Baker v. Baker
Decision Date | 06 April 1940 |
Parties | BAKER v. BAKER. |
Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Calhoun & Matthews, of Memphis, for complainant.
Canada & Russell, of Memphis, for defendant.
This suit was filed by Isabel C. Baker, the widow of T. H. Baker, Sr., deceased, against the executor of his estate and those interested therein as devisees and legatees. The ultimate end sought by the bill was to have established the complainant's right to share in the estate as a dissentient widow according to statutory provisions relating thereto rather than according to the will. As a prerequisite to this relief, it was sought to have set aside for fraud an antenuptial contract that stood in complainant's way and which was entered into by her and her husband after their engagement to marry and before the marriage was consummated; and also to have rescinded a transaction wherein, according to the averments of the bill, the executor, without the knowledge or consent of complainant, deposited to her credit in a bank the sum of $1,000, representing a cash bequest made to her in the will; and taking advantage of her distressed condition and without informing her of her rights and the true condition of the estate, prevailed upon her to sign some kind of instrument in connection with the transaction, of the contents of which she was unaware.
It was alleged that upon learning of her rights she promptly returned the $1,000 or endeavored to do so by sending to the executor her check for that amount drawn on the bank in which he had deposited that sum to her credit. The bill also prayed to have the administration transferred to the Chancery Court and for certain incidental relief that we do not regard as material to any question before us at this time.
The defendants filed a joint and separate answer denying in detail the averments of the bill respecting the alleged fraud both with respect to the procurement of the antenuptial contract and the other transaction above mentioned. They averred that the deceased generously provided for the complainant by leaving her the benefits of an insurance policy whereby she will receive throughout her life the sum of $113.34 per month; and also a cash bequest of $1,000, which the complainant knowingly received from the defendant executor "in full payment of specific cash bequest" made to the complainant in the will of her deceased husband and that she executed her written receipt therefor acknowledging the payment to be for the purpose stated and the acceptance of this bequest the defendants plead "as a bar to this action" upon the theory apparently that the complainant's effort to have the antenuptial contract set aside was an essential step in connection with her dissent from her husband's will and that the acceptance mentioned amounted to an election to take under the will.
As to the effort to set aside the antenuptial contract the defendants also plead that the complainant was estopped by her laches in failing to assert her alleged rights in this connection during the lifetime of her husband.
A jury having been demanded, the case proceeded to trial and at the conclusion of the evidence the chancellor, on motion of the defendants, withdrew the issues from the jury and dismissed the bill. After an unsuccessful motion for a new trial, the complainant appealed in error. There are numerous assignments which do not require separate treatment. Apart from the challenge to the action of the chancellor in withdrawing the issues from the jury, the principal question is with respect to the chancellor's action in excluding complainant's testimony as to certain transactions with, and statements by, her deceased husband as being forbidden by Code, section 9780, set out below.
As developed by the evidence the theory of the effort to set aside the antenuptial contract was primarily that the complainant entered into the agreement in ignorance of the fact that the deceased was a wealthy man and that since the contract was entered into subsequent to their engagement to marry there existed at the time it was made a confidential relationship between the parties and that in view of this fact good faith required that he should have made a full disclosure of his financial circumstances.
At the time of her marriage to the deceased the complainant was a widow about sixty years of age with five grown children. She met the deceased in June, 1933. He also was about sixty years of age and had grown children — three daughters and a son. The parties became engaged in September, 1933, and the marriage was consummated on December 20, 1933. They lived together until Mr. Baker's death on February 16, 1939. No children were born of this union.
The antenuptial contract was entered into on December 14, 1933, was signed by both of the parties, with a witness to their respective signatures, and was apparently prepared by a lawyer.
It may be said at once that the record discloses through correspondence of the deceased and otherwise that at the time of their engagement and prior thereto, and at the time the contract in question was entered into, the complainant had every reason to believe that the deceased was very much in love with her and very determined upon the marriage, and insofar as the present record discloses this feeling was mutual and continued thereafter.
It is a fair inference that the contract was prepared at the instance of the deceased. In any event, the complainant knew nothing about it until it was presented to her by him for her signature.
After referring to the contemplated marriage and reciting that "both are severally possessed of real estate and personal property in his and her own right and each of said parties having children by former marriages, all of said children being possessed of means of support independent of their parents", it was in substance agreed that the marriage should in no way change the legal rights of either of the parties or their children and heirs at law in the property owned by them respectively, and that neither would make any claim of any kind whatsoever to any part or share in the real or personal property of the other.
At the time the contract was entered into, the complainant's property consisted of a house and lot in Memphis valued at about $3,000, against which there was an indebtedness, including taxes secured by liens, of about $1,700, and two lots valued at about $600. It seems that after the marriage, in order to prevent a foreclosure, the house and lot were in some way acquired by the deceased. In any event, he owned it at the time of his death.
At the time the contract was entered into, the deceased was rated as being worth from $200,000 to $250,000 and carried $61,500 of life insurance. He owned 800 shares of stock in the Trenton Cotton Oil Company, shown to be worth at that time about $133 a share. The inventory of his estate showed assets aggregating $176,680.23 with the statement that in the making of the inventory there had been no effort to "place on the above property or establish in any way actual values thereof, etc."
The complainant testified that at the time the contract was signed she knew the deceased owned a home at 1519 Harbert Avenue and that he was interested in the "Trenton Cotton Seed Oil Company"; that she did not know the nature and extent of his interest or its value, and did not know that he was a wealthy man; ; that she had no information from any source regarding his financial worth.
At the conclusion of her examination the following occurred:
In this connection it should be stated that the Mr. Calhoun referred to is a member of the bar and is a brother of the complainant's first husband. The complainant appears to have relied upon him for advice and he is one of her solicitors in this case.
Prior to the marriage, deceased had as stated, owned a home on Harbert Avenue in Memphis worth about $10,000, with furnishings worth an equal amount. After the marriage the parties lived in this residence until the husband's death.
It then developed that the deceased had for a recited consideration of $10...
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