Baird v. Connell

• Decision Date: 15 October 1903
• Parties: MARGARET BAIRD, Appellant, v. HERBERT C. CONNELL, JOSEPH SHUISKI, SHELDON BANK, AND LOWELL MORSE AND WIFE, Appellees
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

96 N.W. 863

121 Iowa 278

MARGARET BAIRD, Appellant, v. HERBERT C. CONNELL, JOSEPH SHUISKI, SHELDON BANK, AND LOWELL MORSE AND WIFE, Appellees

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

October 15, 1903

Appeal from Sioux District Court.--HON. GEO. W. WAKEFIELD, Judge.

SUIT in equity to set aside a conveyance, for redemption of certain lands, and to quiet plaintiff's title thereto. Trial to the court. Decree for defendants, and plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

I. S Struble and A. K. Webb for appellant.

W. D Boies for appellees.

OPINION

DEEMER, J.

The property in controversy was purchased by plaintiff, who was the wife of S. B. Baird, in the year 1889, from one H. C. Connell, who executed and delivered to her a bond for a deed. There was a mortgage on the property to one Ormsby for the sum of $ 1,000, which plaintiff assumed and agreed to pay. The plaintiff and her then husband took possession of the property, and used and occupied the same until the year 1893, when plaintiff removed therefrom, and went to live with her daughter, with whom she lived until the year 1894, when she moved to Story county, Iowa. The Ormsby mortgage matured some time in the latter part of the year 1890, and in the early part of that year plaintiff's husband made arrangements with the Sheldon Bank to take up the mortgage, and as security therefor was to procure a deed from Connell running directly to the bank. This was consummated by the execution of a deed from Connell and wife to the bank under date of November 24, 1890. Thereafter, and on December 17, 1891, Baird and wife also executed a quitclaim deed of the property to the bank. This the plaintiff claims was also intended as security for the amount of the advancement to Ormsby and a small indebtedness of S. B. Baird. There is a dispute regarding the character of this conveyance, and we shall have more to say of it during the course of this opinion. Baird and his wife did not get along pleasantly, and on December 17th they agreed to separate, and entered into a written contract of separation, the material parts of which are as follows: "S. B. Baird and M. J. Baird, his wife, having concluded and agreed to live separate and apart the one from the other, make the following agreement in relation to their property: M. J. Baird is to have all the household furniture in the house occupied by them in Boyden, Iowa two bedsteads, mattresses, springs, and pillows upon the same, two pairs of blankets, one double lounge, one wash stand, two pitchers, two wash bowls, one extension table, all the dishes, two carpets, one piece of ten yards of new carpet, two feather beds, one center table, one small rocking chair, six double chairs, half of the potatoes in the cellar, two cows, one red without horns, the other brindle cow with horns--and two pigs. The said S. B. Baird is to have the balance of the property and furniture, and this is to be regarded as a final settlement of their property rights and interest and neither is to have hereafter any interest whatsoever in the property of the other; nor is either to be liable for the support or maintenance of the other, and they each agree and do relinquish all claim to the other's property. [Signed] S. B. Baird. M. J. Baird."

They did not long remain apart, but after a short time resumed their former relations, which continued in a fitful sort of a way until about the year 1893, when they again separated, which separation was final. In October of the year 1895 plaintiff obtained a divorce from her husband in the district court of Story county, Iowa and in that proceeding was awarded alimony in the sum of $ 600. In the latter part of the year 1893 S. B. Baird began negotiations with defendant Morse to sell or trade him the property in dispute, which finally culminated in a contract of exchange, and the execution of a special warranty deed by the Sheldon Bank to Morse under date of January 1, 1894. Before bringing her suit for divorce in Story county, plaintiff commenced this action, which is to set aside the deed from the bank to Morse, to redeem the property from the bank's claim, for an accounting of the rents and profits, and to quiet plaintiff's title in and to the property. The defendant Connell filed a disclaimer, and is consequently out of the case. The defendant Sheldon Bank does not seem to have been more than a nominal party for the reason, no doubt, that it has received its money, and is indifferent as to the result of the controversy. The defendants Morse answered the petition, setting forth many defense, the more important of which were that they purchased the property for a valuable consideration from the holder of the legal title, without any knowledge or notice of the plaintiff's claim; second, that plaintiff parted with all her interest in the property at the time of her first separation from her husband; third, that plaintiff's claim to the property was adjudicated in the divorce proceedings in the Story county district court; and, fourth, an estoppel growing out of plaintiff's conduct with reference to the property. We shall notice these defenses as we proceed.

