Baldrick v. Garvey
| Decision Date | 22 April 1885 |
| Citation | 23 N.W. 156,66 Iowa 14 |
| Parties | BALDRICK v. GARVEY ET AL |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from Polk Circuit Court.
ACTION to foreclose a mortgage. The Chicago Lumber Company was made defendant, as claiming to have a mechanic's lien upon the premises. The court granted a decree foreclosing the mortgage, and established the mechanic's lien of the Chicago Lumber Company. The defendants, Garvey and wife appeal.
AFFIRMED.
Cole Mc Vey & Clark, for appellants.
Callender & Smith, for plaintiff, appellee.
Berryhill & Henry, for Chicago Lumber Company.
The premises in question constitute the homestead of the defendant, John Garvey, and his wife. John Garvey is insane and was at the time of the commencement of the action. He defends by guardian ad litem. The defense set up is that he was insane at the time of the execution of the notes and mortgage held by plaintiff, and at the time of the purchase of the lumber for which the Chicago Lumber Company claims a lien. In 1881, John Garvey employed the plaintiff to build a dwelling-house upon the premises in question, which house was completed in the fall of that year. In March, 1882, he purchased of the Chicago Lumber Company the lumber in question, which was used in making some improvements upon the premises. On the twenty-ninth day of September, 1882, the notes and mortgage were executed to the plaintiff. In the spring or summer of 1882 Garvey's mind became affected, and in January of the next year he was adjudged insane. His mind does not appear to have been greatly affected, if at all, as early as the purchase from the Chicago Lumber Company. Later, his mental weakness and aberration became more marked, and we cannot say that the question as to his capacity to execute the notes and mortgage, at the time they were executed, is entirely free from doubt. We have to say, however, that each one of us, upon a separate reading of the evidence, has reached the conclusion that he was competent to transact such business. He owed Baldrick, for building the house, the amount for which the notes and mortgage were given, unless he had previously paid him. If he had paid him, it would appear that he had forgotten the fact, and that the plaintiff took advantage of his forgetfulness to defraud him. As tending to show payment, a receipt signed by the plaintiff was introduced in evidence, which is in these words:
The plaintiff offered to show by his own testimony that, at time the receipt was given, Garvey gave him his note as a temporary arrangement to cover the amount which it was supposed would become due under the contract, and that the arrangement was made because the plaintiff had become involved, and apprehended trouble with his creditors. But the court excluded the testimony, and one of the questions argued by counsel is as to the correctness of the ruling of the court in this respect. We do not find it necessary to pass upon this question, because, without the evidence, we are reasonably well satisfied that the payment shown by the receipt was not a cash payment. Garvey appears to have been in moderate circumstances, and Mrs. Garvey understood that the house had not been paid for. It is true, she says that she did not understand that...
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