Baker v. State
| Decision Date | 03 May 1978 |
| Docket Number | No. 50240,50240 |
| Citation | 358 So.2d 401 |
| Parties | Larry BAKER, Robert Coleman, Henry Gardner, Calvin Hartzog v. STATE of Mississippi. |
| Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
Henry Gardner, pro se.
A. F. Summer, Atty. Gen., by Karen Gilfoy, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee.
Before SUGG, WALKER and COFER, JJ.
WALKER, Justice, for the Court:
This is an appeal from an order overruling and dismissing a petition for writ of error coram nobis. The petition was filed in the Circuit Court of Jefferson Davis County. Without an evidentiary hearing, the court overruled the petition and dismissed it. On appeal, petitioners contend it was error to overrule the petition without conducting an evidentiary hearing.
We affirm the dismissal of the petition, but on different grounds than that of the trial judge.
In their petition appellants contend they were denied effective assistance of counsel when entering their plea of guilty to rape and that their guilty pleas were the product of duress and therefore involuntary. Specifically, they contend that prior to the plea they had all given written statements which were obtained by threats and use of force against them. Additionally they allege that their court-appointed attorney erroneously told them they would face the possibility of capital punishment if they elected to stand trial.
The record in this cause reveals that appellants were represented by counsel when entering their pleas of guilty, and the trial judge conducted a thorough examination of each defendant as to whether the pleas were knowingly and voluntarily given. Among other things, the trial judge specifically asked if the plea was free and voluntary, to which each defendant replied, "yes." He then asked if there had been any threats or abuse, to which all replied, "no."
In a like manner, the trial judge asked if the court-appointed attorneys had advised them of their rights and the significance of pleading guilty. They answered in the affirmative and went on to expressly state that they were satisfied with their legal representation.
When the petition for error coram nobis was considered by the trial court, the only evidence before the judge was the petition and the record made at the time the guilty pleas were taken. In his written opinion, the trial judge impliedly held that the record showed the pleas were voluntary and therefore were conclusive on petitioners.
Appellants contend that they should not be precluded from an evidentiary hearing based on the transcript of the guilty plea hearing alone. In an analogous though different situation, the United States Supreme Court held that federal courts may not adopt a per se rule prohibiting challenge to a guilty plea even though the transcript of the plea on its face shows a voluntary and knowing plea. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977). That case, however, involved a guilty plea allegedly based on a plea bargain agreement which was not kept. Under that circumstance, the attack was not on the voluntariness or knowingness of the plea, but rather on the failure of the state to abide by its promise.
We agree with the spirit of Blackledge, e. g., that there should not be a per se rule prohibiting collateral attack on a plea in all circumstances, simply because the transcript on its face reflects recitation of voluntariness and awareness of the consequence. On the other hand, we are mindful, as stated in Blackledge, that "Solemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity." The state, the defendant, and the judicial system all have a significant interest in the plea. For the defendant, if guilty, he can begin serving his sentence without facing the delay and agony of a futile trial. Time is conserved for the state prosecutor and an already crowded court system is spared an unnecessary burden. Balanced against these administrative interests of course is the interest of protecting constitutional rights, particularly in the criminal law area.
Because of these competing interests, we agree that a per se rule excluding collateral attack on pleas facially correct, is not warranted. On the other hand with the need for an end to litigation and conclusiveness of judgment at some point, we must severely limit the circumstance under which an apparently correct plea may be attacked. We have done this to a certain extent in prior cases. In Botts v. State, 210 So.2d 777 (Miss.1968), we held that:
The burden of proof is upon the petitioner on an application for a writ of error coram nobis to establish to a reasonable probability facts upon which he relies for relief. Wheeler v. State, 219 Miss. 129, 155, 63 So.2d 517, 68 So.2d 868, 70 So.2d 82 (1954); 18 Am.Jur.2d Coram Nobis § 26 (1965).
Thus, it is at least clear the burden of proof is on the petitioner. The measure of proof required is that of a reasonable probability.
In the present case, petitioners allege they were under duress because they had previously signed a written statement under threats from law enforcement officials. Balanced against this allegation is that part of the plea transcript where defendants expressly denied to the court that they were under any duress to plead guilty. In such a situation the trial judge is confronted with sworn statements made in open court by an accused denying any duress on the one hand, while on the other hand, he has presented to him a petition, unsupported by affidavits of others, by the same person alleging that there was duress. We hold, that in such a situation, the petition fails to rise to the level of a reasonable probability as required by Botts, supra. In order to rise to the required level, the petition of defendants must have attached affidavits of other persons which demonstrate a reasonable probability that the latter allegation is true.
The same analysis, however, does not hold true as to appellants' second contention. If, as alleged, appellants pleaded guilty under the mistaken advice that they could be subject to capital punishment if convicted at trial, this then, is a factor which may make appropriate a collateral attack on the plea by way of a petition for error coram...
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