Bailey v. Verizon Communications, Inc.

• Citation: 544 F.Supp.2d 33
• Decision Date: 14 April 2008
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 07-1494 (RCL).
• Parties: Ivy BAILEY, Plaintiff, v. VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

544 F.Supp.2d 33

Ivy BAILEY, Plaintiff, v. VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS INC., Defendant.

Civil Action No. 07-1494 (RCL).

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

April 14, 2008.

Ivy Bailey, Windsor, PA, pro se.

Jacqueline M. Holmes, Jones Day, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ROYCE C. LAMBERTH, District Judge.

Now before the Court comes defendant Verizon Communications Inc.'s motion [3] to dismiss. Upon full consideration of the motion, plaintiffs opposition, the reply, the entire record herein, and applicable law, the Court GRANTED defendant's motion in an Order [9] dated March 31, 2008. The reasons for the Court's Order are set forth below.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was employed as an executive secretary within MCI's Law and Public Policy Department from 2001 until accepting a severance package in 2006. (See Compl. ¶ 3.) Defendant Verizon acquired MCI in 2006. (See id. ¶ 2.) At some time during plaintiffs employment, MCI entered into a contract for legal services with the law firm of Proskauer Rose LLP ("Proskauer"). (See id. ¶¶ 6-7.) According to plaintiff, she had ethical concerns about this contract because her direct supervisor Harvey Rumeld had a brother, Myron Rumeld, who was a partner at Proskauer. (See id. ¶¶ 9-10.) Plaintiff's suspicions were apparently strengthened when she overheard Verizon attorney Kathleen Tremblay complain about Proskauer. (See id. ¶¶ 13-14.) At some point, plaintiff brought up her concerns to Harvey Rumeld, who was allegedly unresponsive to her. (See id. ¶ 17.) Plaintiff asserts that she then was subject to a hostile work environment, racially offensive comments, and sexually suggestive innuendo. (See id. ¶ 16.) Plaintiff later revealed her concerns to Verizon Executive Vice-President of Ethics, Nancy Higgins. (See id. ¶ 18.) Plaintiff contends that Ms. Higgens was also unresponsive to her complaints. (See id. ¶ 19.)

On February 10, 2006, shortly after Verizon's acquisition of MCI, plaintiff accepted a severance package from Verizon in exchange for signing a separation agreement and release, which set an effective date of February 1, 2006 for plaintiffs termination. (See General Release Agmt., Ex. 1 to Holmes Decl.) According to the agreement, plaintiff received a severance payment of $6,658.97 and agreed to "release and forever discharge [defendant] ... from any and all claims, demands, attorney's fees, damages or liability of any nature whatsoever ... which Employee may have which arise out of, concern or relate in any way to Employee's employment with [defendant]...." (Id. at ¶ d.) Plaintiff further agreed to release defendant from all claims arising under state or federal law and specifically agreed to release defendant from all Title VII claims. (See id.)

On December 18, 2006, plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (See EEOC Charge, Ex. 2 to Holmes Decl.) This charge alleged only age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"). (See id.) On February 23, 2007, the EEOC dismissed plaintiffs charge and issued a notice to plaintiff of her right to sue within ninety days of the notice. (See EEOC Notice, Ex. 3 to Holmes Decl.) However, due to an EEOC administrative error, this notice was not mailed to plaintiff until April 20, 2007. (See Ltr. from EEOC to Bailey, Ex. 4 to Opp.)

On July 19, 2007, plaintiff filed this suit as a pro se litigant in District of Columbia Superior Court. Plaintiff's complaint seeks relief "for acts of retaliation and the creation of a hostile work environment" that has "caused plaintiff considerable pain and suffering." Defendant removed the action to this Court on August 20, 2007, and asks the Court to dismiss this case pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard

Defendant moves to dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. When a party files a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), "the plaintiff[] bear[s] the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction." Biton v. Palestinian Interim Self-Gov't Autk, 310 F.Supp.2d 172, 176 (D.D.C.2004). A court considering a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction must construe plaintiffs' complaint in plaintiffs' favor, accepting all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged. Jerome Stevens Pharms., Inc. v. FDA, 402 F.3d 1249, 1253 (D.C.Cir.2005).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), this Court will dismiss a claim if the plaintiff fails to plead "enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1974, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). The complaint need only set forth a short and plain statement of the claim, giving the defendant fair notice of the claim and the grounds upon which it rests. Kingman Park Civic Ass'n v. Williams, 348 F.3d 1033, 1040 (D.C.Cir. 2003) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). This Court must construe the allegations and facts in the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and must grant the plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged. Barr v. Clinton, 370 F.3d 1196, 1199 (D.C.Cir.2004) (citing Kowal v. MCCommc'ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C.Cir.1994)). However, the Court need not accept asserted inferences or conclusory allegations that are unsupported by the facts set forth in the complaint. Kowal, 16 F.3d at 1276.

