Baker v. American Juice, Inc.

• Decision Date: 06 July 1994
• Docket Number: No. 2:93cv262 JM.,2:93cv262 JM.
• Citation: 870 F. Supp. 878
• Parties: Jerry BAKER, Plaintiff, v. AMERICAN JUICE, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana

870 F. Supp. 878

Jerry BAKER, Plaintiff, v. AMERICAN JUICE, INC., Defendant.

No. 2:93cv262 JM.

United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, Hammond Division.

July 6, 1994.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

James R. Oates, Merrillville, IN, for plaintiff.

Robert J. Dignam, Merrillville, IN, Joseph Beckman, Steven H. Adelman and Michael Green, Chicago, IL, for defendant.

ORDER

MOODY, District Judge.

This is a lawsuit that, from the record before the court, should never have been brought. Jerry Baker's lawyer should have known better. Perhaps he did. At any rate, on April 8, 1994, American Juice, Inc. moved for summary judgment. See FED.R.CIV.P. 56. To this date, Baker has not responded to that motion. American Juice's motion is hereby GRANTED. American Juice's motion for attorneys' fees is also GRANTED. See 28 U.S.C. § 1927.

I.

"Summary judgment is appropriate — in fact, is mandated—where there are no disputed issues of material fact and the movant must prevail as a matter of law." Dempsey v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co., 16 F.3d 832, 836 (7th Cir.1994). A non-moving party may not rest on its pleadings to defeat summary judgment. See FED. R.CIV.P. 56(c). Accordingly, where a party fails to oppose a summary judgment motion

the court will assume that the facts as claimed and supported by admissible evidence by the moving party are admitted to exist without controversy.

LOCAL RULE 56.1. The Seventh Circuit recently "endorsed the exacting obligation" this rule imposes on non-moving parties. See Waldridge v. American Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 921 (7th Cir.1994). The appeals court acknowledged that "district courts are not obliged in our adversary system to scour the record looking for factual disputes." Id. at 922. This court will not "scour the record" on Baker's behalf: the court accepts as undisputed American Juice's well-supported factual allegations.

II.

American Juice is a privately owned and operated corporation. Baker worked for American Juice in its Gary, Indiana plant from May, 1988 until June, 1992. Baker Dep. at 25-26; Sherwood Aff. ¶ 2. From September, 1989 until June, 1992, Baker was employed as a "filler operator," a management position not covered by any union contract. Baker Dep. at 25-26.

Baker was not an ideal employee. American Juice has produced more than 17 notifications of disciplinary violations and absenteeism by Baker during his tenure with the company. Baker Dep.Exs. 1-17. American Juice's "Employee Handbook" indicates that there are four levels of rules violation within the company. For a Group I violation, the least serious of these, an employee may be discharged after the fourth infraction. Emp. Handbook at 2. For a Group IV violation, the most serious level of violation, discharge may occur at the first infraction. Emp. Handbook at 2. Most of Baker's violations were for lesser infractions. However, in January, 1992 Baker violated the Group IV rule against disobeying a supervisor. Sherwood Aff. ¶ 4. Rather than fire Baker for that infraction, as the employee handbook provided for, American Juice suspended Baker for three days. Sherwood Aff. ¶ 4. American Juice was not so patient with Baker when, in June, 1992, he again violated the same Group IV rule by thrice refusing to start up a machine that his supervisor asked him to start. See Sherwood Aff. ¶ 4; Baker Dep. at 88. The company had had enough and— "based on the write-up of the latest incident and Baker's entire work record"—Baker was fired. See Sherwood Aff. ¶ 4.

Baker, who is African-American, then filed charges of discrimination with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission "EEOC", ultimately receiving a right-to-sue letter from that agency. Complaint ¶ 6. Baker sued American Juice in state court; American Juice removed the action here. See Baker v. American Juice, No. 93-262, slip. op. at 1-2 (N.D.Ind. Dec. 17, 1993) (denying motion to remand).

III.

Baker's complaint is somewhat disjointed, and implicates numerous legal theories. The complaint suggests violations of the United States and Indiana constitutions, breach of contract, retaliatory discharge, breach of contract, and violations of the federal civil rights laws. American Juice convincingly argues that no triable issue exists under any of these legal theories. Baker, as noted, has not argued otherwise. The court takes up Baker's legal theories in turn.

A. Constitutional violations.

Baker's complaint alleges "the deprivation of rights guaranteed to Baker by the United States Constitution" and "the Constitution of the State of Indiana." Baker has no cause of action against a private entity under either the state or federal constitution. This is a matter of horn-book law. Even passing research on the part of Baker's counsel would have revealed that there was no basis for asserting these legal bases for relief.

