Baker By and Through Baker v. Eckerd Corp., 97-00286

• Decision Date: 06 August 1997
• Docket Number: No. 97-00286,97-00286
• Citation: 697 So.2d 970
• Parties: 22 Fla. L. Weekly D1966 Alisabeth BAKER By and Through her natural guardian, parent and next best friend, Laura BAKER, Petitioner, v. ECKERD CORPORATION, a foreign corporation, and Robert Simmons, Respondents.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 970

697 So.2d 970

22 Fla. L. Weekly D1966

Alisabeth BAKER By and Through her natural guardian, parent and next best friend, Laura BAKER, Petitioner, v. ECKERD CORPORATION, a foreign corporation, and Robert Simmons, Respondents.

No. 97-00286.

District Court of Appeal of Florida,

Second District.

Aug. 6, 1997.

Mark Norden, P.A., Fort Myers, for Petitioner.

Robert E. Bugg of Park, Bugg, Rodnite, Ossian and Zdravko, P.A., Clearwater, for Respondents.

PER CURIAM.

Alisabeth Baker, by and through her natural guardian, parent, and next best friend, Laura Baker, (hereinafter "Baker"), has filed a petition for writ of certiorari asserting that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law when it granted Eckerd's pretrial motion to compel discovery and denied Baker's related motion for protective order. We have determined that the petition should be granted in part.

The underlying case in this matter is Baker's action for damages against Eckerd Corporation and Eckerd pharmacist, Robert Simmons. In 1991, Simmons allegedly mislabeled a prescription or dispensed improper medication which caused injury to the child, including brain damage. During the discovery process, Eckerd sought all records from the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services referring to the child. In a motion to compel the production of these documents, Eckerd asserted there were occasions when HRS removed the child from her parents' home due to substance abuse and physical abuse. Further, records indicated that the child was kicked in the head by a horse sometime after 1991, and had numerous surgeries upon her brain. Eckerd claimed that, given the allegations of brain damage, information concerning any trauma to the child's head or other abuse which might relate to causation of her injuries was necessary. Baker objected to such production. The trial court granted the motion to compel and denied Baker's motion for protective order, holding that pursuant to section 415.51(5), Florida Statutes (1995), all records relating to the child were to be produced by HRS.

The standard of review for a petition for writ of certiorari is whether the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law. In the case of an order regarding discovery, the trial court has broad discretion. Only when an order allowing discovery constitutes an abuse of discretion which would cause irreparable damage should the ruling be set aside. See American Southern Co. v. Tinter, Inc., 565 So.2d 891 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); Lorei v. Smith, 464 So.2d 1330 (Fla. 2d DCA), review denied, 475 So.2d 695 (Fla.1985).

We hold that the trial court has abused its discretion because it did not consider the privacy protections of section 415.51(2), Florida Statutes (1990). The protection afforded by the statute is applicable to any unfounded reports of child abuse during the time period of June 11, 1990, through the effective date of the amendment to the statute, September 30, 1995. See Ch. 90-50, § 8, at 119, Laws of Fla.; Ch. 95-228, § 46, at 2054, Laws of Fla.

The broad language within section 415.51(5), ¹ granting the authority to the court to order the disclosure of all records and reports of HRS's "child protection team," does not override the separate and express privacy protections for unfounded reports established in the 1990 version of section 415.51(2). See Cebrian v. Klein, 614 So.2d 1209, 1212 (Fla. 4th DCA 199...