Having joined with her husband in the conveyance of the property to the bank, it will be observed that on the face of the records plaintiff has no standing in court. Defendants Morse have a clear paper title running from the government through certain mesne conveyances to Connell, from Connell to the bank, and from the bank to Morse. The bond for a deed has been performed by these conveyances, and whatever interest Mrs. Baird had in the property was ostensibly transferred to the bank by the quitclaim deed from Baird and wife. But it is conceded that these conveyances to the bank, except the one from Baird and wife, were for security only, and should, therefore, be treated, so far as this litigation is concerned, as mortgages. But, as plaintiff joined with her husband in the conveyance to the bank, she must show that this also was intended as security, else her case must fail. This presents one of the controlling questions in the case, and, if decided adversely to plaintiff, will end her case.

It will be observed that this deed was made on the same day as the separation agreement, from which we have quoted. That agreement does not in express terms refer to the property in dispute, but the evidence leaves no doubt as to the character of the transaction. Plaintiff herself testified as follows: "Baird and I had separated, and had entered into a written contract of separation about December 17, 1891. Exhibit five is that contract, and that is my signature. On that same day Baird and I had an oral agreement as to what he should pay me for my interest in the property in controversy under the terms of our separation agreement. We had a talk a few days before December 17, 1891, and we went to Sheldon December 17th, to settle up the matter. He made a proposition that I could take one thousand ($ 1,000.00) dollars or the property. That was in view of our separation, and that agreement was carried out at Sheldon December 17, 1891. He paid me eleven hundred ($ 1,100.00) dollars for my interest in the property." This is fully corroborated by the representative of the bank, who testified: "She accepted from S. B. Baird in the sum of eleven hundred ($ 1,100.00) dollars. At the time of the payment of the eleven hundred ($ 1,100) dollars to Mrs. Baird by Mr. Baird, there was a deed given to them by Sheldon Bank covering the property in controversy. We were to hold it as security for the eleven hundred seventy-four dollars twenty-five cents ($ 1,174.25) which was to be paid by Baird, and after that was paid we were to deed it to any party designated by him. The reason this quitclaim deed was executed was, I thought we wouldn't have first-class title unless we had a deed direct from Mrs. Baird; therefore I demanded a quitclaim deed from her to clear the title. I took this deed with the understanding on my part that Mrs. Baird was relinquishing all her right and title to the land in controversy by reason of the payment of the eleven hundred ($ 1,100) dollars to her by Mr. Baird. On this same day, December 17, 1891, I rented the premises other for one hundred twenty ($ 120) dollars, which she paid in cash. I gave Mr. Baird credit for the one hundred twenty ($ 120) dollars paid by her. I rented these premises to Mrs. Baird for the benefit of Mr. Baird, and he received the proceeds. Lowell Morse paid me the one thousand ($ 1,000.00) dollars due upon the Ormsby mortgage. I deeded the premises to Lowell Morse at Mr. Baird's instance. I think I never had any talk with Mrs. Baird about the ownership or the title from December 17, 1891, until I deeded this property to Lowell Morse, on January 1, 1894." This, then, was the real agreement between the parties, and it is manifestly conclusive of the case, unless it be for certain matters relied upon by plaintiff, which are said to abrogate and nullify the agreement.

It goes without saying that an agreement between husband and wife for future separation is contrary to public policy, and is therefore void; and it is also true that, when property is owned by husband or wife, the other has no interest therein which can be the subject of contract between them. Code section 3154. But it is just as true that this section relates to the interest which the husband or wife has in the lands of the other which arises out of or is created by the marriage relation. It has no application to any property interest which the husband or wife may have in the land of the other based upon contracts with third persons, or derived from sources other than the marriage relation. Baxter v. Hecht, 98 Iowa 531, 67 N.W. 407. Indeed, section 3157 of the Code expressly provides that a conveyance,...