Baker v. Gen. Motors

• Decision Date: 22 May 2023
• Docket Number: Civil Action 4:21-cv-01260-BP
• Parties: JESSE BAKER, Plaintiff, v. GENERAL MOTORS LLC, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas

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JESSE BAKER, Plaintiff, v. GENERAL MOTORS LLC, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 4:21-cv-01260-BP

United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Fort Worth Division

May 22, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

HAL R RAY, JR. UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Before the Court in this case based on diversity of citizenship are Defendant General Motors LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment with Brief and Appendix in Support (ECF Nos. 41, 42 43), Plaintiff Jesse Baker's Response to the Motion with Brief and Appendix in Support (ECF Nos. 50, 51, 52), and Defendant's reply to the Motion (ECF No. 56). After considering the pleadings and applicable legal authorities the Court DENIES the Motion.

I. BACKGROUND

General Motors LLC (“GM”) operates an assembly plant in Arlington, Texas. ECF No. 42 at 7. GM often contracts with various entities, including Central Conveyor Company (“Central Conveyer”), who employed Jesse Baker (“Baker”) at the time of the incident at issue. ECF No. 42 at 7. On September 3, 2021, Baker was preparing tools before beginning work the next day on a conveyor belt. ECF Nos. 42 at 7. He was working in what was known as the plant's “fabrication shop.” ECF Nos. 42 at 7. As he went about his work, Baker's supervisor, whom Central Conveyer also employed, retrieved an empty job box and asked Baker to take it to the site where people pulling chains would be working the next day. ECF No. 42 at 7. This particular job box had a broken lock, so Baker's supervisor instructed him to weld a hasp onto the box. Id. Baker did not open the box or otherwise inspect it before using a grinder to work on the hasp. ECF No. 42 at 8. At some point after Baker began to use the grinder, an explosion occurred. Id. Baker was knocked unconscious and sustained injuries. ECF No. 42 at 8. He now sues GM to recover damages for his injuries. ECF No. 1 at 9-10.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Summary Judgment

Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is proper when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; See Slaughter v. S. Talc Co., 949 F.2d 167, 170 (5th Cir. 1991). Disputes concerning material facts are genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “An issue is ‘material' if it involves a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Burgos v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 20 F.3d 633, 635 (5th Cir. 1994). “The movant bears the burden of identifying those portions of the record it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Triple Tee Golf, Inc. v. Nike, Inc., 485 F.3d 253, 261 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-25 (1986)).

When a movant carries his initial burden, the nonmovant must then show that the entry of summary judgment would be improper. Duckett v. City of Cedar Park, 950 F.2d 272, 276 (5th Cir. 1992). Although the nonmovant may satisfy this burden by tendering depositions, affidavits, and other competent evidence, “conclusory allegations, speculation, and unsubstantiated assertions are inadequate to satisfy the nonmovant's burden.” Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1429 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc). Merely colorable evidence or evidence not significantly probative will not defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50.

Furthermore, a mere scintilla of evidence will not defeat a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 252; Davis v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 14 F.3d 1082, 1086 (5th Cir. 1994).

The Court must view summary judgment evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Rosado v. Deters, 5 F.3d 119, 123 (5th Cir. 1993). In addition, factual controversies are resolved in favor of the nonmovant, but only when both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts, thus creating an actual controversy. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc). In the absence of any proof, however, the Court does not assume that the nonmovant could or would prove the necessary facts. Id.

In making its determination on the motion, the Court looks at the full record including the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and requests for admissions, and affidavits. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Williams v. Adams, 836 F.2d 958, 961 (5th Cir. 1988). However, the Court's function is not “to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 242-43. The Court will grant the movant's motion for summary judgment only if it meets its burden and the nonmovant fails to make the requisite showing that a genuine issue exists as to any material fact. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; Duckett, 950 F.2d at 276.

B. Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code

Chapter 95 of the Code applies only to a claim:

(1) against a property owner, contractor, or subcontractor for personal injury, death, or property damage to an owner, a contractor, or a subcontractor or an employee of a contractor or subcontractor; and

(2) that arises from the condition or use of an improvement to real property where the contractor or subcontractor constructs, repairs, renovates, or modifies the improvement.

