Arteaga v. State

• Decision Date: 09 June 1988
• Citation: 527 N.E.2d 1194,532 N.Y.S.2d 57,72 N.Y.2d 212
• Parties: , 527 N.E.2d 1194 Jorge ARTEAGA, Appellant, v. STATE of New York, Respondent. Michael TREACY, Appellant, v. STATE of New York, Respondent.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 57

532 N.Y.S.2d 57

72 N.Y.2d 212, 527 N.E.2d 1194

Jorge ARTEAGA, Appellant, v. STATE of New York, Respondent.

Michael TREACY, Appellant, v. STATE of New York, Respondent.

Court of Appeals of New York.

June 9, 1988.

John D. Charles, Albany, and David C. Leven, New York City, for appellants.

Robert Abrams, Atty. Gen. (Peter H. Schiff, O. Peter Sherwood and Vernon Stuart, Albany, of counsel), for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

HANCOCK, Judge.

Claimants, inmates in a State correctional facility, seek damages from the State for unlawful confinement and loss of privileges resulting from the prosecution of disciplinary charges against them. Their appeals from an order affirming the dismissal of their claims present a common issue: whether the State is immune from liability for the actions of employees of the Departme of Correctional Services in commencing and conducting formal disciplinary proceedings. We hold that where, as here, the employees act under the authority of and in full compliance with the governing statutes and regulations (Correction Law §§ 112, 137; 7 NYCRR parts 250-254), their actions constitute discretionary conduct of a quasi-judicial nature for which the State has absolute immunity ( see, Tarter v. State of New York, 68 N.Y.2d 511, 510 N.Y.S.2d 528, 503 N.E.2d 84; Tango v. Tulevech, 61 N.Y.2d 34, 471 N.Y.S.2d 73, 459 N.E.2d 182).

I

On February 13, 1985, claimant Arteaga was confined to a cell and charged in a misbehavior report with conspiracy to escape from the Great Meadow Correctional Facility and with possession of a weapon found in the soap factory warehouse where he worked. Following a timely Superintendent's hearing, the Hearing Officer found Arteaga guilty and imposed a punishment of 90 days in the special housing unit or in keeplock status and the loss of certain privileges. It appears from the record that the charge was based, in part, on a statement of a confidential informant made to the officer who filed the misbehavior report. On administrative appeal, the Department of Correctional Services reversed for lack of substantiating evidence and the proceeding against claimant Arteaga was terminated. For reasons of safety and to preserve the "viability" of the informant, his testimony was not presented on the appeal.

Claimant Treacy, while an inmate at Great Meadow on October 13, 1983, was charged with possession of escape paraphernalia and contraband. He was confined to his cell pending a Superintendent's hearing after which he was found guilty, given 180 days in special housing and deprived of six months' good behavior allowance. It appears that the misbehavior report was based in part on escape paraphernalia found in the prerelease room where Treacy worked and on information from a confidential informant who had identified claimant from a photograph as an inmate involved in an escape plan. The Department Review Board affirmed the Superintendent's disposition on administrative appeal. Subsequently, after claimant Treacy commenced a CPLR article 78 proceeding challenging the determination, the Commissioner reversed the disposition administratively, restored claimant's good behavior allowance, and expunged references to the charge from his records.

After the dismissal of the proceedings against them, claimants--contending that the sanctions imposed had been unlawful--commenced separate damage actions in the Court of Claims pleading causes of action for malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, and violation of statutory rights. Claimant Treacy also included a cause of action for negligent investigation. The Arteaga court dismissed that action on motion as barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. In Treacy, the court granted a dismissal but did so without addressing the question of immunity (131 Misc.2d 849, 501 N.Y.S.2d 1005). It found no legal basis for any of the causes of action because of claimant's status as an inmate and the fact that his confinement followed a Superintendent's hearing held in accordance with departmental regulations. In a consolidated appeal, the Appellate Division unanimously affirmed, adverting to the broad discretion vested by the Legislature in the Department of Correctional Services in the disciplining of inmates and holding that such activity is not one "with regard to which the State has waived its sovereign immunity" (125 A.D.2d 916, 917, 510 N.Y.S.2d 280). We granted leave to appeal and now affirm for the reasons which follow.

II

With the enactment of the Court of Claims Act § 8, the State waived that immunity which it had enjoyed solely by reason of its sovereign character ( see, Weiss v. Fote, 7 N.Y.2d 579, 585-586, 200 N.Y.S.2d 409, 167 N.E.2d 63; Bernardine v. City of New York, 294 N.Y. 361, 62 N.E.2d 604). While assuming liability under the rules applicable to corporations and individuals for the actions of its officers and employees in the everyday operations of government ( see, e.g., Wingerter v. State of New York, 79 A.D.2d 817, 435 N.Y.S.2d 157, affd. 58 N.Y.2d 848, 460 N.Y.S.2d 20, 446 N.E.2d 776; McCrink v. City of New York, 296 N.Y. 99, 71 N.E.2d 419; Bernardine v. City of New York, supra), the State retained its immunity for those governmental actions requiring expert judgment or the exercise of discretion ( see, Friedman v. State of New York, 67 N.Y.2d 271, 502 N.Y.S.2d 669, 493 N.E.2d 893; Weiss v. Fote, supra). This immunity, we have held, is absolute when the action involves the conscious exercise of discretion of a judicial or quasi-judicial nature ( see, Tarter v. State of New York, 68 N.Y.2d 511, 510 N.Y.S.2d 528, 503 N.E.2d 84, supra; Tango v. Tulevech, 61 N.Y.2d 34, 471 N.Y.S.2d 73, 459 N.E.2d 182, supra).

