Bain v. Cal. Teachers Ass'n

• Decision Date: 28 September 2015
• Docket Number: 2:15–cv–02465–SVW–AJW
• Citation: 156 F.Supp.3d 1142
• Court: U.S. District Court — Central District of California
• Parties: April Bain et al. v. California Teachers Association et al.

156 F.Supp.3d 1142

April Bain et al.

v.California Teachers Association et al.

2:15–cv–02465–SVW–AJW

United States District Court, C.D. California.

Signed September 28, 2015

Joshua S. Lipshutz, Joanna L. Powell, Gibson Dunn and Crutcher LLP, San Francisco, CA, Marcellus A. McRae, Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr, Gibson Dunn and Crutcher LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiff.

Alice O'Brien, Eric A. Harrington, Derrick R. Ward, Jason Walta, National Education Association, David J. Strom, American Federation of Teachers, Washington, DC, Jacob F. Rukeyser, Laura P. Juran, California Teachers Association, Burlingame, CA, Jacob James White, Weinberg Roger and Rosenfeld, Michael Eldredge Plank, Holguin Garfield Martinez and Quinonez APLC, Barrett K. Green, Littler Mendelson PC, Los Angeles, CA, Richa Amar, California Teachers Association, Santa Fe Springs, CA, David A. Rosenfeld, Jannah V. Manansala, Stewart Weinberg, Weinberg Roger and Rosenfeld APC, Alameda, CA, Jesus E. Quinonez, Bush Gottlieb, ALC, Glendale, CA, Michael C. Wenzel, Bertrand Fox Elliot Oshman and Wenzel, San Francisco, CA, Sue Ann Salmon Evans, Dannis Woliver Kelley, Candace M. Bandoian, Dannis Woliver Kelley, Ellen C. Wu, Long Beach, CA for Defendant.

Proceedings : IN CHAMBERS ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS [75]

STEPHEN V. WILSON

, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Background

On April 3, 2015, four dues-paying members of public school teachers' unions (“Plaintiffs”) filed suit against teachers' unions and school superintendents (“Defendants”). (Compl.¶¶ 21–34.) In their first amended complaint (“FAC”), Plaintiffs allege that they are “effectively compelled” to relinquish their First Amendment right not to speak because they cannot enjoy substantial employment-related benefits and union voting rights without making contributions that fund the unions' political and ideological activities. (See FAC ¶¶ 4–17.)

On July 17, 2015, Defendants moved to dismiss the FAC for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted. (Dkt.75.) Defendants argue: (1) no First Amendment violation can result from internal union decisions because that is not state action; (2) even if there is a state action, pressure to join or remain in a union does not amount to an unconstitutional condition and; (3) Plaintiffs' relief sought would violate Defendants' First Amendment rights by hindering their right of association through their right of self-governance. (See id. at 7–24.)

For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants the Defendants' motion to dismiss without prejudice and leave to amend within 30 days of this order.

Legal Standard

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the legal sufficiency of the claims stated in the complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6)

. To survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff's complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. A complaint that offers mere “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. ; see also

Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir.2009) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ).

In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion, a court “must accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Retail Prop. Trust v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 768 F.3d 938, 945 (9th Cir.2014). Thus, “[w]hile legal conclusions can provide the complaint's framework, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

Where a complaint is dismissed, “leave to amend should be granted ‘unless the court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.’ ” DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir.1992)

(quoting Schreiber Distrib.

Co. v. Serv–Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir.1986) ). “In the absence of any apparent or declared reason—such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.—the leave sought should, as the rules require, be ‘freely given.’ ” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962)

; see also

Sharkey v. O'Neal, 778 F.3d 767, 774 (9th Cir.2015) (abuse of discretion to not apply Foman factors).

Factual Allegations

Plaintiffs allege that the State of California and teachers' unions effectively compel them to join unions and that the unions require them to contribute to political and ideological expenditures as a condition of membership. (FAC ¶¶ 4–5.)

