Baker v. Coughlin

• Decision Date: 09 February 1996
• Docket Number: Nos. 952,1203,s. 952
• Citation: 77 F.3d 12
• Parties: Edley BAKER, As Administratrix of the Estate of Willie Baker, Plaintiff-Appellee, Edley Baker, Counter-Defendant, Mark Erhardt, Cross-Claimant, and Mark Erhardt, A Correctional Officer at Lakeview Shock Incarceration Facility; Gilbert Acevedo, A Correctional Sergeant at Lakeview Shock Incarceration Facility; James Cullinan, A Correctional Sergeant at Lakeview Shock Incarceration Facility; John Doe, C.O., a ficticious name, Correctional Officers at Lakeview Shock Incarceration Facility; Douglas Smardz, Correctional Officer; John Attea, Jr., Correctional Officer, Defendants, v. Thomas A. COUGHLIN, III, Commissioner of the New York State Department of Correctional Services; Glen Gord, Deputy Commissioner for Security for the New York State Department of Correctional Services; Robert Greifinger, Deputy Commissioner and Chief Medical Officer for the New York State Department of Correctional Services; Ronald Moscicki, Superintendent of Lakeview Shock Incarceration Facility; Daniel Urbank, A Correctional Officer at Lakeview Shock Incarceration Facility; Jose Galindo, M.D., Medical Director at Lakeview Shock Incarceration Facility; James Steeg, R.N., Nurse Administrator at Lakeview Shock Incarceration Facility; Richard Lester, Regional Health Services Administrator for Lakeview Shock Incarceration Facility, Individually and in their Official Capacities; Catherine Day, R.N., at Lakeview Shock Incarceration Facility, Defendants-Appellants, Mark Erhardt; Gilbert Acevedo; James Cullinan, Counter-Claimants, Thomas A. Coughlin, III; Glen Gord; Robert Greifinger; Ronald Moscicki; Daniel Urbank; Jose Galindo; James Steeg; Richard Lester, Counter-Claimants-Appellants. to 1206, Docket 95-2498, 95-2499, 95-2520, 95-2521 and 95-2549.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

Page 12

77 F.3d 12

Edley BAKER, As Administratrix of the Estate of Willie Baker, Plaintiff-Appellee Edley Baker, Counter-Defendant Mark Erhardt, Cross-Claimant and Mark Erhardt, A Correctional Officer at Lakeview Shock Incarceration Facility; Gilbert Acevedo, A Correctional Sergeant at Lakeview Shock Incarceration Facility; James Cullinan, A Correctional Sergeant at Lakeview Shock Incarceration Facility; John Doe, C.O., a ficticious name Correctional Officers at Lakeview Shock Incarceration Facility; Douglas Smardz, Correctional Officer; John Attea, Jr., Correctional Officer, Defendants, v. Thomas A. COUGHLIN, III, Commissioner of the New York State Department of Correctional Services; Glen Gord, Deputy Commissioner for Security for the New York State Department of Correctional Services; Robert Greifinger, Deputy Commissioner and Chief Medical Officer for the New York State Department of Correctional Services; Ronald Moscicki, Superintendent of Lakeview Shock Incarceration Facility; Daniel Urbank, A Correctional Officer at Lakeview Shock Incarceration Facility; Jose Galindo, M.D., Medical Director at Lakeview Shock Incarceration Facility; James Steeg, R.N., Nurse Administrator at Lakeview Shock Incarceration Facility; Richard Lester, Regional Health Services Administrator for Lakeview Shock Incarceration Facility, Individually and in their Official Capacities; Catherine Day, R.N., at Lakeview Shock Incarceration Facility, Defendants-Appellants, Mark Erhardt; Gilbert Acevedo; James Cullinan, Counter-Claimants, Thomas A. Coughlin, III; Glen Gord; Robert Greifinger; Ronald Moscicki; Daniel Urbank; Jose Galindo; James Steeg; Richard Lester, Counter-Claimants-Appellants.

Nos. 952, 1203 to 1206, Docket 95-2498, 95-2499, 95-2520,

95-2521 and 95-2549.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Argued Jan. 19, 1996.

Decided Feb. 9, 1996.

Howard L. Zwickel, Assistant Attorney General of the State of New York, Albany, New York (Dennis C. Vacco, Attorney General, Peter H. Schiff, Deputy Solicitor General, Nancy A. Spiegel, Assistant Attorney General, Albany, New York, of counsel), for Defendants-Appellants Coughlin, Gord, Greifinger, Moscicki, Galindo, Steeg, Day, and Lester.

Lipsitz, Green, Fahringer, Roll, Salisbury & Cambria, Buffalo, New York (Richard Weisbeck, Buffalo, New York, of counsel), for Defendant-Appellant Erhardt. ¹

Rowley, Forrest, O'Donnell, Beaumont & Pelerisi, P.C., Albany, New York (Brian J. O'Donnell, Albany, New York, of counsel), for Defendant-Appellant Urbank.