The absolute immunity for quasi-judicial discretionary actions is founded on public policy and is generally said to reflect the value judgment that the public interest in having officials free to exercise their discretion unhampered by the fear of retaliatory lawsuits outweighs the benefits to be had from imposing liability ( see, Rottkamp v. Young, 21 A.D.2d 373, 376, 249 N.Y.S.2d 330, affd. 15 N.Y.2d 831, 257 N.Y.S.2d 944, 205 N.E.2d 866; Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 [2d Cir.], cert. denied 339 U.S. 949, 70 S.Ct. 803, 94 L.Ed. 1363; 2 Harper and James, Law of Torts § 29.10, at 1641). Not all discretionary actions, however, are accorded absolute immunity (see, Tarter v. State of New York, supra, 68 N.Y.2d at 519, 510 N.Y.S.2d 528, 503 N.E.2d 84).

Whether an action receives only qualified immunity, shielding the government except when there is bad faith or the action taken is without a reasonable basis (see, e.g., Friedman v. State of New York, supra, 67 N.Y.2d at 283-285, 502 N.Y.S.2d 669, 493 N.E.2d 893; Southworth v. State of New York, 62 A.D.2d 731, 405 N.Y.S.2d 548, affd. 47 N.Y.2d 874, 419 N.Y.S.2d 71, 392 N.E.2d 1254; Weiss v. Fote, supra, 7 N.Y.2d at 585, 587, 200 N.Y.S.2d 409, 167 N.E.2d 63; Ufnal v. Cattaraugus County, 93 A.D.2d 521, 524-525, 463 N.Y.S.2d 342) or absolute immunity, where reasonableness or bad faith is irrelevant ( see, Tango v. Tulevech, supra, 61 N.Y.2d at 42, 471 N.Y.S.2d 73, 459 N.E.2d 182), requires an analysis of the functions and duties of the particular governmental official or employee whose conduct is in issue (see, Tarter v. State of New York, supra, 68 N.Y.2d at 518-519, 510 N.Y.S.2d 528, 503 N.E.2d 84). The question depends not so much on the importance of the actor's position or its title as on the scope of the delegated discretion and whether the position entails making decisions of a judicial nature--i.e., decisions requiring the application of governing rules to particular facts, an "exercise of reasoned judgment which could typically produce different acceptable results" ( Tango v. Tulevech, supra, 61 N.Y.2d at 41, 471 N.Y.S.2d 73, 459 N.E.2d 182; see, Tarter v. State of New York, supra, 68 N.Y.2d at 518-519, 510 N.Y.S.2d 528, 503 N.E.2d 84).

Thus, in Tarter, in evaluating the functions of the Board of Parole under Executive Law article 12-B, we concluded that parole release decisions were "classically judicial" in nature and deserving of full immunity (68 N.Y.2d, supra, at 518, 510 N.Y.S.2d 528, 503 N.E.2d 84). Similarly, we have held that the discretionary action of a county probation officer in making a judgment concerning custody of a child (Tango v. Tulevech, supra), the acts of correction officials and parole supervisors in establishing the level of restrictions on and the degree of supervision for a released inmate ( Eiseman v. State of New York, 70 N.Y.2d 175, 184, 518 N.Y.S.2d 608, 511 N.E.2d 1128), and the decision of a building inspector in refusing to grant a building permit ( Rottkamp v. Young, 15 N.Y.2d 831, 257 N.Y.S.2d 944, 205 N.E.2d 866, supra) sufficiently evinced the attributes of judicial decision making to merit full immunity (see also, Santangelo v. State of New York, 101 A.D.2d 20, 28-29 474 N.Y.S.2d 995 [determination of the Temporary Release Committee and the Superintendent of correctional facility granting a weekend furlough warranted quasi-judicial immunity]; Schanbarger v. Kellogg, 35 A.D.2d 902, 315 N.Y.S.2d 1013, appeal dismissed 29 N.Y.2d 649, 324 N.Y.S. 1033, 273 N.E.2d 321, cert. denied 405 U.S. 919, 92 S.Ct. 944, 30 L.Ed.2d 789 [District Attorney's action in prosecuting crime entitled to quasi-judicial immunity] ). ¹

We next consider the application of these principles to the correction officers involved in the investigation and prosecution of the charges against claimants.

III

To carry out the "formidable tasks" of maintaining order and security in correctional facilities and protecting the safety of inmates and employees, the Legislature has granted the Commissioner of Correctional Services broad discretion in the formulation and implementation of policies relating to security and to the disciplining of inmates ( Matter of Rivera v. Smith, 63 N.Y.2d 501, 513, 483 N.Y.S.2d 187, 472 N.E.2d 1015). Pursuant to this...