Melia v. Appeal Bd. of Mich. Employment Sec. Commission

• Decision Date: 04 September 1956
• Docket Number: No. 39,39
• Citation: 78 N.W.2d 273,346 Mich. 544
• Parties: Mary E. MELIA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. The APPEAL BOARD OF the MICHIGAN EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION and The Michigan Employment Security Commission, Defendants, and Universal Products Company, Inc., a Delaware corporation, Intervening Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 273

78 N.W.2d 273

346 Mich. 544

Mary E. MELIA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. The APPEAL BOARD OF the MICHIGAN EMPLOYMENT SECURITY

COMMISSION and The Michigan Employment Security

Commission, Defendants,

and

Universal Products Company, Inc., a Delaware corporation,

Intervening Defendant-Appellant.

No. 39.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Sept. 4, 1956.

McClintock, Fulton, Donovan & Waterman, Detroit, for Universal Products Company, Inc., Intervening defendant and appellant.

Zwerdling, Zwerdling, Keith & Livingston, Detroit, for plaintiff-appellee.

A. L. Zwerdling, Detroit, of counsel.

Thomas M. Kavanagh, Atty. Gen., Edmund E. Shepherd, Sol. Gen., Lansing, Arthur W. Brown, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant Commission.

Beaumont, Smith & Harris, Frank E. Cooper, Detroit, for amici curiae.

Before the Entire Bench except REID, J.

CARR, Justice.

The material facts in this case are not in dispute. For some time prior to September 23, 1953, plaintiff was employed by the defendant Universal Products Company, Inc., which was engaged in carrying on business in Dearborn. On the date mentioned plaintiff was laid off for lack of work. Shortly thereafter she filed her claim for benefits under the provisions of the Michigan Employment Security Act. ¹ In accordance with statutory provisions then in effect she was allowed a primary weekly benefit rate of $27 based on 30 credit weeks. The last of the 20 payments then granted was collected on May 14, 1954.

At the legislative session of 1954 section 60 of the act was amended by P.A.1954, No. 197, in such manner as to increase the maximum amount of benefits payable to persons entitled thereto. As so amended, said section C.L.S.1954, § 421.60, read as follows:

'See. 60. (a) If this amendatory act takes effect before May 15, 1954, then each individual for whom there is current an unexpired benefit year established prior to June 27, 1954, shall receive an adjustment reflecting any increase in his weekly benefit rate and/or maximum amount of benefits which will result from applying sections 27 and 50 of this act, as amended, on that portion of his benefit rights which were not exhausted prior to June 27, 1954; and in the case of benefit years established on or after June 27, 1954, the weekly benefit rate and maximum amount of benefits shall be computed in accordance with sections 27 and 50 of this act, as amended. If this amendatory act does not take effect before May 15, 1954, then the provisions of sections 27 and 50 of this act, as amended, relating to the weekly benefit rate and maximum amount of benefits, shall be applicable only to benefit years established after the effective date of this amendatory act.'

Act No. 197 was given immediate effect, and was approved May 7, 1954. On July 2nd following, plaintiff filed a claim for further benefits, relying on the amendment. Her benefit year did not expire until September 25, 1954. Because of the situation in this respect it was, and is, plaintiff's claim, she having failed to obtain employment, that she was entitled to additional benefits in accordance with the amendment. The defendant commission denied the application on the ground that the benefits to which plaintiff was entitled were exhausted prior to June 27, 1954, and that the amendatory act did not entitle her to additional payments. An application for a redetermination was made, with a like result. Thereupon plaintiff appealed to a referee of the commission, before whom proofs were taken, with the result that the commission's action was sustained. The appeal board affirmed the holding of the referee. The proceeding was then reviewed by the circuit court of Wayne County on writ of certiorari, and the order of the appeal board was reversed. Thereupon, on leave granted, the intervening defendant, plaintiff's employer, appealed to this Court, claiming that the circuit judge erred in overruling the appeal board.

The controlling question at issue is the interpretation of section 60 as amended at the 1954 legislative session, above quoted. In considering the matter it must be borne in mind that the duty of the Court is to interpret the statute as we find it. The wisdom of the provision in question in the form in which it was enacted is a matter of legislative responsibility with which courts may not interfere. Michigan & Vicinity Conference Board, International Molders & Foundry Workers Union of North America, A. F. of L. v. Enterprise Foundry Co., 321 Mich. 265, 32 N.W.2d 515. As tersely stated by Chief Justice Butzel in Roosevelt Oil Company v. Secretary of State, 339 Mich. 679, 694, 64 N.W.2d 582, 589, 'It is the function of the court to fairly interpret a statute as it then exists; it is not the function of the court to legislate.'

