Baldwin v. Chi., R. I. & P. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 19 January 1916
• Docket Number: No. 30247.,30247.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court
• Parties: BALDWIN & RIGGS v. CHICAGO, R. I. & P. RY. CO.

173 Iowa 524

156 N.W. 17

BALDWIN & RIGGS

v.CHICAGO, R. I. & P. RY. CO.

No. 30247.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Jan. 19, 1916.

Appeal from District Court, Van Buren County; F. M. Hunter, Judge.

Action to recover damages for injury to cattle and depreciation in value due to a failure on the part of the company to transport and deliver them at their destination within a reasonable time. Defense interposed, that the action was not brought within the time provided in the contract, and that no notice of the injury or damage was served upon the defendant before said stock was removed from the destination and mingled with other stock, as required by the terms of the contract of shipment or bill of lading. Judgment in the court below for the defendant. Plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed.Work & Irish, of Keosauqua, for appellants.

Robt. & H. B. Sloan, of Keosauqua, and J. H. Johnson, of Des Moines, for appellee.

GAYNOR, J.

In the month of March, 1912, the plaintiffs delivered to the defendant company at St. Paul, Minn., five loads of cattle to be transported over defendant's lines to certain points in Iowa. Certain carloads were consigned to J. W. Riggs, Douds, Iowa, and certain carloads to J. A. Baldwin, at Selma, Iowa. It is claimed by the plaintiffs that the defendant was negligent in transporting said cattle, and the same were unreasonably delayed in transit, and were neglected and uncared for during transportation; that by reason thereof the cattle were damaged when they arrived at their destination; that two of the cattle were dead, and others were rendered worthless, or practically so; that all the cattle were damaged more or less. Upon this alleged negligence, the plaintiffs ask recovery of the defendant in sum of $589 on the first count of their petition.

The record discloses that on January 13, 1913, the plaintiffs delivered to the defendant company at Selma, Iowa, certain fat cattle to be transported by said company over its lines to the stockyards in Chicago, Ill. The plaintiffs claim that the cattle were unreasonably delayed in transit through the negligence of the defendant; that, if said cattle had been transported with reasonable diligence, they would have arrived in Chicago in time for the Wednesday market, January 15th; that they did not arrive at the stockyards until 6:30 p. m. Wednesday, too late for that day's market; that by reason of the delay in transportation the cattle were depreciated, and were bruised and injured by reason of the long confinement, and when delivered were in a weakened, sickened, and stunted condition, and their value impaired. For the purposes of this case we may assume that these allegations are true, and that the plaintiffs suffered damage substantially as claimed by them, and that such damage was the proximate result of defendant's negligence.

The defendant answers plaintiffs' petition, and admits that it received the cattle for transportation to the various stations mentioned by the plaintiffs, but says that at the time it received the cattle for shipment, the plaintiffs entered into a written contract covering the transportation of the cattle, which, so far as material to this controversy, reads as follows:

“That as a condition precedent to claiming or recovering damages for any loss or injury to or detention of live stock, or delay in transportation thereof, covered by this contract, the second party, as soon as he discovers such loss or injury, shall promptly give notice thereof in writing to some general officer, claim agent, or station agent of the first party, or to the agent at destination, or to some general officer of the delivering line, before such stock is removed from the point of shipment, or from the place of destination, as the case may be, and before such stock is mingled with other stock; and such written notice shall in any event be served within one day after delivery of the stock at its destination, in order that such claim may be fully and fairly investigated. It is agreed that a failure to strictly comply with all the foregoing provisions shall be a bar to the recovery of any and all of such claims.”

With the further provision:

“That no suit or action against the first party for the recovery of any claim by virtue of this contract shall be sustainable in any court of law or equity, unless such suit or action be commenced within six months next after the cause of action shall occur; and, should any suit or action be commenced against the first party after the expiration of six months, the lapse of time shall be constituted conclusive evidence against the validity of such claim, any statute of limitations to the contrary notwithstanding.”

