Baker v. Cuomo, 93 Civ. 6839 (VLB)

Decision Date22 December 1993
Docket NumberNo. 93 Civ. 6839 (VLB),93 Civ. 8420 (VLB) to 93 Civ. 8427 (VLB).,93 Civ. 6839 (VLB)
Citation842 F. Supp. 718
PartiesTheodore BAKER and all individuals similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Mario CUOMO, Governor of the State of New York and Thomas Coughlin, Commissioner of New York State Department of Correction Services, Defendants. Raymond STRAWDER and all individuals similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Mario CUOMO, Governor of the State of New York and Thomas Coughlin, Commissioner of New York State Department of Correction Services, Defendants. Milton GOODMAN and all individuals similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Mario CUOMO, Governor of the State of New York and Thomas Coughlin, Commissioner of New York State Department of Correction Services, Defendants. Anthony CANADY and all individuals similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Mario CUOMO, Governor of the State of New York and Thomas Coughlin, Commissioner of New York State Department of Correction Services, Defendants. Richard JACKSON and all individuals similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Mario CUOMO, Governor of the State of New York and Thomas Coughlin, Commissioner of New York State Department of Correction Services, Defendants. Yohannes JOHNSON and all individuals similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Mario CUOMO, Governor of the State of New York and Thomas Coughlin, Commissioner of New York State Department of Correction Services, Defendants. Mark SIMON and all individuals similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Mario CUOMO, Governor of the State of New York and Thomas Coughlin, Commissioner of New York State Department of Correction Services, Defendants. Tyrone SANCHEZ and all individuals similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Mario CUOMO, Governor of the State of New York and Thomas Coughlin, Commissioner of New York State Department of Correction Services, Defendants. Malcolm NELSON and all individuals similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Mario CUOMO, Governor of the State of New York and Thomas Coughlin, Commissioner of New York State Department of Correction Services, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

Theodore Baker, pro se.

Raymond Strawder, pro se.

Milton Goodman, pro se.

Anthony Canady, pro se.

Richard Jackson, pro se.

Yohannes Johnson, pro se.

Mark Simon, pro se.

Tyrone Sanchez, pro se.

Malcolm Nelson, pro se.

MEMORANDUM ORDER

VINCENT L. BRODERICK, District Judge.

I

These nine identical actions are brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by prisoners at the Green Haven Correctional Facility (collectively, "plaintiffs"). Each action alleges unconstitutional deprivation of the right to vote because of incarceration for a felony conviction. Plaintiffs seek monetary damages of $1.50 per day, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief.

The related cases in the caption of this memorandum order are consolidated under the following caption:1

THEODORE BAKER, RAYMOND STRAWDER, MILTON GOODMAN, ANTHONY CANADY, RICHARD JACKSON, YOHANNES JOHNSON, MARK SIMON, TYRONE SANCHEZ, MALCOLM NELSON and all individuals similarly situated, Plaintiffs,

v.

MARIO CUOMO, Governor of the State of New York and THOMAS COUGHLIN, Commissioner of New York State Department of Correction Services, Defendants.

93 Civ 6839 (VLB)

All future filings should include this caption and case number.

Plaintiffs allege that New York Election Law § 5-106(2), which prohibits incarcerated felons from voting in federal, state, and local elections, unconstitutionally discriminates against Blacks and Hispanics, who allegedly comprise 87% of the total prison population and 25% of the population of New York state.

II

The case raises profound issues, but these have already been examined by the judiciary with uniform negative outcomes. If a different approach is to be taken, it would be more appropriate for such a step to be initiated by the higher courts rather than at the trial level. Unless this is to be done, appointment of counsel at the district court level or awaiting responses by the defendants would consume resources with little likelihood of benefit to plaintiffs or the public.

Because of the possibility that an appellate court may choose to appoint counsel at the appellate level or to grant relief, it may be useful to consider the variety of options which might be available were the existing rule to be re-examined.

The preponderance of minority groups in our prisons is a subject of profound concern. The ability of the judiciary to confront the underlying reasons for this phenomenon is limited.2

Under our system of justice, governed by if not always attaining due process and providing numerous safeguards to defendants, political empowerment of those convicted of crime cannot necessarily be assumed to be in the interest of citizens who are members of minority communities. The Equal Protection Clause and the federal Voting Rights Act seek to protect such citizens.3 The victims of crime are also predominantly members of minority groups, as eloquently pointed out by Representative Charles Rangel and former Manhattan Borough President William Sutton.4

Permitting prisoners to vote in local elections might swamp local electorates, depriving innocent citizens of the opportunity to guide the destiny of their municipalities or obtain representation at the county or state level. The resultant practical disenfranchisement of local residents would itself be unjustifiably discriminatory.5 Moreover, local services in such political subdivisions are also usually separate from those provided in prisons, in regard to which prisoner franchise would be of greatest significance if local prisoner representation were to be required.

Prisoner voting at the statewide level or at the former residence of a prisoner is permitted in some states (see part IV below). An appellate court has not as yet, but might, determine that there is no sufficient reason for denying the franchise at that level to prisoners.

