Baker v. Indiana Family & Social Serices Admin
| Decision Date | 29 April 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. IP 02-1172-C-B/S.,IP 02-1172-C-B/S. |
| Citation | 260 F.Supp.2d 731 |
| Parties | Jibade Anthony BAKER, Plaintiff, v. INDIANA FAMILY & SOCIAL SEVICES ADMINISTRATION, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana |
Swaray E. Conteh, The Law Office of Swaray E. Conteh, Indianapolis, IN, for Plaintiff.
Patricia 0. Grow, Loralei C. Lannan, Office of the Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, for Defendant.
ENTRY GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintif claims of national origin discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., as amended, and claims of race and national origin discrimination under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983. Defendant, Indiana Family and Social Services Administration, contends that Plaintiff, Jibade Anthony Baker, has failed to state a Title VII national origin claim because Plaintiffs Equal Employment Opportunity Commission charge did not allege national origin discrimination. Further, Defendant contends that Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity bars Plaintiffs §§ 1981 and 1983 claims and also that Plaintiffs § 1983 claims are barred because state entities are not "persons" for purposes of § 1983. For the reasons set forth below, we GRANT Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
Jibade Anthony Baker ("Baker") is a Black, male citizen of Nigeria who currently resides, and during the period of the complaint resided, in Indianapolis, Indiana. Compl. ¶¶ 5, 8-20. Indiana Family and Social Services Administration ("FSSA") hired Baker in 1994 to work in the Division of Financial Enhancement ("DFE") and later gave him a supervisory role. Id. ¶ 10. Around 1997, DFE Director Ken Reilly ("Reilly") advised Baker and senior management that he would be leaving his position. Id. ¶ 11. Reilly advised Plaintiff to learn the duties of DFE director, indicating that Plaintiff would become the DFE director upon his, Reilly's, departure. Id. However, Reilly was told that his suggestion to Baker was not proper, and FSSA, according to state policy,1 immediately posted the position of DFE director in the State's job bank. Id. ¶ 12. Baker applied for the position, and although he was one of two finalists, FSSA offered the position to Richard Hunter ("Hunter"), an African-American. Id. ¶ 13.
FSSA terminated Hunter shortly after appointing him because he was unable to perform the duties for which he was hired. Id. ¶ 14. Thereafter, FSSA appointed Carl Hoffman ("Hoffman"), a Caucasian, as acting DFE director, even though Baker, one of the former finalists for the position, was still employed in the division. Id. While acting as DFE director, Hoffman allowed Baker to supervise the division because, according to Plaintiff, Hoffman had no accounting, management, or supervisory experience. Id. ¶¶ 14, 15. Meanwhile, FSSA again placed the DFE director position in the State's job bank. Id. ¶ 16. Baker applied for the position again, as did Hoffman, and both were selected as finalists. Hoffman was offered the position. Id.
Hoffman again allowed Baker to supervise the division. Id. ¶ 17. During this time, an unidentified individual named Jim Mooney made a derogatory comment about Baker to Hoffman, asking why Hoffman was "allowing the nigger to run the place." Id. For reasons not enumerated in the complaint, FSSA subsequently forced Hoffman to resign as DFE director. Id. ¶ 18. Baker alleges that, at this point in time, he could have become acting director. Id. He also makes a separate claim that, in December 2001, he applied for an "Accountant I" position within FSSA, but that the position was offered to an allegedly less qualified Caucasian applicant. Id. ¶ 20.
Baker filed a timely charge of race discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and received his Notice of Right to Sue on or about April 30, 2002. Id. ¶ 3. On July 2, 2002, Baker filed a complaint in this court, claiming that: (1) FSSA intentionally eliminated DFE to prevent him from becoming its director; (2) when FSSA eliminated DFE, it failed to offer him a promotion equivalent to the eliminated position solely because of his race and national origin; and (3) FSSA had, since 1994, continuously denied him promotion to DFE director because of his race and national origin. Id. ¶¶ 18-20.
