Bakewell v. Breitenstein

• Citation: 396 S.W.3d 406
• Decision Date: 05 March 2013
• Docket Number: No. WD 75341.,WD 75341.
• Parties: John Randolph BAKEWELL, Appellant, v. Laurie K. BREITENSTEIN, Successor Trustee of the Janice M. Bakewell Living Trust Dated July 2, 2010, Respondent, Jerry D. Lawson, Trustee For CitiFinancial Services, Inc.; Respondent, John Randolph Bakewell, Personal Representative Of The Estate Of Janice M. Bakewell, Deceased, Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

396 S.W.3d 406

John Randolph BAKEWELL, Appellant,
v.
Laurie K. BREITENSTEIN, Successor Trustee of the Janice M. Bakewell Living Trust Dated July 2, 2010, Respondent,
Jerry D. Lawson, Trustee For CitiFinancial Services, Inc.; Respondent,
John Randolph Bakewell, Personal Representative Of The Estate Of Janice M. Bakewell, Deceased, Respondent.

No. WD 75341.

Missouri Court of Appeals,
Western District.

March 5, 2013.

[396 S.W.3d 408]

John Randolph Bakewell, Appellant Pro Se.

David G. Bandre, Jefferson City, MO, for respondent Laurie K. Breitenstein.

Matthew A. Clement, Jefferson City, MO, for respondent Jerry Lawson.

Before Division Three: Cynthia L. Martin, Presiding Judge, Joseph M. Ellis, Judge and Gary D. Witt, Judge

CYNTHIA L. MARTIN, Judge.

This appeal involves the effect of a judicial decree of legal separation on the property rights of a spouse following the death of the other spouse.

Following the death of Janice M. Bakewell (“Ms. Bakewell”), John Bakewell (“Mr. Bakewell”) filed a declaratory judgment action against Laurie Breitenstein (“Breitenstein”), successor trustee of Ms. Bakewell's living trust, and Jerry Lawson (“Lawson”), trustee on a deed of trust executed by Ms. Bakewell in favor of CitiFinancial Services, Inc. Mr. Bakewell sought a declaration that he was the lawful owner of real estate awarded to Ms. Bakewell in a legal separation judgment prior to her death. Breitenstein counterclaimed and sought a declaration that Ms. Bakewell's living trust was the lawful owner of a deferred compensation account awarded to Ms. Bakewell in the legal separation judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment finding Mr. Bakewell possessed no rights in the real estate and declaring the living trust to be the owner of the deferred compensation account. Mr. Bakewell appeals, pro se.

We affirm.

[396 S.W.3d 409]

Factual and Procedural History¹

The material facts are not in dispute. In 1977, Mr. and Ms. Bakewell married. In 1989, Mr. and Ms. Bakewell purchased a home located at 241 Fredricks Lane, Jefferson City, Missouri (“the Real Estate”). In 2004, Ms. Bakewell filed for legal separation from Mr. Bakewell. On February 17, 2005, the Cole County Circuit Court entered a judgment and decree of legal separation (“the Separation Judgment”), in which the trial court approved a property settlement agreement and divided the marital property and debts between Mr. Bakewell and Ms. Bakewell.²

Pursuant to the Separation Judgment, Ms. Bakewell was awarded the Real Estate and her “PEBSCO deferred compensation plan” (“the Deferred Compensation Account”) as her sole and separate property. The Separation Judgment provided that Mr. Bakewell “shall have no right, title, or interest” in the Real Estate or the Deferred Compensation Account. Similarly, the Separation Judgment awarded Mr. Bakewell certain property as to which Ms. Bakewell was ordered to “have no right, title, or interest.”

The Separation Judgment also generally ordered the parties to “execute appropriate deeds, quit-claims, and such certificates of title or other documents as are necessary to show sole ownership of the items of real and personal property awarded to each herein.” On February 28, 2005, Mr. Bakewell executed a quitclaim deed (“Quitclaim Deed”), wherein Mr. Bakewell, “in conformance with [the Separation Judgment],” agreed to “Remise, Release and forever Quit–Claim” the Real Estate to Ms. Bakewell “so that neither [Mr. Bakewell] nor his heirs ... shall or will hereafter claim or demand any right or title to the [Real Estate], but they, and every one of them shall, by these presents, be excluded and forever barred.” The Quitclaim Deed was recorded on July 8, 2005.

In 2008, CitiFinancial Services, Inc. (“CitiFinancial”) extended credit to Ms. Bakewell in the principal sum of $47,100.62. Ms. Bakewell executed a deed of trust (“Deed of Trust”) in favor of CitiFinancial granting it a lien on the Real Estate to secure payment. Lawson is the trustee on the Deed of Trust.

On July 2, 2010, Ms. Bakewell conveyed the Real Estate by deed (“Deed”) into the “Janice M. Bakewell as Trustee of the ‘Janice M. Bakewell Living Trust Dated July 2, 2010’ ” (“Trust”).³ The Deed was recorded on July 6, 2010. Breitenstein is the successor trustee of the Trust.

