Baird v. Maher
| Decision Date | 05 March 1947 |
| Docket Number | Motion No. 443. |
| Citation | 316 Mich. 657,26 N.W.2d 346 |
| Parties | BAIRD et al. v. MAHER et al. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Original proceeding in mandamus by Andrew C. Baird and others against the Honorable John J. Maher and others, constituting the Election Commission of the City of Detroit.
Writ issued.
We issued an order directing the defendant election commission to show cause why a writ of mandamus should not be issued directing the defendant commission to refrain from placing the designation ‘common pleas judge’ under the names of George T. Cartwright and Emmanuel N. Karay as candidates for said office, on the ballots to be used at the biennial spring election in Detroit, April 7, 1947. Return has been made and arguments heard in open court.
Plaintiffs are duly nominated candidates for the office of judge of the common pleas court of the city of Detroit, to be voted on at said election. They are not present incumbents in said office. George T. Cartwright and Emmanuel N. Karay are also duly nominated candidates for said office, to be voted on at said election. They are present incumbents by virtue of appointment by the governor, and now seek election by ballot for the first time, to continue in office by virtue of election.
Plaintiffs insist that Cartwright and Karay are not entitled to have the designation ‘common pleas judge’ printed on the ballots to be used at said election in connection with their names. Plaintiffs demanded of the defendant election commission that such designation be omitted, which demand was refused. The present proceeding is to compel the defendant commission to refrain from printing such designation of office on the ballot under the names of Cartwright and Karay. Imminence of the impending election and the short period of time for printing and distributing the ballots requires a prompt decision.
At the outset it is obvious that the constitutional provision for nonpartisan election of judges and judicial officers does not apply. It refers to ‘justices of the supreme court, judges of the circuit court, judges of probate courts and all county judicial officers provided for by the legislature under section 21 of article VII of the constitution.’ Mich.Const.(1908), art. 7, § 23, adopted April 3, 1939. The common pleas court is a municipal court of the city of Detroit and its judges are not county judicial officers within the inclusion of said constitutional amendment. Said common pleas court comes into being by virtue of Act No. 260, Pub.Acts 1929, and amendments thereto (Stat.Ann.1946 Cum.Supp. § 27.3651 et seq.), which provide:
In any city which now has a population of over 250,000 inhabitants, the several courts of the justices of the peace of such city, as established and operated under the provisions of any general statute, local or special act, or the provisions of the charter of any such city, are hereby consolidated into one court, which shall be known as the common pleas court of such city.'
Cartwright and Karay were appointed by the governor February 1, 1945, and February 27, 1946, respectively, by virtue of a provision in section 2 of said act (Stat.Ann.1946 Cum.Supp. § 27.3652), as follows:
If Cartwright and Karay have any right to the designation ‘common pleas judge’ under their names on the ballot, it must be as the result of some provision in the above act. The only provision which can be said to apply is in section 2, which governs the appointment and election of common pleas judges, and reads as follows:
‘ Provided, That an incumbent who is a candidate for re-election, may, upon his request in writing have printed below his name the designation, ‘common pleas judge’.'
Cartwright and Karay are incumbents, but are not ‘candidates for reelection.’ That each is ‘an incumbent who is a candidate’ is beyond dispute. The legislature has put into the act ‘an incumbent who is a candidate for reelection.’ It might well have said ‘a candidate to succeed himself,’ or ‘a candidate for election,’ or ‘a candidate at the next election,’ or merely ‘a candidate.’ But ‘for reelection,’ as used in said proviso, has a definite and plain meaning. There was no such provision (for any designation of the ballot) prior to the amendment of the act by Act No. 158, Pub.Acts 1939. The proviso, ‘That an incumbent who is a candidate for re-election, may, upon his request in writing have printed below his name the designation, ‘common pleas judge,” is the only change in section 2 of the act made by said amendment. Under the circumstances, ...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Gardner v. Van Buren Public Schools
...197, 96 N.W.2d 782 (1959); Wyandotte Savings Bank v. State Banking Comm'r, 347 Mich. 33, 78 N.W.2d 612 (1956); Baird v. Detroit Election Comm., 316 Mich. 657, 26 N.W.2d 346 (1947); United Ins. Co. v. Attorney General, 300 Mich. 200; 1 N.W.2d 510 (1942).2 Specifically, the majority explains:......
-
Melia v. Appeal Bd. of Mich. Employment Sec. Commission
...rendered nugatory.' Of like import are: United Insurance Co. v. Attorney General, 300 Mich. 200, 1 N.W.2d 510; Baird v. Detroit Election Commission, 316 Mich. 657, 26 N.W.2d 346. See, also, Williams v. Secretary of State, 338 Mich. 202, 60 N.W.2d The interpretation of section 60(a), as amen......
-
People ex rel. O'Brien v. Society of Good Neighbors
...instant case, it is possible so to do, every pertinent provision of the relevant statute must be given effect. Baird v. Detroit Election Commission, 316 Mich. 657, 26 N.W.2d 346. It follows that the order of the circuit judge dismissing the instant quo warranto proceedings was Appellee in i......