Lawrence D. Behr, Buffalo, New York, for Defendant-Appellant Cullinan. ¹

Danieu and Attea Law Firm, North Boston, New York (Richard J. Attea, North Boston, New York, of counsel), for Defendant-Appellant Attea. ¹

Elizabeth L. Koob, New York, New York, (Joan Magoolaghan, Cara Cherny, Law Graduate, Koob & Magoolaghan, New York, New York, of counsel), for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Before: NEWMAN, Chief Judge, MAHONEY, Circuit Judge, and SAND, District Judge. ^*

MAHONEY, Circuit Judge:

Defendants-appellants John Attea, Jr., Thomas A. Coughlin, III, James Cullinan, Catherine Day, Mark Erhardt, Jose Galindo, Glen Gord, Robert Greifinger, Richard Lester, Ronald Moscicki, James Steeg, and Daniel Urbank (collectively "Appellants") appeal from an order entered July 5, 1995 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York, Con. G. Cholakis, Judge, insofar as it denied their motion to dismiss state law tort claims brought by plaintiff-appellee Edley Baker ("Baker") against Appellants in their personal capacities. We conclude that Appellants are entitled to immunity from those claims pursuant to New York Correction Law § 24, and reverse.

Background

Baker is the administratrix of the estate of her deceased son Willie Baker. At the time of his death, Willie Baker was an inmate at the Lakeview Shock Incarceration Facility ("Lakeview"). Appellants were officers and employees of the New York State Department of Correctional Services (the "Department"). Baker alleges that Willie Baker died of asphyxiation and strangulation as a result of an altercation at Lakeview between Willie Baker and some of the Appellants. Baker further alleges that those Appellants holding supervisory positions in the Department failed to provide Willie Baker with safe and secure custody consistent with good and accepted correctional practices, and that other Appellants failed to provide appropriate medical care that could have saved Willie Baker's life.

Baker commenced the present suit in federal court, seeking damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of Willie Baker's constitutional rights. Baker's complaint, which named Appellants both individually and in their official capacities, included pendent state law claims for common law intentional tort, negligence, and medical malpractice. Appellants moved, inter alia, to dismiss the state law claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to New York Correction Law § 24 and the Eleventh Amendment. The district court granted the motion with respect to Baker's state law claims against Appellants in their official capacities, holding that the Eleventh Amendment barred such suits in federal court. Baker v. Coughlin, No. 93-CV-1324, slip op. at 10 (N.D.N.Y. June 30, 1995). The district court denied the motion, however, with respect to Baker's pendent state law claims against Appellants in their personal capacities. Id. The district court adopted the reasoning of Brown v. Coughlin, 869 F.Supp. 196 (S.D.N.Y.1994), and concluded that § 24 was a procedural and indemnity provision that did not provide corrections officers with immunity from state law claims brought against them in their personal capacities in federal court. Baker, slip op. at 10.

This appeal followed. ²

Discussion

New York Correction Law § 24 provides in pertinent part:

1. No civil action shall be brought in any court of the state, except by the attorney general on behalf of the state, against any officer or employee of the [Department of Correctional Services], in his personal capacity, for damages arising out of any act done or the failure to perform any act within the scope of the employment and in the discharge of the duties by such officer or employee.

2. Any claim for damages arising out of any act done or the failure to perform any act within the scope of the employment and in the discharge of the duties of any officer or employee of the [Department of Correctional Services] shall be brought and maintained in the court of claims as a claim against the state.

While conceding that her pendent claims could not be brought against Appellants in their personal capacities in a New York court, see Arteaga v. State, 72 N.Y.2d 212, 221, 532 N.Y.S.2d 57, 62, 527 N.E.2d 1194, 1199 (1988) ("[I]nmates are precluded by [§ 24(1) ] from suing Correction Department employees in their personal capacity in State courts...."); Cepeda v. Coughlin, 128 A.D.2d 995, 997, 513 N.Y.S.2d 528, 530 (3d Dep't) (same), appeal denied, 70 N.Y.2d 602, 518 N.Y.S.2d 1024, 512 N.E.2d 550 (1987), Baker contends that § 24 does not prevent her from bringing those same state law claims in federal court. She argues that because § 24(1) refers only to actions brought "in any court of the state," that section does not abrogate her common law rights against corrections officers to the extent that relief is sought in federal court. However, § 24(2) requires that state law claims for damages against corrections officers "shall be brought ... [as] claim[s] against the state." This provision, by its plain terms, precludes the assertion of claims against corrections officers in any court, including the federal courts. ³ Baker seeks to avoid this conclusion by adopting the reasoning of Brown, which ruled that "[s]ubdivision 2 ... cannot properly be read in isolation" from subdivision 1 of § 24, 869 F.Supp. at 198 n. 4, and therefore preempts only personal capacity claims that are brought in state court.

Thus, Baker's argument concerning § 24(2) ultimately rests upon her analysis of § 24(1) as limiting personal capacity claims only in state courts. We reject that analysis. It is of no significance that § 24(1) refers only to actions in state courts, because a federal court acts essentially as a state court in addressing pendent state law claims. As we stated in Promisel v. First American Artificial Flowers, Inc., 943 F.2d 251 (2d Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1060, 112 S.Ct. 939, 117 L.Ed.2d 110 (1992):

In applying pendent jurisdiction, federal courts are bound to apply state substantive law to the state claim. See United Mine Workers [v. Gibbs], 383 U.S. [715,] 726, 86 S.Ct. [1130,] 1139, [16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966) ]; see also Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 553 F.2d 812, 813 (2d Cir.1977) ("It is the source of the right, not the basis of federal jurisdiction, which determines the controlling law.") [.] This includes any restrictions set by the state on whether a plaintiff may bring a court action regarding the claim. If a state would not recognize a plaintiff's right to bring a state claim in state court, a federal court exercising pendent jurisdiction, standing in the shoes of a state court, must follow the state's jurisdictional determination and not allow that claim to be appended to a federal law claim in federal court. See Hunnewell v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 628 F.Supp. 759, 761 (S.D.N.Y.1986).

943 F.2d at...