Were this to occur, the result would be to avoid reducing the total weight of the minority vote in the states and in voting for members of the Electoral College, while likewise avoiding discriminatory adverse discrimination against local citizens with the misfortune to live in a political subdivision containing a prison. A ruling of this type, if made, might be based on the importance of voting rights and weakness of contrary imperatives at the statewide level, thus avoiding the need for complex and controversial resort to statistical analyses.

III

Voting is a fundamental political right, Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 1071, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886). Disenfranchisement of felons under state law, however, has been consistently upheld. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 53, 94 S.Ct. 2655, 2670, 41 L.Ed.2d 551 (1974); Owens v. Barnes, 711 F.2d 25, 27 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 963, 104 S.Ct. 400, 78 L.Ed.2d 341 (1983); Green v. Board of Elections of City of New York, 380 F.2d 445, 451 (2d Cir.1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1048, 88 S.Ct. 768, 19 L.Ed.2d 840 (1968).6

Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that representation of a state in the House of Representatives and Electoral College may be reduced "when the right to vote at any election ... is denied ... or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime" (emphasis supplied).

The Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) ("Voting Rights Act"), protects an individual's right to vote by prohibiting states from creating voter qualifications that result in discrimination based on race or color. This entails avoidance of vote dilution, which may occur when voting arrangements prevent effective use of the franchise. See White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 93 S.Ct. 2332, 37 L.Ed.2d 314 (1973); Wesley v. Collins, 605 F.Supp. 802 (M.D.Tenn.1985), aff'd 791 F.2d 1255 (6th Cir.1986). The Voting Rights Act does not guarantee minority groups proportional representation but does guarantee everyone an opportunity equal to that of others to obtain representation. Butts v. City of New York, 779 F.2d 141 (2d Cir.1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1021, 106 S.Ct. 3335, 92 L.Ed.2d 740 (1986).

The legislative history of the Voting Rights Act, see S.Rep.No. 97-417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 27, reprinted in 1982 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 177, 205 (hereinafter "Senate Report"), lists numerous factors to be considered by a court in weighing the totality of the circumstances analysis to determine if challenged election procedures violates the Act. See White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 93 S.Ct. 2332, 37 L.Ed.2d 314 (1973); Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir.1973), aff'd on other grounds sub nom East Carroll Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636, 96 S.Ct. 1083, 47 L.Ed.2d 296 (1976); Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255, 1260 n. 5 (6th Cir.1986). Such factors are "neither exclusive nor controlling", and "the `totality of the circumstances' analysis requires a highly individualistic inquiry." Wesley, 791 F.2d at 1260.

Disproportionate racial impact of felon disenfranchisement on a minority voting population does not establish a violation of the Voting Rights Act absent other reasons to find discrimination. Id. at 1261. In concluding that a Tennessee statute which disenfranchised felons did not violate the Voting Rights Act, the court in Wesley held that disproportionate impact "does not `result' from the state's qualification of the right to vote on account of race or color," id. at 1262, but rather, "felons are disenfranchised because of their conscious decision to commit a criminal act for which they assume the risks of detention and punishment." Id.7

IV

Some states grant incarcerated felons the right to vote but the vast majority of states do not. This is pertinent although not controlling. Massachusetts allows incarcerated felons to vote in statewide elections, a fundamental right guaranteed by the state constitution,8 and on the legal theory that incarcerated persons have the capacity to acquire domicile...

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5 cases
  • Muntaqim v. Coombe
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit
    • April 23, 2004
    ...§ 1973. The District Court dismissed their complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. See Baker v. Cuomo, 842 F.Supp. 718 (S.D.N.Y.1993). A panel of this Court reversed, see Baker v. Cuomo, 58 F.3d 814 (2d Cir.1995), and then reaffirmed its decision in an opi......
  • Baker v. Pataki
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit
    • May 30, 1996
    ...Amendments of the Constitution and § 1973, for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. See Baker v. Cuomo, 842 F.Supp. 718 (S.D.N.Y.1993) ("Baker I "). A panel of this Court reversed, holding, inter alia, that plaintiffs-appellants had stated a claim under § 1973. See B......
  • L.I. Head Start Child Development Services, Inc. v. Economic Opportunity Com'n, CV 00-7394 (ADS).
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York
    • July 8, 2009
  • Baker v. Cuomo
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit
    • June 19, 1995
    ...it would dismiss the claims under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Baker v. Cuomo, 842 F.Supp. 718, 723 (S.D.N.Y.1993). The district court's thoughtful memorandum opinion stated that this case "raises profound issues." Id. at 720. The cour......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles
  • Felon disenfranchisement: law, history, policy, and politics.
    • United States
    • Fordham Urban Law Journal Vol. 32 No. 5, September 2005
    • September 1, 2005
    ...supra note 70, at 375. (186.) Id. at 374-75. (187.) 85 F.3d 919 (2d Cir. 1996) (5-5 decision). (188.) Id. at 921. See Baker v. Cuomo, 842 F. Supp. 718 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Portugal, supra note 12, at 1329. When the litigation began, then-Governor Mario Cuomo was the defendant; he was replaced b......

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