The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and given effect to the intention of the legislature. If the language of a statutory provision is unambiguous, the intent must be determined accordingly. It is requisite that pertinent provisions of the act be considered together, to the end that the general plan and purpose of the law-making body may be ascertained. All parts of the specific provision to be construed must be given force and effect. This means that no phrase, or clause, or word, may be ignored in determining the construction of such provision. In the early case of People v. Burns, 5 Mich. 114, it was said:

'No rule is better settled than, in construing a statute, effect must be given to every part of it. One part must not be so construed as to render another part nugatory, or of no effect. The same rule applies to words, in construing a sentence.'

Likewise, in Attorney General, ex rel. Zacharias v. Board of Education of City of Detroit, 154 Mich. 584, 118 N.W. 606, 608, the Court accepted with approval the following statement from the opinion filed in the cause by four judges of the Wayne circuit court who heard the case:

"It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that full effect shall be given to every part of the act under consideration. Every clause and every word is presumed to have some force and meaning. No portion should be rendered nugatory.'

Of like import are: United Insurance Co. v. Attorney General, 300 Mich. 200, 1 N.W.2d 510; Baird v. Detroit Election Commission, 316 Mich. 657, 26 N.W.2d 346. See, also, Williams v. Secretary of State, 338 Mich. 202, 60 N.W.2d 910.

The interpretation of section 60(a), as amended by the Act of 1954, which the Michigan employment security commission, the referee, and the appeal board determined to be correct, is clearly stated in the opinion of the referee as follows:

'It should be noted that section 60(a) of the act provides that claimant shall be entitled to additional benefits on that portion of his benefit rights which were not exhausted prior to June 27, 1954. According to the Webster International Dictionary the word 'exhausted' means 'emptied'. Since in this case there were no more benefit rights left prior to June 27, 1954, the benefit rights have been exhausted. The word 'exhausted' is placed in the act for a purpose. If there was an intention on the part of the legislature to allow additional benefits on all claims where the benefit year has not expired before June 27, 1954, there would be no need of placing the word 'exhausted' in the act. The word 'exhausted' was placed in the act for the purpose of denying additional benefits on all claims where the benefit year has not expired before June 27, 1954, and on which claims all benefits allowed have been collected before June 27, 1954. The claimant's benefit rights were exhausted prior to June 27, 1954, within the meaning of the act and it is difficult to see how the act can be interpreted to allow additional benefits after June 27, 1954, when the benefit rights have been previously exhausted. Before the amended act became effective June 27, 1954, the claimant had no right to additional benefits since there was no act effective prior to that day allowing additional benefits. The claimant exhausted her benefits prior to June 27, 1954, the effective date of the amended act, and consequently she would not be entitled to additional benefits under the amended act.'

It is pointed out in the brief filed by the Attorney General's Department on behalf of the defendant commission that the phraseology of the 1954 amendment was not at variance with corresponding language in prior amendments to said section. Thus in P.A.1945, No. 335, the commission was authorized to grant benefits under the amended act to any claimant whose benefit year should begin subsequent to March 31, 1945. It was further declared that:

'With respect to any individual for whom there is current a benefit year, established prior to April 1, 1945, and which has not expired prior to that date, the duration of benefits and the weekly benefit amount as established in the original determination shall be adjusted to permit such individual to receive an increase in his weekly benefit amount and the duration of his benefits on that portion of his benefit rights which were not exhausted prior to April 1, 1945.'

P.A.1949, No. 282, which was given immediate effect and approved June 11, 1949, provided that:

'With respect to any week of unemployment beginning on or after July 3, 1949, an individual for whom there is current an unexpired benefit year established prior to July 3, 1949, shall receive an adjustment of his weekly benefit rate and maximum amount of benefits in accordance with section 27 of this act, as amended, on that portion of his benefit rights which were not exhausted prior to July 3, 1949.'

Practically identical language was used in P.A.1951, No. 251, which amended section 60 in such manner as to provide for a transition from the prior benefit rates to the application of the amended act. It thus appears that in the specific amendment under consideration here the legislature was, in substance, repeating the language of prior amendme...