defendant at the time of the commission of the crime. The defense of insanity must be clearly proved to the reasonable satisfaction of the jury and the burden is on defendant to do so. Code 1940, Title 15, § 422; Boyle v. State, 229 Ala. 212, 154 So. 575; Lee v. State, Ala.Sup., 20 So.2d 471. Counsel seem to confuse the defendant's moral obliquity with that insanity which in law will excuse a person of crime. The rule of criminal responsibility has long been established and adhered to in this state. Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 2 So. 854, 60 Am.Rep. 193. It is firmly established that there is no recognition in our law of emotional insanity as an excuse for crime. Coffey v. State, 244 Ala. 514, 14 So.2d 122; 6 Ala.Dig., Criminal Law, k51. And much force must be conceded to the conclusion that the act in question was the outgrowth of evil emotions engendered by a long series of juvenile delinquencies and anti-social conduct.
In the absence of proof of insanity as will excuse him of crime, we may assume his mental condition on February 11th, when the offense was committed, to have been the same as on February 1st, when he escaped from confinement. It clearly appears from the depositions of his expert witnesses that this condition was merely psychopathic. He is described in the depositions as a 'psychopathic personality,' which is another way of designating a disordered personality, anti-social and criminal in tendency, superinduced by environment, long juvenile delinquency, etc.
Dr. Corretti, defense witness and on the hospital staff and a psychiatrist of thirteen years' experience, in announcing his conclusion that when accused escaped 'he was of sound mind' and 'responsible for his acts,' testified that 'Daniel F. Reedy is essentially a psychopathic personality, a psychiatric term employed to describe those persons who are essentially unstable, inadequate, frequently anti-social individuals who are immature emotionally, who have poor judgment, who are impulsive, and who do not adjust readily to their surroundings.'
Dr. Joseph Gilbert, alienist and psychiatrist for the District of Columbia and chief of the Psychiatric Division of the hospital, with twenty-five years' experience, deposed similarly. It was his opinion also that on February 1, 1944, Reedy's condition was that of a psychopathic personality, described by him as
Neither of the two alienists was willing to substantiate the plea of insanity by any stronger proof than that such was Reedy's mental status on February 1st, nor would either opine what his mental condition was on February 11th, when the crime was committed.
This evidence falls far short of clearly establishing that at the time of the commission of the crime the defendant was afflicted with a diseased mind to the extent that (1) he did not know right from wrong as applied to the particular act in...
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Duncan v. State
...as tending to illustrate the gravity of the assault. By analogy see Johnson v. State, 272 Ala. 633, 133 So.2d 53(4); Reedy v. State, 246 Ala. 363(10), 20 So.2d 528.' (273 Ala. 551, 142 So.2d This is a voluminous record, consisting of three large volumes. We have not in this opinion treated ......
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State v. Goyet
...enlarge its rule to include one who has a psychopathic personality as insane, still adhering to the right and wrong rule. Reed v. State, 246 Ala. 363, 20 So.2d 528, 531. A subnormal mentality is not a defense to a charge of crime unless the accused is by reason thereof unable to distinguish......
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Aaron v. State
...v. State, 257 Ala. 322, 58 So.2d 623, and cases cited. Like construction has been placed upon § 428, Title 15, Code 1940. Reedy v. State, 246 Ala. 363, 20 So.2d 528. We do not think it improper to point out our disagreement with the position taken by the Solicitor to the effect that the ini......
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Barbour v. State
...emotional or moral insanity as an excuse for crime. Wingard v. State, supra; Coffey v. State, 244 Ala. 514, 14 So.2d 122; Reedy v. State, 246 Ala. 363, 20 So.2d 528. Furthermore more temporary mania not the result of a disease of the mind does not constitute insanity. Braham v. State, 143 A......