Baldwin v. City of San Diego

• Decision Date: 28 August 1961
• Citation: 15 Cal.Rptr. 576,195 Cal.App.2d 236
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Daniel T. BALDWIN et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. CITY OF SAN DIEGO, a Municipal Corporation, et al., Defendants and Appellants. Civ. 6461.

Page 576

15 Cal.Rptr. 576

195 Cal.App.2d 236

Daniel T. BALDWIN et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. CITY OF SAN DIEGO, a Municipal Corporation, et al., Defendants and Appellants.

Civ. 6461.

District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, California.

Aug. 28, 1961.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 21, 1961.

Jean F. DuPaul, City Atty., and Robert L. Bergen, Deputy City Atty., San Diego, for appellants.

Kenneth Sperry, Long Beach, for respondents.

SHEPARD, Justice.

This is an appeal by defendants City of San Diego, hereinafter called 'city', and certain of its officers from those portions of a judgment in declaratory relief which decree that plaintiffs are entitled to certain fluctuating pension rights and award specific sums to each plaintiff for accrued unpaid pension installments.

Facts

In general substance, the facts which apply to all plaintiffs are as follows: Plaintiffs are retired members of the Police or Fire Departments of city. All plaintiffs filed claims and sued for recovery of certain alleged unpaid amounts of money alleged to be due and unpaid on their retirement pensions, on the theory that by reason of certain charter changes after their pension rights became vested, their pension payments had been improperly held to a 'fixed' rate of pension under a charter amendment of 1941, St.1941, p. 3447, § 162, whereas they should have been paid on a 'fluctuating' rate; and on the additional theory that they were entitled to the benefit of certain 'extra' pay emoluments now being paid to persons holding the position held by each of them prior to retirement. The trial court awarded certain sums to each plaintiff on the basis of the difference between the 'fixed' rate on which each plaintiff had actually been paid and the amount that would have been paid on the basis of the 'fluctuating' rate, plus the said 'extra' pay emoluments above referred to, for the period of three years prior to the date of the filing of each claim.

At the time plaintiffs were employed by city, the wording of the pension benefit provisions applicable to plaintiffs provided for a 'fluctuating' pension conforming to a percentage of the rate of pay for the position held by each of them during their service, adjusted to the rate of pay for each such position as currently paid at the time the pension payments accrued. In the year 1941, city's charter was changed to provide a 'fixed' pension rate. Shortly after the decision by this Court in Abbott v. City of San Diego, 165 Cal.App.2d 511, 332 P.2d 324, in which it was held that the charter provision purporting to restrict claims to the 90-day period immediately preceding filing of claims was ineffectual to prevent recovery of unpaid sums accruing during the 3-year period immediately prior to the commencement of the action, city commenced procedure for enactment of an amendment to that section so as to supply the deficiencies therein which had been pointed out. Thus section 110 of city's charter, in accordance with an amendment thereto effective May 20, 1959, now provides, in substance, that no action may be maintained against city unless a claim be filed as therein provided, within 90 days from the date of accrual of such claim. All claims herein referred to were filed prior to 90 days after the effective date (May 20, 1959) of said amendment to section 110 of city's charter (Stat.1959, p. 5724). In fact, except the claim of plaintiff Raymond D. Ritchey, which was filed June 19, 1959, all claims were filed immediately prior to the effective date of said amendment. No complaint is made as to form of the claims or the time within which the action was filed after the filing of claims.

The trial judge decreed that plaintiffs had acquired a vested right to the 'fluctuating' pension and that the 'fixed' pension limitations provided by the amendment of 1941 were not applicable. City does not contest, in this appeal, that portion of the judgment decreeing 'fluctuating' pension rights to plaintiffs, but does challenge certain other provisions of the judgment.

Statute of Limitations

City first contends that the trial court erred in determining that section 110 of city's charter, as amended, has no retroactive application to claims filed by plaintiffs against city.

It is well settled that a legislative authority may validly shorten the time within which a right of action may be commenced, providing the claimant is allowed by the new statute a reasonable time after the effective date of the new limitation within which to bring action on an accrued cause not already barred by the former statute. But it is also settled that such new statute so shortening the time for filing of an action may not validly destroy the enforcement of a vested right by a regulation that retroactively cuts off such right of enforcement, without any opportunity to the claimant to commence enforcement after the shortend time commences to run. Destroying enforcement of a vested right is, under the conditions here presented, tantamount to destroying the right itself. These rules have been recognized by our Supreme Court from the very commencement of jurisprudence in this State. Scarborough v. Dugan, 10 Cal. 305, 308; Doehla v. Phillips, 151 Cal. 488, 492, 91 P. 330; Rosefield Packing Co. v. Superior Court, 4 Cal.2d 120, 122[1-2], 47 P.2d 716; Norton v. City of Pomona, 5 Cal.2d 54, 63, 53 P.2d 952; Mercury Herald Co. v. Moore, 22 Cal.2d 269, 274-275[4-6], 138 P.2d 673, 147 A.L.R. 1111; Wells Fargo & Co. v. City & County of San Francisco, 25 Cal.2d 37, 41, 152 P.2d 625; Rand v. Bossen, 27 Cal.2d 61, 65, 162 P.2d 457; Scheas v. Robertson, 38 Cal.2d 119, 125, 238 P.2d 982. A plethora of cases decided by our District Courts of Appeal have followed the same rule.