The contract, with these provisions in it, was signed by both the plaintiffs and the defendant company, and constitutes the bill of lading or contract under which the cattle were shipped. At the time the shipments were made, the company had two tariff rates on cattle--one rate where the shipment was made with a limitation as to the amount of recovery in case of loss; a higher rate where the shipment was made without limitation. These cattle, it appears, were shipped at the lower tariff rate. These tariff rates had been filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission and certified to by the secretary. One of these tariff rates was introduced in evidence and known as the Western Trunk Line Circular, and provided:

“Live Stock--Limitation of Liability.

Rates on live stock published in tariffs will apply on shipments made at owner's risk, with a limitation of liability on the part of the railroad company as a common carrier, under the terms and conditions of the current live stock contract provided by said company; the contract to be first duly executed in the manner and form provided for therein. On shipments made without limitation of carrier's liability at common law, not less than one hundred fifty per cent. of the rate named will be charged, and, under this status, shippers will have the choice of executing and accepting the contract for shipment of live stock with or without limitation of liability, the rates to be made as provided for herein.”

It was shown that this provision in the “Western Trunk Line Circular was in effect and applied on the shipments that were made to the Union Stockyards, Chicago, Ill., as well as to the other shipments. It is conceded that no notice of the alleged injury to the stock was even given the defendant prior to the commencement of the action. The action was commenced on the 13th day of March, 1913.

As to the first count of plaintiffs' petition, it is clear that if the provision of the contract relied upon was one which, under the law, the parties had a right to enter into, and one that was binding upon both parties, the plaintiffs are not entitled to recover, for it appears that the action was not commenced for nearly a year after the alleged damage, and that no notice was given, as required by the contract.

[1] These were interstate shipments, and therefore governed, not by the laws of this state, but by the acts of Congress and the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, and, it follows that section 2074 of the Code of 1897 does not apply. We are cited by the plaintiffs both to this section and to the case of Cramer v. Rock Island R. Co., 153 Iowa, 111, 133 N. W. 387. The Cramer Case, however, was reversed by the Supreme Court of the United States. 232 U. S. 490, 34 Sup. Ct. 383, 58 L. Ed. 697. See Heilman & Clark v. C. & N. W. Ry. Co., reported in 149 N. W. 436.

In Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. Co. v. Harriman Bros., reported in 227 U. S. 657, 33 Sup. Ct. 397, 57 L. Ed. 690, the Supreme Court of the United States had occasion to pass upon the exact question that is here presented, so far as the first count of plaintiffs' petition is concerned. In that case, which went from Missouri, the stipulation in the shipping contract provided that no suit should be brought after the lapse of 90 days after the happening of any loss or damage. The Supreme Court said:

“It is conceded that there are statutes in Missouri, the state of the making of the contract, and the state in which the loss and damage occurred, and in Texas, the state of the forum, which declare contracts invalid which require the bringing of an action for a carrier's liability in less than the statutory period, and that this action, though started after the lapse of the time fixed by the contract, was brought within the statutory period of both states. The liability sought to be enforced is the ‘liability’ of an interstate carrier for loss or damage under an interstate contract of shipment, declared by the Carmack Amendment of the Hepburn Act of June 29, 1906 (chapter 3591, § 7, pars. 11, 12, 34 Stat. 595 [U. S. Comp. St. 1913, § 8592]). The validity of any stipulation in such a contract which involves the construction of the statute, and the validity of a limitation upon the liability thereby imposed, is a federal question, to be determined under the general common law, and, as such, is withdrawn from the field of state law or legislation. * * * The liability imposed by the statute is the liability imposed by the * * * special contract with the shipper, provided the limitation or qualification be just and reasonable, and does not exempt from loss or responsibility due to negligence [[[citing authorities]. The policy of statutes of limitation is to encourage promptness in the bringing of actions, that the party shall not suffer by loss of evidence from death or disappearance of witnesses, destruction of documents, or failure of memory. But there is nothing in the policy or object of such statutes which forbids the...