B. Plaintiff's Claim Must Be Dismissed

Construing plaintiff's complaint in a light most favorable to her, she has attempted to state discrimination causes of action under Title VII and the District of Columbia Human Rights Act ("DCHRA"), and a wrongful termination claim based on her voicing concerns over the Proskauer contract. For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that each of plaintiffs claims must be dismissed.

1. Separation Agreement and Release

Plaintiff's release agreement is governed by Delaware state law. (See General Release Agmt. ¶ 1, Ex. 1 to Holmes Decl.) "Under Delaware law, a release is valid and binding when there has been a meeting of the minds of the parties, when the release is supported by consideration, and where there has been no fraud, misrepresentation, mistake, duress, or undue influence." Fox v. Rodel, Inc., No. 98-531, 1999 WL 588293, at *8 (D.Del. July 14, 1999) (citing Del. Lumber & Milwork, Inc. v. Anecon Constr. Co., No 9306-011, 1996 WL 280781, at *2 (Del.Super.Ct. April 19, 1996)). Further, when "the release is clear and unambiguous and supported by consideration, it only will be set aside where there is fraud, duress, coercion, or mutual mistake...." Edge of the Woods v. Wilmington Savings Fund Soc'y, FSB, No. 97C-09-281, 2001 WL 946521, at *4 (Del.Super.Ct. Aug. 16, 2001). Here, the release's language is unambiguously general: it is titled "General Release Agreement" and plaintiff agreed to "release and forever discharge [defendant] ... from any and all claims...." The requirement of consideration is also satisfied because plaintiff received a severance package — including a $6,658.97 payment — in exchange for her release. Yet, plaintiff contends that she entered the release under mistake and economic duress.

When construing allegations in a light most favorable to plaintiff, the Court finds that she has not sufficiently asserted the presence of mistake or duress that would render the release invalid. First, in claiming mistake, plaintiff contends that despite signing the agreement stating that she would "release and forever discharge [defendant] ... from any and all claims," she was unaware that the release would prevent her from bringing suit. (See Opp. at 1.) Plaintiff alleges that she relied on an EEOC officer's assurance that the release would not affect her ability to bring suit against defendant Verizon. (See id.) However, merely asserting that one was unaware of all the legal consequences of a release is not a mistake that would free that party from operation of the release. See Judge Trucking Co. v. Estate of Cooper, No. 92C-03-041, 1994 WL 680039, at *4-5 (Del.Super.Ct. Sept. 29, 1994) (holding that courts do not provide relief for such misunderstandings, which are considered mistakes of law); see also 76 C.J.S. Release § 25 (2007) (stating that "a releasor cannot escape from the effects of his or her agreement, in whole or in part, by merely showing that he or she was mistaken as to the law, or as to the legal import and effect of the terms used"). Plaintiff's alleged mistake is merely a unilateral mistake of law for which this Court is unable to provide relief. Further, plaintiffs reliance on the purported statement of an EEOC officer — a third party — does not give rise to any claim of fraudulent inducement against defendant because plaintiff does not allege that she relied upon any such false assurance made by defendant.

Second, plaintiffs claim of economic duress must fail because plaintiff has not alleged the three elements that constitute economic duress: "(1) a `wrongful act,' (2) which overcomes the will of the aggrieved party, (3) who has no adequate legal remedy to protect himself." See Block Fin. Corp. v. Inisoft Corp., 2006 WL 3240010, at *5 (Del.Super.Ct. Oct. 30, 2006) (citation omitted). To establish economic duress, a plaintiff must show that she was deprived of her free will through wrongful acts directly against her business interest. Id. Here, plaintiff states that she was subject to economic duress because she was unable to pay her mortgage and other bills at the time of signing the release. Such an assertion is not sufficient to plead economic duress.

Because of plaintiffs signed release and her...