Baldeviso v. Thompson

• Decision Date: 08 December 1972
• Docket Number: No. 5196,5196
• Citation: 54 Haw. 125,504 P.2d 1217
• Parties: Tante BALDEVISO et al., Petitioners-Appellants, v. Myron B. THOMPSON, Director, Hawall Department of Social Services and Housing, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Page 1217

504 P.2d 1217

54 Haw. 125

Tante BALDEVISO et al., Petitioners-Appellants, v. Myron B. THOMPSON, Director, Hawall Department of Social Services and Housing, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 5196.

Supreme Court of Hawai'i.

Dec. 8, 1972.

Syllabus by the Court

1. The Hawaii Rules of Civil Procedure apply to an action commenced by a petition for an alternative writ of mandamus.

2. A petition for an alternative writ of mandamus will be treated as a complaint. HRCP Rule 7(a).

3. A motion to quash an alternative writ of mandamus will be treated as a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. HRCP Rule 12(b)(6).

4. Where matters outside the pleadings are considered by the trial court on a motion to dismiss, the order entered will be treated as a summary judgment. HRCP Rule 12(b).

5. On an appeal from summary judgment, the question is whether the complaint, affidavit and other matters considered outside of the pleadings raised any genuine issues of material fact.

6. Hawaii's Department of Social Services & Housing is bound by federal and its own regulations requiring determination of eligibility to receive welfare assistance within applicable time limits.

7. Hawaii's and federal welfare regulations setting forth time limits within which eligibility for welfare assistance must be determined requires good faith compliance by the Department of Social Services & Housing which is reasonable in light of surrounding circumstances affecting its ability to process such applications.

8. Where plaintiffs fail to show systematic or injurious discrimination, a violation of equal protection guarantees does not exist.

9. Exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required when the judicial relief sought is against delay in the administrative process or where administrative remedies are insufficient to vindicate the claims of the plaintiffs.

10. A court will grant the relief to which a party is entitled under the evidence adduced even if he has not demanded such rlief in his pleadings. HRCP Rule. 54(c).

Michael A. Town, Supervising Atty., Legal Aid Society of Hawaii, Wailuku (Robert Gilbert Johnston, Chief, Civil Div., Honolulu, with him on the briefs), for petitioners-appellants.

Benjamin M. Matsubara, Deputy Atty. Gen. (George Pai, Atty. Gen., Honolulu, with him on the brief), for defendants-appellees.

Before RICHARDSON, C. J., and MARUMOTO, ABE, LEVINSON and KOBAYASHI, JJ.

ABE, Justice.

The appellants are welfare applicants who claimed that their applications for welfare assistance were not processed within 30 days of receipt of the application as required by Federal ¹ and State ² regulations. They brought a petition for an alternative writ of mandamus before the Second Circuit Court on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated. Appellees (hereinafter 'Department of Social Services and Housing' or 'DSS&H'), charged with administering the State welfare programs, moved to quash the alternative writ of mandamus that had issued, attaching thereto affidavits of appellee Tam, Public Welfare Administrator. At the hearing on the motion to quash, oral testimony of appellee Tam was also heard.

The circuit court granted the motion to quash the alternative writ of mandamus on the ground that appellants failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. It appears that the basis of the circuit court's judgment was 'that full compliance (with the 30-day processing requirement) in the future is impossible.'

Appellants have appealed from this judgment quashing the alternative writ of mandamus.

In their opening brief the appellants urged this court to 'reverse the lower court's judgment and order the Respondent-Appellees to perform their legal duty; or, in the alternative, remand to the lower court to issue such an order.' Since we have decided to remand this case to the circuit court, we need not decide whether this court may itself issue an original order to any non-judicial entity in exercising its appellate jurisdiction.

This being a civil action not excepted by Rule 81 of the Hawaii Rules of Civil Procedure prior to the amendments thereto effective July 1, 1972, the rules applied to the action brought by the appellants. ³

The appellants' petition for an alternative writ of mandamus will be treated as a complaint. HRCP Rule 7(a). Similarly, the appellees' motion to quash will be treated as a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. HRCP Rule 12(b)(6). Since affidavits and matters outside the pleadings were considered by the circuit court, the motion to dismiss shall be treated as one for summary judgment. HRCP Rule 12(b). Thus, the question before this court is whether the circuit court correctly granted the motion of summary judgment in favor of the movant-appellees.