Exclusive Bargaining Representative

Plaintiffs argue that the State has created a legal framework that has foreseeably enabled teachers' unions to compel contributions used for political and ideological expenditures. California law provides that a union may become the exclusive bargaining representative for public school employees after it submits proof that the majority of employees in a bargaining unit wish to be represented exclusively by the union.¹ (Id. ¶ 37.) As the exclusive bargaining representative, a union may only bargain over the “terms and conditions of employment.” (Id. ) The terms and conditions of employment include: wages, hours of employment, health and welfare benefits, leave, transfer and reassignment policies, safety conditions of employment, class size, procedures to be used for the evaluation of employees, and procedures to be used for processing grievances.² (Id. ¶ 38.) When an entity is designated the exclusive bargaining representative, it has a duty to fairly represent each employee in matters of collective bargaining. (Id. ¶ 37.)

Agency–Shop Provision

After a union is designated an exclusive bargaining representative, it is allowed to enter an agency-shop arrangement with individual school districts.³ (Id. ¶ 8, 40.)

State law allows exclusive bargaining representatives to require all teachers in their district to either join the union or pay a fair share service fee.⁴ (See id. ) This puts teachers to a choice: (1) become a member of the union and pay “chargeable” and “non-chargeable” dues, or (2) become a nonmember and pay only “chargeable” fees. (Id. ¶ 40.) Only nonmembers must receive a notice that states the percentage of fees that are “non-chargeable” and they may opt out of paying those fees. (Id. ¶ 41.) There is no provision of law that allows members to opt out of “non-chargeable” fees, including on fees used for political and ideological expenditures. (Id. ¶ 42.) In fact, the unions are authorized by law to have dues and fees deducted directly from an employee's paycheck. (Id. ¶ 42, 66–67.)

Membership Benefits

There are significant benefits to union membership that are not available to nonmembers. Many employment-related benefits are conditioned on union membership and therefore induce teachers to become or remain union members. (Id. ¶ 43.) Examples of employment-related benefits provided directly by teachers' unions include: disability insurance, free legal representation, life insurance, death and dismemberment benefits, and disaster relief. (Id. ¶¶ 44, 47–52.) In some instances, the unions provide member benefits even though they are authorized to negotiate for equivalent benefits through collective bargaining. For instance, school districts can only participate in California State Disability Insurance and Paid Family leave programs through a collectively bargained agreement. (Id. ¶ 45.) Therefore, unions effectively have a veto on school district participation and have opted to provide disability insurance and maternity benefits directly to their members. (Id. ¶ 46.) Unions tout these exclusive employment-related benefits to deter teachers from exercising their First Amendment rights. (Id. ¶ 53.) Communications provided to nonmembers inform teachers of all the benefits that they could receive if they opted in to union membership. (Id. ¶ 53–55.) Unions train local leaders on how to “convert agency-fee payers to members” and plan to expand their benefits to further expand the disparity in benefits between member and nonmembers. (Id. ¶¶ 56–57.)

Union membership also allows for voting rights. Nonmembers are unable to vote in union votes, based on the rules of some unions. (Id. ¶ 58.) This includes voting on matters that directly implicate collective bargaining interests. (Id. ) This is a feature of membership that is used to deter teachers from opting out of membership. (Id. )

Predictable Consequences of State Actions

Plaintiffs argue that the state law and union practices predictably lead to coerced political expenditures. (Id. ¶ 60.) The State is responsible for determining the matters that are subject to collective bargaining. (Id. ¶ 64.) The State has, through local school districts, entered into collective bargaining agreements with unions that require teachers to choose between non-membership and membership that includes expenditures on political and ideological expression.⁵ (Id. ¶ 65.) The State deducts “chargeable” and “non-chargeable” dues directly from teachers' paychecks and gives them to the unions. (Id. ¶ 66–67.) Further, the State allows unions to bundle...