Baker v. Hedstrom
| Decision Date | 20 July 2012 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 30,475,30,639.,30,491,s. 30,475 |
| Citation | 2012 -NMCA- 073,284 P.3d 400 |
| Court | Court of Appeals of New Mexico |
| Parties | Bryanna Pearl BAKER, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Stephanie HEDSTROM, M.D.; Southwest Perinatology; William Ramirez, M.D., Lee C. Caruana, M.D.; Family Practice Associates, P.C.; Misbah Zmily, M.D.; Misbah Zmily, P.C.; Cordell Halverson, M.D.; Lorene Valdez–Boyle, M.D.; San Miguel Hospital Corp., d/b/a Alta Vista Regional Hospital; The Board of Regents of the University of New Mexico, as Trustees of the University of New Mexico Health & Sciences Center; and John Does # 1–20; and Jane Does # 1–20, Defendants–Appellees. Lorrice Gordon, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. ABQ Health Partners, L.L.C., Defendant–Appellant. Paul Campos, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Cheri Wilson, deceased, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Loretta Conder, M.D.; Loretta Conder, M.D., P.C.; a Corporation, Omkar Tiku, M.D.; and Omkar Tiku, P.C., a Corporation, Defendants–Appellees. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
McGinn, Carpenter, Montoya, & Love, P.A., Tyler J. Atkins, Randy McGinn, The Kauffman Firm, Cid Lopez, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellant Bryanna Baker.
Law Offices of Felicia C. Weingartner, P.C., Felicia C. Weingartner, The Kauffman Firm, Cid Lopez, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellee Lorrice Gordon.
Garcia & Vargas, LLC, Ray M. Vargas, II, The Law Office of Stephen Durkovich, Stephen Durkovich, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellant Paul Campos.
Hinkle, Hensley, Shanor & Martin, L.L.P., Dana S. Hardy, William P. Slattery, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellees Loretta Conder, M.D. and Loretta Conder, M.D., P.C.
Allen Shepherd Lewis Syra & Chapman PA, Edward W. Shepherd, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellees Omkar Tiku, M.D. and Omkar Tiku P.C.
Lorenz Law, Alice T. Lorenz, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellant ABQ Health Partners, L.L.C.
Butt Thornton & Baehr PC, Emily A. Franke, W. Ann Maggiore, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellees Stephanie Hedstrom, M.D. and Southwest Perinatology, P.C.
Lorrie A. Krehbiel, Melanie Frassanito, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellees Lee C. Caruana, M.D. and Family Practice Associates, P.C.
Sharp Law Firm, Lynn S. Sharp, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellant ABQ Health Partners, L.L.C.
Miller Stratvert, Jennifer D. Hall, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellees Misbah Zmily M.D. and Misbah Zmily, P.C.
{1} In these consolidated cases, we must determine if Defendants are health care providers as defined in the New Mexico Medical Malpractice Act (MMA), NMSA 1978, Sections 41–5–1 to –29 (1976, as amended through 2008). The MMA defines “health care provider” as “a person, corporation, organization, facility[,] or institution licensed or certified by this state to provide health care or professional services as a doctor of medicine, hospital, outpatient health care facility, doctor of osteopathy, chiropractor, podiatrist, nurse anesthetist[,] or physician's assistant[.]” Section 41–5–3(A). Health care providers must qualify under the MMA before they are entitled to its benefits. See§ 41–5–5; see also Roberts v. Sw. Cmty. Health Servs., 114 N.M. 248, 250, 837 P.2d 442, 444 (1992).
{2} Plaintiffs are individuals or the estate of a deceased individual; all have asserted medical malpractice claims against Defendants and their agents. Defendants are business entities that are neither hospitals nor outpatient health care facilities involved in the treatment of Plaintiffs. Relying on the plain language of Section 41–5–3(A), Plaintiffs assert that even though Defendants procured coverage under the MMA, they may not invoke the protections of the MMA because they are not “health care provider[s]” as that term is defined in the MMA. Defendants respond that Plaintiffs' plain language interpretation is too restrictive and contrary to the Legislature's intention that coverage under the MMA be widely available to as many providers of health care services as possible. Defendants ask us to define the term “health care provider” broadly and to conclude that they fall within the scope of that definition. We reject Plaintiffs' plain language interpretation, agree with Defendants' legislative intent arguments, and conclude that Defendants are health care providers.