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 95.002. If Chapter 95 applies, a property owner is liable to independent contractors for failure to provide a safe workplace only if the property owner (1) exercises or retains some control over the manner in which the work is performed, other than the right to order the work to start or stop or to inspect progress or to receive reports; and (2) the property owner had actual knowledge of the danger or condition resulting in the personal injury, death, or property damage and failed to adequately warn. Id. § 95.003.

A defendant property owner has the initial burden to establish that Chapter 95 covers a plaintiff's claim. See Weekly Homes, LLC v. Paniagua, 646 S.W.3d 821, 827 (Tex. 2022). Once the defendant establishes the applicability of Chapter 95, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to overcome its limitations on liability. Id.

Whether Chapter 95 applies to a claim is a preliminary issue that underlies all other issues. Phillips v. The Dow Chemical Co., 186 S.W.3d 121, 130 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.); Francis v. Coastal Oil & Gas Corp., 130 S.W.3d 76, 83 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.). Issues of statutory construction raise questions of law that the appellate courts review de novo. Subaru of America, Inc. v. DavidMcDavidNissan, Inc., 84 S.W.3d 212, 222 (Tex. 2002); See First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Combs, 258 S.W.3d 627, 631 (Tex. 2008).

III. ANALYSIS

GM asserts that summary judgment is appropriate because Baker's sole means of recovery is Chapter 95 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, which precludes common-law negligence claims against the property owner. §§ 95.001 and 95.002; ECF No. 42 at 10. GM asserts that Baker is not entitled to recover under Chapter 95 because he has not met all of the statutory elements. ECF No. 42 at 10-21.

GM alleges that a dangerous condition in proximity to an improvement may constitute a condition of the improvement itself. ECF No. 42 at 13 (citing Alba v. CalAtlantic Homes of Tex., Inc., No. 02-21-00345-CV, 2022 WL 1420542 at *8 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth, May 5, 2022, no pet.) (citing Los Compadres Pescadores, L.L.C. v. Valdez, 622 S.W.3d 771, 785-86 (Tex. 2021)). It argues that because Baker was working on the job box that housed tools and equipment to be used on a chain pull and conveyor belt, both improvements to the property, Baker's claim arises from the “condition of an improvement” at the plant. ECF No. 42 at 14.

Baker responds that Chapter 95 does not apply because his claim concerns the use or condition of a trade fixture, not an improvement. ECF No. 51 at 25-26; Ineos USA, LLC. v. Elmgren, 505 S.W.3d 555, 567 (Tex. 2016). Baker asserts that he was hired to work on GM's conveyor belt and other production equipment over a holiday weekend, making the conveyor belt and other production equipment the relevant “improvement.” ECF No. 51 at 25. Further, Baker was injured before the shutdown of plant operations began and before any contractors began work on the production equipment itself. Id. Therefore, Baker contends that repairing the job box to secure the workers' hand tools constituted an improvement, if any, to a trade fixture, not to any real property. Id.

Chapter 95 does not define “improvement,” but the Texas Supreme Court has “broadly defined an ‘improvement' to include ‘all additions to the freehold except for trade fixtures [that] can be removed without injury to the property.'” Abutahoun v Dow Chem. Co., 463 S.W.3d, 42, 49 (Tex. 2015) (second alteration in original) (quoting Sonnier v. Chisholm-Ryder Co., 909 S.W.2d 475, 479 (Tex. 1995)); see also Torres v. Chauncey Mansell & Mueller Supply Co., 518 S.W.3d 481, 487 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2017, pet. denied) (concluding that an improvement is not limited to the specific mechanism causing the injury, but rather, the factors that define the improvement's breadth such as the interrelationship of the mechanism with its physical and geographic environments). A claim satisfies this part of § 95.002 only if it “results from a condition or use of the same improvement on which the contractor (or its employee) is working when the injury occurs.” Ineos, 505 S.W.3d at 567. A workplace may include several different improvements, and each improvement may possess...