[396 S.W.3d 410]

On July 10, 2010, Ms. Bakewell died.⁴ At the time of Ms. Bakewell's death, she and Mr. Bakewell were still married, notwithstanding their legal separation pursuant to the 2005 Separation Judgment.

On August 30, 2010, Mr. Bakewell filed a declaratory judgment against Breitenstein, as successor trustee of the Trust, and against Lawson, as trustee for CitiFinancial on the Deed of Trust.⁵ Mr. Bakewell sought to void the Quitclaim Deed, the Deed of Trust, and the Deed, and sought a declaration that he was the lawful owner of the Real Estate. Mr. Bakewell claimed that the Quitclaim Deed, which had not named Ms. Bakewell as a grantor, failed to lawfully convey his interest in the Real Estate because it was owned by he and Ms. Bakewell as tenants by the entirety. Mr. Bakewell thus claimed that Ms. Bakewell's subsequent conveyances via the Deed of Trust and the Deed were void because he had never waived his inheritance and statutory rights as a surviving spouse in the manner required by section 474.120.⁶

Breitenstein counterclaimed seeking a declaration that the Deferred Compensation Account was the property of the Trust.⁷

Mr. Bakewell, Breitenstein, and Lawson filed competing motions for summary judgment addressing the claims asserted in Mr. Bakewell's petition.⁸

On April 7, 2011, the trial court entered a partial summary judgment finding, in pertinent part:

3. [Mr. Bakewell] was divested of his title and interest in said Real Estate as a result of the [Separation Judgment] entered by this court[.] While better practice would have been to include the legal description of the Real Estate in that judgment, the execution of [the Quitclaim Deed] by [Mr. Bakewell], the same required of him by said judgment, divests him of any claim of marital interest.

4. Defendants Breitenstein and Lawson are entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to the issue of ownership of the Real Estate and the validity of the claims of the Janice M. Bakewell Living Trust dated July 2, 2010 and CitiFinancial Services, Inc.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS:

5. Defendants Breitenstein and Lawson are hereby granted summary judgment in their favor on the issues of extinguishment of any claim of [Mr. Bakewell] to the Real Estate. Following the [Separation Judgment], and the execution and filing of the [Quitclaim Deed] recorded with the Recorder of Deeds for Cole County, Missouri ... the Real Estate became the sole and separate property of [Ms. Bakewell].

[396 S.W.3d 411]

Mr. Bakewell] has no right, title or interest to the Real Estate.

(Emphasis added.)

On May 2, 2011, Mr. Bakewell appealed. While his appeal was pending, Breitenstein filed a motion for summary judgment on her counterclaim regarding the Deferred Compensation Account. Breitenstein asserted that the Separation Judgment awarded the Deferred Compensation Account ⁹ to Ms. Bakewell, that Ms. Bakewell subsequently named the Trust as the transfer on death owner of the Deferred Compensation Account, but that absent a court order, the company managing the Deferred Compensation Account would not honor the transfer on death designation.

On February 21, 2012, we dismissed Mr. Bakewell's appeal because the partial summary judgment entered by the trial court was not a final judgment for purposes of appeal. Bakewell v. Breitenstein, 363 S.W.3d 353 (Mo.App. W.D.2012).

On May 25, 2012, the trial court entered summary judgment (“Judgment”) granting Breitenstein's counterclaim by declaring that Mr. Bakewell “retains and holds no ownership or marital interest” in Ms. Bakewell's Deferred Compensation Account and that the Trust is the true and rightful owner of the Deferred Compensation Account. The Judgment also entered judgment in favor of Breitenstein and Lawson on all of Mr. Bakewell's claims by incorporating the partial summary judgment previously entered by the trial court by reference.

Mr. Bakewell appeals.

Standard of Review

“ ‘When considering appeals from summary judgments, [we] will review the record in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was entered.’ ” State ex rel. Ad Trend, Inc. v. City of Platte City, 272 S.W.3d 201, 203 (Mo.App. W.D.2008) (quoting ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Mid–Am. Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371, 376 (Mo. banc 1993)). “ ‘Our review is essentially de novo. The criteria on appeal for testing the propriety of summary judgment are no different from those which should be employed by the trial court to determine the propriety of sustaining the motion initially.’ ” Id. (citation omitted). “ ‘Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ ” Sauvain v. Acceptance Idem. Ins. Co., 339 S.W.3d 555, 568 (Mo.App. W.D.2011) (citation omitted).

Analysis

Mr. Bakewell asserts five points on appeal.¹⁰ In his first three points, Mr. Bakewell alleges that the trial court erroneously “reformed” the Quitclaim Deed. In his fourth point, Mr. Bakewell alleges that the trial court erroneously failed to void the Deed of Trust. In his fifth point, Mr. Bakewell alleges that the trial court erroneously declared the Deferred Compensation Account to be Trust property.

Points I, II, & III

In his first three points on appeal, Mr. Bakewell claims that the trial court erred in “reforming” the Quitclaim Deed. The

[396 S.W.3d 412

import of these points is an assertion that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction or contravened existing law by treating the Quitclaim Deed as legally effective to convey Mr. Bakewell's interest in the Real Estate to Ms. Bakewell. We conclude that because Mr. Bakewell was divested of all right, title, and interest in the Real...