Baker v. State
| Decision Date | 09 September 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 36477,36477 |
| Citation | 271 S.E.2d 360,246 Ga. 317 |
| Parties | BAKER v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Marson G. Dunaway, Jr., Rockmart, for appellant.
William A. Foster, III, Dist. Atty., Daniel J. Sammons, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee.
John Baker was convicted in Polk County for aggravated battery and sentenced to twelve years. Baker filed a motion for new trial which the trial court overruled and Baker appeals. We reverse.
1. Baker argues that his aggravated battery conviction cannot stand because the prohibition in Code Ann. § 26-1305 against maliciously causing bodily harm to another "by seriously disfiguring his body" is so vague as to violate the due process clause of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
The state contends that this enumeration of error cannot be considered on the ground that said enumeration was raised for the first time in Baker's motion for new trial, and moves that the case be transferred to the Court of Appeals.
While this court has held that "(a) question as to the constitutionality of a law can not be raised for the first time in a motion for a new trial" Stone v. State, 202 Ga. 203, 204, 42 S.E.2d 727 (1947), we have more recently noted that a defendant cannot waive his right to litigate, by writ of habeas corpus, the constitutionality of a statute under which he has been convicted, and that, therefore, in order to avoid future habeas corpus litigation, we will adjudicate untimely challenges to a statute's constitutionality on direct appeal. Barnes v. State, 244 Ga. 302, 303, 260 S.E.2d 40 (1979). The state's motion to transfer is denied.
2. "It is well established that vagueness challenges to statutes which do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in the light of the facts of the case at hand." United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550, 95 S.Ct. 710, 714, 42 L.Ed.2d 706 (1974).
Thus, the issue before this court is whether Code Ann. § 26-1305's prohibition against maliciously causing bodily harm to another "by seriously disfiguring his body" gave Baker due notice that it prohibited the acts for which he has been convicted. See Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 230, 71 S.Ct. 703, 707, 95 L.Ed. 886 (1950).
Black's Law Dictionary defines "disfigurement" as "that which impairs or injures ... the appearance of a person ...," and defines "serious" as "grave, (or) great."
There is evidence in this record that Baker hit his mother-in-law, Madge Godfrey, breaking her nose "all to pieces"; that he hit her "repeatedly"; that the results of his beating were "severe, extensive bruises throughout the face and eyes, and forehead" with "deep lacerations" at the bridge of her nose, her right brow, and her left temple, with "arterial bleeding" flowing from the final laceration; and, that the totality of the injuries required approximately twenty-five stitches.
We hold that the prohibition against maliciously causing bodily harm to another "by seriously disfiguring his body" gave Baker due notice that it prohibited the acts for which he has been convicted.
3. At trial, Baker advanced two exculpatory theories: first, that Mrs. Godfrey had physically attacked his wife (who is also Mrs. Godfrey's daughter) during a discussion regarding custody of his wife's son, that his wife had kicked Mrs. Godfrey in the face during the altercation, thereby causing the deep laceration in, and arterial bleeding from, Mrs. Godfrey's left temple, and that the other injuries sustained by Mrs. Godfrey were the result of Baker's exercise of reasonable (and therefore justified) force to protect the physical safety of his wife; second, that even if the other injuries sustained by Mrs. Godfrey were the result of Baker's exercise of unreasonable force, said injuries did not constitute "serious disfigurement" and thus warranted a conviction for the crime of simple battery only.
These exculpatory theories advanced by Baker raised two material issues of fact: (1) did Mrs. Godfrey attack Baker's wife and (2) did Baker's wife kick Mrs. Godfrey in the head, thereby causing the deep laceration in the latter's left temple?
As probative of Mrs. Godfrey's motive for attacking his wife, Baker attempted to elicit testimony from Mrs. Godfrey concerning the reason for the transfer of legal custody of his wife's child from his wife to Mrs. Godfrey, and the number of transfers of the child's physical custody between the two. For the same reason, Baker also attempted to elicit Mrs. Godfrey's testimony that her sole source of...
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