Baker v. The County of Warren

• Decision Date: 28 July 1899
• Docket Number: 235-1899
• Citation: 11 Pa.Super. 170
• Parties: E. D. Baker, Appellant, v. The County of Warren
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

11 Pa.Super. 170

E. D. Baker, Appellant, v. The County of Warren

No. 235-1899

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

July 28, 1899

Argued May 18, 1899

Appeal by plaintiff, from judgment of C.P. Warren Co.-1899, No. 40 on case submitted to the decision of the court, under act of 1874, in favor of defendant.

Assumpsit. Before Lindsey, P. J.

It appears from the testimony that in April, 1898, there was a large and extensive forest of timber and brush lands situated in Warren county owned by different persons. Three separate fires were discovered in said forest and a portion of the same owned by G. W. Campbell & Sons, one April 30, one May 9 and 10, and one July 8 and 9, 1898. These fires were of considerable magnitude and burned over several hundred acres of timber land before they could be extinguished. At the time of these fires the constable of the township in which they occurred, by virtue of his office ex officio fire warden for the same, was called upon by the plaintiff to assist in extinguishing the said fires. The plaintiff was an employee of G. W. Campbell & Sons at the several times when the fires were discovered, he was paid by them his regular daily wages for the period when the first two fires occurred, but was not paid for work performed at said fires, nor for extra time that he worked at night; neither was he paid for any of the time spent in assisting to extinguish the last fire. While each of the three fires was in the same forest and on different portions of lands owned by G. W. Campbell & Sons yet other portions of this same forest were owned by different persons and there was evidence tending to show that they might have been destroyed by said fires had not the plaintiff and others assisted the constable in putting out the same. It also appears that Campbell & Sons notified the constable of the fires and invoked his assistance; also that part of the duties of the plaintiff was to guard against and extinguish any fires occurring on the lands of his employer. The plaintiff claimed the sum of $ 5.40 as due him under the Act of March 30, 1897, P. L. 9.

The court below entered judgment for the defendant, holding inter alia, as follows:

[We are, therefore, of opinion that the part of the act requiring the several counties and the state to pay the expense of putting out forest fires is unconstitutional and void.] [We are also of opinion that the claim of the plaintiff is not one that comes within the spirit and meaning of the act of March 30, 1897.]

Judgment for defendant. Plaintiff appealed.

Errors assigned among others were to portions of the general charge, reciting same. In directing the prothonotary to enter judgment for defendant with costs. In its answer to defendant's fourth request for legal conclusions, which request and answer are as follows: " 4. Under all the evidence and law in this case the plaintiff is not entitled to recover, and the judgment must be for the defendant. Answer: The third and fourth are sustained."

Affirmed.

J. W. Dunkle, for appellant. -- If the judgment of the court below is to stand then the act of March 30, 1897, relating to the protection of forests from fire, is practically a nullity, and of no benefit for the purposes for which it was passed.

It is generally conceded by all authority that the destruction of the forests of this commonwealth works great injury to the state and its citizens.

All that is required is that the title fairly give notice of the subject of the act so as reasonably to lead to an inquiry into its body: Com. v. Lloyd, 2 Pa.Super. 6, affirmed in 178 Pa. 308. See also Bradley v. Pittsburg, 130 Pa. 475, Pittsburg v. Daly, 5 Pa.Super. 528, and Com. v. Green, 58 Pa. 229.

We think the principle decided in Com. v. Lloyd, 2 Pa.Super. 6, and Hayes v. Cumberland Co., 5 Pa.Super. 159, rules the case now before this court.

W. W. Wilbur, of Wilbur & Schnur, for appellee. -- The title to an act must not only contain but one object the subject of the legislation, but must also express the same so clearly and fully as to give notice of the legislative purpose to those specially interested therein.

Clearly to express does not mean that which is dubious and hence not clearly expressed.

While an act may conform to the first rule, it must also to the second and express the legislative purpose to place burdens on the taxpayers: Road in Phoenixville, 109 Pa. 44.

The legislature must give notice in the title of the act of their intention to impose liability upon the municipality to be affected by the legislation, otherwise the legislation is void: Quinn v. Cumberland Co., 162 Pa. 55.

Before Rice, P. J., Beaver, W. W. Porter, W. D. Porter and Beeber, JJ.

OPINION

RICE, J.

The plaintiff claimed to recover from the county at the rate of twelve cents an hour for services rendered his employers, G. W. Campbell and Sons, in extinguishing forest fires which originated in and were confined to the lands or timber owned by them, for which services his employers have either paid him or are liable. This is not the precise way in which he states his claim, but as we proceed we think it will be seen that this is what it amounts to under the evidence. Is the county liable under the Act of March 30, 1897, P. L. 9?

The object of this legislation is the prevention and extinction of forest fires. Its subject, as expressed in the title of the act, is the powers and duties of township constables as ex officio fire wardens, and the duties of citizens required by such officers to render assistance in the extinguishment of fires. There is not a provision in the body of the act that is not germane to this subject. The act, therefore contains but one subject. This is frankly conceded by the appellees' counsel. " But, unity of subject is not enough," Road in Phoenixville, 109 Pa. 44, and it is argued that the subject is not clearly expressed in the title, because no mention is made of the matter of compensation. The validity of this objection depends...