A party moving for dismissal under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) must show that "the pleadings themselves fail to provide a basis for any claim for relief under any set of facts." Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass'n v. Mayflower Transit, Inc., 161 F.Supp.2d 948 (S.D.Ind.2001), quoting Ed Miniat, Inc. v. Globe Life Ins. Group Inc., 805 F.2d 732, 733 (7th Cir.1986); see also Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). Under this analysis, we examine only the sufficiency of the complaint, not the merits of the lawsuit. Autry v. Northwest Premium Servs., Inc., 144 F.3d 1037, 1039 (7th Cir. 1998). Dismissal is appropriate only if it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff cannot establish any set of facts that would entitle him to the relief sought. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984); Mosley v. Klincar, 947 F.2d 1338, 1339 (7th Cir.1991). In applying this standard, we treat all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and we construe all inferences that reasonably may be drawn from those facts in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Szumny v. Am. Gen. Fin., 246 F.3d 1065, 1067 (7th Cir. 2001); Latuszkin v. City of Chicago, 250 F.3d 502, 504 (7th Cir.2001); United Transp. Union v. Gateway Western Ry. Co., 78 F.3d 1208 (7th Cir.1996).
Under Title VII, it is unlawful for an employer "to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., as amended. Prior to filing an employment discrimination claim, however, a plaintiff must exhaust his administrative remedies by filing a timely EEOC charge and receiving a Right to Sue Notice. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(a)(1). Baker properly followed these procedures; nevertheless, substantive flaws in his EEOC charge undermine his national origin discrimination claim. It is a well-established rule that a Title VII plaintiff cannot allege claims in a lawsuit that are not included in his EEOC charge because the purpose of the EEOC charge is to notify the employer of the nature of the charges against it, and to provide the EEOC with a basis for undertaking an investigation of the allegations as well as to conciliate between the parties. Vela v. Village of Sauk Village, 218 F.3d 661, 664 (7th Cir.2000); Cheek v. Western and Southern Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 497, 500 (7th Cir.1994). An exception to this general rule, however, allows for some divergence between a Plaintiffs EEOC charge and his claims in a lawsuit. Id.; see also Babrocky v. Jewel Food Co., 773 F.2d 857, 864 (7th Cir.1985); Sauzek v. Exxon Coal USA Inc., 202 F.3d 913, 920 (7th Cir. 2000). Under this exception, a plaintiff may allege facts in his complaint different from those in his EEOC charge only when they are "like or reasonably related" to the allegations contained in his EEOC charge. Cheek, 31 F.3d at 500. Baker's EEOC charge did not include a claim of national origin discrimination distinct from his claim of race discrimination. Accordingly, in order for his national origin claim to survive a motion to dismiss, it must be "like or reasonably related" to the allegations contained in the EEOC charge, and must "reasonably be expected to grow out of an EEOC investigation of the allegations in the charge." Id.
The claims in a federal complaint and the claims in an EEOC charge are "like or reasonably related" if there is a factual relationship between them such that, at a minimum, the EEOC charge and the complaint "describe the same conduct and implicate the same individuals." Id. at 501; see Rush v. McDonald's Corp., 966 F.2d 1104, 1110 (7th Cir.1992) ().
On the EEOC charge form, Baker checked only the box for race discrimination and supported his complaint with the following statement:
I believe that I have been discriminated against ... in that I have not been promoted because of my race, Black.... In addition, Carl Hoffman made a discriminatory remark which clearly indicated to me that I would not be considered for promotion because of my race.
Compl, Ex. A. Not only did Baker fail to check the box for national origin discrimination on the EEOC charge form, he did not refer to national origin discrimination or identify his national origin in the charge's narrative section. Id. The clear and unequivocal tone of Baker's allegations of race discrimination set forth in the EEOC charge supports a race claim. His allegations do not, however, support or put FSSA on notice of a national origin complaint.
In addition, Baker's complaint and his EEOC charge do not describe the same conduct or implicate the same individuals so as to be "like or reasonably related." In his complaint, Baker states that he applied for the same position as Hunter, an African-American; that Hunter was offered the position; and that Hunter was quickly terminated from the position because he was unable to perform the required duties. Compl. 11113-14. Baker's EEOC charge, on the other hand, mentions a racially derogatory remark made by his supervisor, Hoffman,2 but fails to allege or even mention discrimination based on national...
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