Baker v. Ramey

Decision Date01 January 1863
Citation27 Tex. 52
PartiesM. L. BAKER v. ELIZABETH RAMEY AND OTHERS.
CourtTexas Supreme Court
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

A vendor of land, who retains a lien thereon for the purchase money, has the superior right to the land as against his vendees until the payment of the purchase money; and his deed to the vendees, reserving such lien, does not vest absolute title in them until the purchase money is paid, previous to which they hold the property in subordination to the vendor's superior right.

NOTE.--Darst v. Trammell, post, 129; Monroe v. Buchanan, post, 241; Byler v. Johnson, 45 Tex. 509;Peters v. Clements, 46 Tex., 114;Cannon v. McDaniel, 46 Tex., 303;Masterson v. Cohen, 46 Tex., 520.

In such a case, it is immaterial that the notes given for the purchase money have become barred by the statute of limitation; without payment of the purchase money, the vendees cannot obtain absolute title to the property as against the vendor.

The case of Dunlap's Adm'r v. Wright, 11 Tex., 597, cited and approved.

APPEAL from Rusk. Tried below before the Hon. C. A. Frazer.

This was an action of trespass to try title, brought by Baker, the appellant, against Elizabeth Ramey, one of the appellees, for two lots in the town of Henderson, and the Mansion House hotel situated thereon.

The property in controversy, with other lots, was sold by Baker on the 28th of December, 1853, to Joel B. Crain and George H. Ramey, as partners in the business of hotel-keeping, who executed their note to Baker for $2,300 as the purchase money, payable on 1st of March, 1854, with the privilege of payment in cash notes at any time before maturity. On the same date, Baker executed his deed for the property sold, to Crain & Ramey, reciting therein that it was made “for and in consideration of the note, conditions and stipulations hereinafter specifically set forth.” The deed then described the property conveyed and the note for the purchase money, and proceeded, “which said principal note, and the notes received thereon as purchase money, are hereby created as a lien upon the same until the same and all costs arising from suit on the same are discharged;” and subsequently provided that the deed should be “subject to this defeasance or condition only above stated, that the said notes received thereon, with all cost and interest, are discharged as the purchase money.”

On the 18th of April, 1854, Baker instituted suit on the note against Crain & Ramey, admitting credits to the amount of $1,044. This suit was continued from term to term until the spring of 1857, when Baker amended his petition, and alleged that the note was given for the purchase money of the property already described; and that Crain & Ramey, the defendants, were partners, and purchased the property as partnership property, and further suggested the death of Ramey, and discontinued the suit as to him. At the spring term, 1857, there was judgment rendered in this suit in favor of Baker against Crain, as surviving partner, and a decree for a sale of the property to satisfy the judgment. The property was accordingly sold by the sheriff, under execution, on the first Tuesday in July, 1857, when Baker became the purchaser upon his bid of the amount of the judgment and costs.

The deed of the sheriff to Baker, made in pursuance of this sale, was the title asserted by the latter in his present action of trespass to try title against Elizabeth Ramey, the widow of George H. Ramey, in which he sued out a writ of sequestration, under which the sheriff dispossessed the defendant, Mrs. Ramey.

The defendant excepted and answered, alleging the facts above stated, and that on the 28th of December, 1854, pending the suit of Baker against Crain and George H. Ramey, Crain, in consideration of the payment to him of $2,000, sold to said Ramey, by warranty deed, all his interest in the property sued for; that since the sale of the property by Baker to Crain & Ramey, in December, 1853, it had been occupied by Ramey, deceased, with the defendant, his widow, and their four children, as their homestead, up to the ejection of defendant and her children, by the sheriff, under the writ of sequestration issued in this case; that Crain & Ramey and this defendant had put improvements on the property to the value of about $3,000; and that since the eviction of the defendant by the writ of sequestration, the rents and profits of the premises had been worth $1,000 per annum; that Baker, the plaintiff, had never had a valid title to the property, but that the title to an undivided half thereof was in the heirs of Noveline Ochiltree, deceased. And in consideration of the premises, defendant demanded judgment against plaintiff for the possession of the property, for rents and profits since she was dispossessed, and for her damages incurred thereby.

There were numerous exceptions and amendments upon both sides.

Eventually, the plaintiff, protesting that his purchase of the property under the decree against Crain, as surviving partner, invested him with title to all the interest both of Crain and Ramey, amended his pleadings, and claimed, in case he was held not to have acquired title to Ramey's interest, that his lien as vendor be enforced against the same; that his bid at the sale, under the decree, was made in the belief that he was purchasing the whole interest of Ramey as well as Crain; that at the time of the decree in the suit upon the note (referred to in the opinion as No. 1137), Ramey was dead, and there was no administration on his estate; that subsequently thereto his widow, the defendant, and James McBride had obtained letters of administration; that plaintiff had presented to them, within due time, the note for the purchase money, with his affidavit thereto, that it was a just demand against Ramey's estate unless he, the plaintiff, had acquired Ramey's interest by his purchase under the decree against Crain as surviving partner, and that the administrators rejected it as a claim against the estate. The administrators and heirs of Ramey, deceased, were made defendants.

In answer to these amendments the defendants adopted all their former exceptions and answers, and further alleged the presentation to Ramey's administrators of the note, as stated by the plaintiff, and their rejection of it; and that it was barred by limitation, because the plaintiff had not brought suit upon it within three months after its rejection; and also because more than four years had elapsed from the maturity of said note up to the filing of plaintiff's amended petition, setting it up as a cause of action in this suit. The plaintiff excepted to this answer, and his exceptions were overruled.

At the trial, the defendants abandoned their plea of outstanding title in the heirs of Noveline Ochiltree.

The court instructed the jury, in substance, that the plaintiff, by his purchase under the decree, acquired one undivided half interest in the property; and directed the jury to find specially whether the writ of sequestration was wrongfully sued out by the plaintiff to oppress Mrs. Ramey, in which case they could allow her exemplary damages; that in case they found for the plaintiff one-half the property, they should find for the defendants half the rent of it for the time they had been dispossessed under the sequestration; that they would also find the amount of purchase money due on the judgment against Crain, as surviving partner at the date of the sale by the sheriff; and also the amount of damages done to the property since the eviction of Mrs. Ramey under the sequestration.

The verdict returned was as follows: “We, the jury, find for the defendants two hundred and fifty-seven dollars and sixty-four cents; when the above amount is liquidated by the plaintiff, then the property to belong to the plaintiff and the defendants as partners, each holding equal parts in said property.

+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                ¦We find the amount of the judgment at the date of sale by the      ¦$1,801 02¦
                ¦sheriff                                                            ¦         ¦
                +-------------------------------------------------------------------+---------¦
                ¦Cost and interest to date                                          ¦420 00   ¦
...

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