Baldassari v. Produce Terminal Realty Corp.

Decision Date05 May 1972
Citation361 Mass. 738,282 N.E.2d 649
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
PartiesSalvatore BALDASSARI v. PRODUCE TERMINAL REALTY CORPORATION.

Edward S. Ronan, Boston, for plaintiff.

George M. Ford, Boston (Thomas D. Burns, Boston, with him), for defendant.

Before TAURO, C.J., and CUTTER, SPIEGEL, REARDON and HENNESSEY, JJ.

SPIEGEL, Justice.

In this action of tort the plaintiff seeks to recover for injuries sustained on February 3, 1966, as a result of a fall on an accumulation of snow and ice on a platform owned and controlled by Produce Terminal Realty Corporation (Produce). The declaration was in four counts. Two counts were against Produce and two counts were against Boston Market Terminal Company (Boston). During the course of the trial the plaintiff discontinued his action against Boston. We are here concerned with two counts against Produce of an amended declaration. One count essentially alleges that the plaintiff's fall was on an 'artificial and unnatural accumulation of snow and ice' negligently permitted to exist upon the above mentioned platform. The other count essentially alleges that the plaintiff's fall was on a 'collection of ice' negligently allowed to remain on the platform. At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial judge allowed Produce's motion for directed verdicts. The case is before us on the plaintiff's exception to the allowance of the motion.

We summarize the evidence most favorable to the plaintiff. There was testimony from one James T. Hayes, the treasurer of both Boston and Produce, that Produce was a wholly owned subsidiary of Boston. In 1966, Produce 'owned, controlled and maintained' a certain property in South Boston known as the 'Boston Market Terminal' (Terminal). 'The Terminal was then a market facility maintained by Produce for the exclusive use and convenience of about forty or forty-five produce companies which were licensed members of the Terminal organization. The (T)erminal consisted of three long freight houses with six platforms, one along each side of the houses, plus one platform at the end of one of the houses called the house eleven platform. The Terminal entrance was marked by a sign, Boston Market Terminal, and the houses were approachable on train tracks or on macadam and cobblestone roadways. Above the freight houses, connected by an overhead bridge, there were office spaces which Produce orally leased to various member companies. Sawyer & Company (Sawyer), the employer of the plaintiff, was a member company, which also leased office space under a tenancy at will. . . . Boston . . . occupied office space as a tenant of Produce, and paid Produce rent based in large part upon the unit charges Boston levied upon member companies, determined by the number of train or truck units that used the platforms for loading or unloading. Only trucks owned or controlled by member companies could use the Terminal facility, with the exception of a very few trucks sent there on consignment.'

Hayes also testified that Boston was not responsible for maintaining the facility. Produce's maintenance crew had the responsibility to maintain all three freight houses and their platforms, which included the shoveling, salting and sanding of all platforms. 'The maintenance crew . . . would watch the storm elements and when a storm was subsiding or ending, they would go out and clear the platforms. The house eleven platform, being open to the elements on all sides was used less frequently in winter; however it was available for use by any member company at any time. This particular platform which was eight feet wide and 280 feet long, had a fiberglass roof, fastened by nails to wooden supports which resulted in roof leakage. The roof leakage was repaired at some time by replacing the nails with special type washers with calking.' Hayes 'did not know whether the roof was repaired in the winter of 1966.'

The plaintiff testified that he worked as a delivery clerk at the Terminal for Sawyer. His duties 'included the delivery of samples of produce, from . . . (Sawyer's) trucks on the various platforms, to the freight house, where he would set the samples up on display for sale; after which he would return the samples to the truck.' On Wednesday, February 3, 1966, he began work at 4 A.M. He was instructed by his foreman, one Horace H. Henry, to deliver samples of cabbage to the freight house from a truck at house eleven platform. The platform had thirty truck stalls, fifteen located on each side. The cabbage truck was parked at number twelve stall. At 4 A.M. with the assistance of a flashlight, he walked out onto the platform, climbed aboard a side truck and rode to the cabbage truck at number twelve stall. While he was on the house eleven platform, he observed that the center of the platform was covered with 'wavy ice' about 'six inches thick.' He walked on the edge of the platform where he observed no ice. When he returned Henry told him to stand by in case further samples were required from this or other trucks that might come to that platform. At about 7:30 A.M., Henry told the plaintiff to deliver more samples from the cabbage truck. At this time, the plaintiff observed 'that the middle of the platform was covered with thick wavy ice, that that ice was dangerous, but that there was a space along the edge of the platform where there were clear spaces without ice.' The plaintiff stated, 'I was walking where I knew there was no danger, where I knew there were no spots of ice.' This clear space was about twelve inches wide and it appeared to the plaintiff to exist along the entire edge of the platform. In walking along this space at about 7:30 A.M., the plaintiff 'wore rubbers, and watched carefully where he placed his feet.' When he reached stall eleven, about fifteen or twenty feet from the cabbage truck in stall twelve, he 'slipped on ice, fell and broke his ankle.'

Prior to the date and time of his fall the plaintiff observed that there had been no snow fall or precipitation for several days. He further observed that 'the roof of this house eleven platform leaked in the summer when it rained, and that it leaked in the winter when there was any snow resting and melting on it. On February 3, 1966, there was snow accumulation of several inches on the ground from a snow storm several days earlier.'

The plaintiff further testified that there was no sand or rock salt on the ice on the platform, and that he had never seen any sand or rock salt there even though he had seen ice and snow there before.

One Joseph A. Locke, a maintenance man for Produce, who supervised a crew of between three and six, testified that he and his crew had the responsibility to salt, and and shovel clear the various platforms in the winter of 1966. Locke or one of his assistants would inspect the condition of the platforms. Upon such inspection, or upon receiving any complaint from the member companies, Locke's crew would clear up, sand, or salt the platforms.

There was also testimony from Henry that there were leaky spots in the roof over the house eleven platform, that these 'spots were observable by walking down the platform, looking up and seeing the holes right through the roof' and that the icy condition of the platform was much the same as the day before the accident.

1. We first consider the question whether adequate notice of the time, place and cause of the plaintiff's accident was sent by the plaintiff. The plaintiff's notice, addressed to 'Boston Market Terminal, 31 Hs Fargo Street, Boston, Massachusetts,' was admitted in evidence at the trial...

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    ...v. Garrettson-Ellis Lumber Co., Mass., (Mass.Adv.Sh. (1972) 671, 673--674, 281 N.E.2d 282, and Baldassari v. Produce Terminal Realty Corp., Mass. (Mass.Adv.Sh. (1972) 955, 960), 282 N.E.2d 649. ...
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    ...of the affirmative defenses of assumption of risk and contributory negligence falls on the defendant. Baldassari v. Produce Terminal Realty Corp., 361 Mass. 738, 745, 282 N.E.2d 649 (1972). This difference does not affect significantly the parallels we shall draw. In order to simplify our a......
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