On an appeal from a summary judgment, the question is whether the complaints, affidavits and other matters considered outside of the pleadings raised any genuine issue of material fact. Richards v. Midkiff,48 Haw. 32, 396 P.2d 49 (1964). See also 3 Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1242.

The circuit court below in essence granted summary judgment to the appellees on the ground that 'full compliance (with the 30-day processing requirement) in the future is impossible.' This it appears that the circuit court assumed that state and federal welfare regulations require the processing of every welfare application within 30 days of its submission.

We believe, however, that neither the state nor federal time limits for processing welfare applications are intended to be so rigidly applied. While a number of federal cases have passed on the applicability of the federal 30-day time limit to states, none appears to have decided the extent to which a state is bound by that limit. Unlike the state agencies administering their respective welfare programs in Rodriguez v. Swank, 318 F.Supp. 289 (N.D.Ill.1970), aff'd, 403 U.S. 901, 91 S.Ct. 2202, 29 L.Ed.2d 677 (1971), and Worrell v. Sterrett, Civ. 69 F. 33 (U.S.Dist.Ct.N.D.Ill., 1969), there are no claims made by the DSS&H in this case that the federal regulations do not apply, or claims by the welfare applicants that the state regulations are at variance with the federal regulations. The DSS&H admits that it is bound by the federal regulations and that it is obligated to process relevant welfare applications within thirty days. The practical issue between the parties appears to be the acceptability of any given percentage of applications processed within 30 days.

Various sections of the Social Security Act providing for categorical assistance require that applications be processed with 'reasonable promptness.' ⁴ The rule promulgated by the Department of Health Education & Welfare (HEW) now codified in 45 C.F.R. 206.10(a)(3) interprets 'reasonable promptness' to mean within thirty days. The regulation also recognizes that processing 100 percent of the applications within 30 days of their submission may not be possible. It states:

'The State's time standards (not in excess of 30 days) apply except in unusual circumstances (e. g. where the agency cannot reach a decision because of failure or delay on the part of the applicant or an examining physician, or because of some administrative or other emergency that could not be controlled by the agency . . ..' 45 C.F.R. 206.10(a)(3).

In Rodriguez v. Weaver, No. 69 C 2615 (U.S.Dist.Ct.N.D.Ill., Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law & Order, February 9, 1972); see CCH Poverty Law Reporter 15,136, the federal district court found that county departments of the Illinois Department of Public Aid ignored a previous court order requiring a determination of eligibility for benefits under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program within 30 days. Based on this finding the court ordered that federal funds be cut off for April, 1972 unless 90 percent of the applications were processed during that month and that funds be cut of in succeeding months unless the county departments processed more than 95 percent of the applications during that time. We find it informative that the court did not require the county departments to process 100 percent of the applications in order to retain federal funding for the AFDC program. ⁵

We believe that Hawaii's Department of Social Services & Housing is bound by HEW's and its own regulations with respect to the 30-day processing time limit. What is required, however, is good faith compliance with the regulations which is reasonable in light of the resources allocated to the DSS& H to carry out its functions in the welfare area.

The Supreme Court of the United States has stated:

'(I)n every case where a statute enacts or prohibits a thing for the benefit of a person, he shall have a remedy upon the same statute for the thing enacted for his advantage, or for the recompense of a wrong done to him contrary to the said law.' Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39, 36 S.Ct. 482, 484, 60 L.Ed. 874 (1916).

Regulations of governmental agencies have the force of law. State v. Kimball, 54 Haw. 83, 503 P.2d 176 (1972). The 30-day time limit established by the state and federal regulations were promulgated to effectuate the pronouncement the applications be processed with 'reasonable promptness.' Considering the realities of poverty and the immediacy of the needs of people seeking welfare aid, it is not far from accurate to say that these provisions are for the benefit of the welfare applicants. If follows that relief should be granted in this case if the DSS&H has violated the thirty-day provisions and has failed to sustain the burden of showing its good faith in reasonably complying with the regulations. ⁶

Since the good faith of the DSS&H does not appear to be in issue, only the reasonableness of the extent to which the 30-day time limit is complied with remains to be discussed. In many areas of the...