It is also well recognized that the right of a pensioner to payments under his pension is a contractual vested right. The destruction of such right without due process of law is forbidden by our Constitution. Wallace v. City of Fresno, 42 Cal.2d 180, 183, 265 P.2d 884; Allen v. City of Long Beach, 45 Cal.2d 128, 131, 287 P.2d 765; Abbott v. City of Los Angeles, 50 Cal.2d 438, 447, 326 P.2d 484; Abbott v. City of San Diego, supra, 165 Cal.App.2d at page 517, 332 P.2d at page 328.

In construing a legislative enactment, courts will presume that the Legislature did not intend an application of the statute which would violate the Constitution, and will not give it such a construction as to make it contrary to the Constitution unless the working of the statute compels such construction.

'It is an established principle of statutory construction that when two alternative interpretations are presented, one of which would be unconstitutional and the other constitutional, the court will choose that construction which will uphold the validity of the statute and will be constitutional.' Estate of Skinker, 47 Cal.2d 290, 297, 303 P.2d 745, 749, 2 A.L.R.2d 1137.

See also Olivas v. Weiner, 127 Cal.App.2d 597, 600, 274 P.2d 476; Los Angeles County v. Legg, 5 Cal.2d 349, 353, 55 P.2d 206; In re Shafter-Wasco Irr. Dist., 55 Cal.App.2d 484, 488, 130 P.2d 755; Cuthbert v. Woodman, 185 Cal. 43, 45, 195 P. 673; Fay v. District Court of Appeal, 200 Cal. 522, 542, 254 P. 896; People v. McCaughan, 49 Cal.2d 409, 416, 317 P.2d 974.

It is thus clear that a reasonable time after the effective date of the statutory change shortening the time for commencement of action must be given to the holder of a valid accrued claim within which to file his claim or commence his action. What is a reasonable time within which to commence such an action has been held to be primarily a legislative matter; various cases have held times running from 90 days up to 1 1/2 years to be well within the right of the legislative body. Coleman v. Superiod Court, 135 Cal.App. 74, 80, 26 P.2d 673; Masonic Mines Ass'n v. Superior Court, 136 Cal.App. 298, 300, 28 P.2d 691; Reynolds v. Jensen, 14 Cal.App.2d 588, 58 P.2d 687; Kline v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 40 Cal.App.2d 174, 176, 104 P.2d 661, 105 P.2d 362; Arques v. National Superior Co., 67 Cal.App.2d 763, 778, 155 P.2d 643; Rombotis v. Fink, 89 Cal.App.2d 378, 391, 201 P.2d 588.

A statute is presumed to act prospectively unless it expressly or by necessary implication declares to the contrary. Code Civ.Proc. sec. 3; Bank of America Nat. Trust & Savings Ass'n v. Dennison, 8 Cal.App.2d 173, 177, 47 P.2d 296; Masonic Mines Ass'n v. Superior Court, supra; Olivas v. Weiner, supra, 127 Cal.App.2d at page 600[7-10], 274 P.2d at page 479; Fountain v. State Board of Education, 157 Cal.App.2d 463, 469[4-5], 320 P.2d 899; People ex rel. Chapman v. City of Garden Grove, 165 Cal.App.2d 794, 805, 332 P.2d 841; Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Ind. Acc. Comm., 30 Cal.2d 388, 393, 182 P.2d 159; State of California Subsequent Injuries v. Ind. Acc. Comm., 48 Cal.2d 355, 361[2-3], 310 P.2d 1.

Thus, in the case at bar, it is also clear that if section 110 of the charter, as amended effective May 20, 1959, should be construed as cutting off the right to recover prior accrued unpaid pension payments not theretofore barred by the prior statute of limitations, and that said section 110 was not intended to give a claimant of such pension payments a reasonable time within which to file his claim, the result would be that by the mere arbitrary passage of the statute a claimant's right of recovery would for all practical purposes be extinguished as to 2 3/4 years of accrued, unpaid, valid claims. Such a result would be harsh and unjust and in direct violation of the rule hereinbefore pointed out; that is, that while the Legislature may validly shorten time for the bringing of actions, it must, as to the accrued rights of action not already barred by an existing limitation, allow a reasonable time for the claimant to file his claim or bring his action. If it attempts to arbitrarily cut off existing rights by such subterfuge, such an attempt is unconstitutional. As we have already noted,...