With regard to Baker's federal constitutional argument, the Supreme Court made clear long ago that the U.S. Constitution — and specifically the Fourteenth Amendment — "erects no shield against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful." Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13, 68 S.Ct. 836, 842, 92 L.Ed. 1161 (1948). Perhaps this basic constitutional premise led to Baker's blank answer to American Juice's interrogatory — filed in support of summary judgment — that asked Baker to "identify the rights under the United States Constitution ... that were violated by Defendant."

Baker did respond to American Juice's interrogatory vis-a-vis his state constitutional claim. Baker claimed, as he did in his complaint, Complaint ¶ 1, that he was discriminated against by American Juice and that this discrimination violated his liberty interests under Article I of the Indiana Constitution. The Indiana Constitution is no different than the federal constitution, however, in what it defends: i.e., the rights of Indiana's citizens against the governing power of the state. See Lambert v. State Dept. of Highways, 468 N.E.2d 1384, 1387 (Ind.Ct. App.1984) (holding that when the state acts in a proprietary, rather than governing, capacity, that constitutional limitations do not apply); see also Collins v. Day, 604 N.E.2d 647, 650-51 (Ind.Ct.App.1992) (citing Indiana cases that hold there are no practical differences between the equal protection guaranteed under the state versus the federal constitution). Baker, as noted, has not responded to American Juice's arguments, but the court's own research reveals not one reported Indiana case in which a plaintiff brought a claim of private discrimination under the Indiana Constitution.

American Juice is, as a matter of clear law, entitled to judgment on Baker's constitutional claims.

B. Breach of contract.

Baker alleges that "the defendant refused to honor the basic premises of fair dealing and non-discrimination in contracting for the plaintiff's employment in the context of an employee at will and pursuant to the contract between the employer and the employee." Complaint ¶ 3. Giving Baker the benefit of the doubt, this allegation could be construed to allege a breach of contract related to Baker's discharge or a breach relating to his treatment while on the job. In either case, the allegation is frivolous.

Baker has no basis for a breach of contract claim arising from his termination. Subsequent to his September, 1989 promotion, Baker was an at-will employee. See Baker Dep. at 8-9 (union contract no longer applied subsequent to promotion); see also Complaint ¶ 3 (alleging that Baker's relationship with American Juice was "in the context of an employee at will"). An employee-at-will "may be discharged for virtually any reason at any time." Tacket v. Delco Remy, 959 F.2d 650, 653 (7th Cir.1992) (construing Indiana law). Baker's disciplinary record provides more than adequate justification for the termination of his at-will employment.

Baker's at-will status also undercuts any allegation of breach of contract based on an implied covenant of fair, or nondiscriminatory, dealing. Indiana implies no such covenants in an at-will employment context. See Mehling v. Dubois County Farm Bureau Cooperative Ass'n, 601 N.E.2d 5, 9 (Ind.Ct.App.1992); Hamblen v. Danners, Inc., 478 N.E.2d 926, 929 (Ind.Ct.App.1985).

Accordingly, on this theory, too, American Juice is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

C. Retaliatory discharge.

Baker also alleges that American Juice "retaliated against Baker at various and sundry times" when "from January, 1992 to the present and continuing, Baker attempted to exercise his protected and contractual rights to complain and grieve the action taken against his sic." Complaint ¶ 4. It is true that even an at-will employee "cannot be discharged solely for exercising a statutorily conferred right." See Tacket, 959 F.2d at 653 (construing Indiana law). However, there is no evidence that Baker exercised any statutorily provided for grievance procedure prior to his termination. See Sherwood Aff. ¶ 7 ("I am not aware of any complaints made by Jerry Baker to the Unemployment Board of Indiana, the EEOC, or other governmental bodies, until after Baker had been terminated.") It is temporally impossible that Baker's termination was in retaliation for the EEOC charge lodged subsequent to that termination.

In this factual context, Baker's allegation of retaliatory discharge is frivolous and American Juice is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this allegation.

D. The Civil Rights Act.

The meat of Baker's complaint comes in his allegation that "the defendant intentionally isolated sic the laws against discrimination." Complaint ¶ 5. The complaint cites two specific substantive sections of the Civil Rights Act in support of this allegation. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 & 1981. Based on the undisputed record now before the court, summary judgment is mandated on these claims, too.

1. 42 U.S.C. § 1985.

Baker's reliance on § 1985 is clearly misplaced. Section 1985 provides a cause...