{3} In this case, we have consolidated three interlocutory appeals from three differentjudicial districts. Defendants here include several professional corporations that are incorporated under the New Mexico Professional Corporations Act, NMSA 1978, Sections 53–6–1 through –14 (1963, as amended through 2001), and a foreign limited liability company registered in Delaware. All obtained insurance coverage and paid the surcharges necessary to be qualified health care providers under the MMA; the business entities were properly licensed; and the Superintendent of Insurance has listed them all and treated them all as qualified health care providers. We briefly review the facts and procedural posture underlying each of the three cases.
{4} Gordon Case: Plaintiff Lorrice Gordon filed suit alleging permanent injuries from a bowel obstruction following an emergency appendectomy that had required a second surgery and a prolonged hospital stay. The case was filed in the Second Judicial District Court against Lovelace Health System, Inc.; the surgeon who performed the appendectomy; and the surgeons's employer, ABQ Health Partners, L.L.C. (the LLC), a foreign limited liability company organized under the laws of the State of Delaware. The LLC filed a motion to dismiss or stay, arguing that it had procured insurance under the MMA, that it was entitled to the benefits of the MMA, and that it was entitled to dismissal because Gordon had failed to comply with the procedural requirements of the MMA. Gordon responded that the LLC was not entitled to the benefits of the MMA because it was not a “health care provider.” The district court agreed with Gordon, denied the motion to dismiss, and certified the matter for interlocutory review.
{5} Baker Case: Plaintiff Bryanna Baker filed suit in the Fourth Judicial District Court alleging malpractice related to her pregnancies, heart attack, and resulting permanent heart damage. Defendants included the doctors who treated her and the professional corporations under which those doctors practice medicine. Thereafter, she moved for summary judgment, arguing that the professional corporations named as defendants in her suit could not benefit from the damage limitations in the MMA—despite the fact that they had procured insurance under the MMA—because they are not health care providers. The district court rejected Baker's motion, determined that the defendant corporations are health care providers, and certified the ruling for interlocutory review.
{6} Campos Case: Cheri Wilson had her gall bladder removed and died three days after the procedure. Paul Campos, the personal representative of Wilson's estate, filed a wrongful death action in the First Judicial District against the doctor who performed the procedure, against Wilson's primary care physician whom Wilson had consulted after the procedure, and against the professional corporations under which both doctors practice medicine. The defendant professional corporations had obtained insurance under the MMA and filed motions to dismiss, arguing that Wilson's estate failed to comply with the procedural requirements of the MMA. Campos opposed the motion and argued that the corporations are not “health care provider[s]” as that term is defined in the MMA and, thus, were not entitled to the benefits of the MMA. The district court rejected this argument, granted the motion to dismiss, and certified the matter for interlocutory review. This Court granted the interlocutory appeals of the three cases and, upon the stipulated request of the parties, consolidated them because they all involve a similar question.
{7} The sole issue before us is whether the definition of “health care provider” as set forth in Section 41–5–3(A) of the MMA includes Defendant professional corporations and the foreign limited liability company. Relying on Cummings v. X–Ray Assoc. of New Mexico, P.C., 1996–NMSC–035, 121 N.M. 821, 918 P.2d 1321, and Otero v. Zouhar, 102 N.M. 482, 697 P.2d 482 (1985), overruled on other grounds by Grantland v. Lea Reg'l Hosp., Inc., 110 N.M. 378, 796 P.2d 599 (1990), Defendants assert that no New Mexico appellate court has ever found that a corporation or limited liability company was precluded from being a qualified “health care provider” under the MMA. While this may be the case, it does not answer our question. In Cummings, our Supreme Court held that the MMA's three-year statutory limit was constitutional and that it barred plaintiff's suit against the defendant corporation. Otero, on the other hand, was a case in which the Superintendent of Insurance incorrectly informed plaintiff that defendant limited liability corporation was not a qualified health care provider. Otero, 102 N.M. at 486, 697 P.2d at 486. Consequently, plaintiff's application for review of his claims was not filed before the statute of limitations had run. Id. Our Supreme Court concluded that plaintiff was entitled to rely on the representations of the superintendent and, because the superintendent conveyed incorrect information, the Court reinstated plaintiff's claims against defendant. Id. at 487, 697 P.2d 482. To the extent that Defendants argue that our Supreme Court affirmatively decided that the corporate entities in Cummings and Otero were health care providers, their reliance on those cases is misplaced. Neither Cummings or Otero addressed the specific question before us today. Accordingly, the question presented by the parties in the case before us has not yet been considered by New Mexico appellate courts, and it is therefore one of first impression.
{8} We begin our review by establishing our standard of review and then set out the rules of statutory construction that guide our analysis.
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