Baldwin v. Director of Revenue

• Decision Date: 31 January 2001
• Citation: 38 S.W.3d 401
• Parties: (Mo.banc 2001) . Bradley C. Baldwin, Appellant, v. Director of Revenue, Respondent. (Consolidated with) Jimmy D. Ballard, Appellant, v. Director of Revenue, Respondent. SC82900 & SC83037 Supreme Court of Missouri Handdown Date: 0
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

38 S.W.3d 401 (Mo.banc 2001)

This slip opinion is subject to revision and may not reflect the final opinion adopted by the Court.

Bradley C. Baldwin, Appellant, v. Director of Revenue, Respondent. (Consolidated with) Jimmy D. Ballard, Appellant, v. Director of Revenue, Respondent.

SC82900 & SC83037

Supreme Court of Missouri

Handdown Date: 01/31/2001

Appeal From: Circuit Court of Gentry County, Hon. W. Rex Beavers

Counsel for Appellant: Jeffrey S. Eastman

Counsel for Respondent: Paul Wilson and Evan J. Buchheim

Opinion Summary: In separate cases, Jimmy Ballard and Bradley Baldwin were stopped then determined to have blood alcohol contents over .10%. Their licenses were suspended. Both were under 21 at the time and sought to apply 1996 statutory amendments as to their suspensions/records. As to Ballard, the court ruled that probable cause was not needed to stop him under section 302.505.1. As to Baldwin, the court ruled he was not entitled to avail himself of sections 302.541.2 and 302.545, providing an exemption from proof of financial responsibility filing requirements and record expungement.

REVERSED AND REMANDED AS TO BALDWIN; AFFIRMED AS TO BALLARD.

Court en banc holds:

(1) Section 302.505.1 as amended contains two alternative clauses. The first applies license suspension to "any person" arrested on probable cause to believe the driver had a BAC of .10% or more. The second applies suspension to persons under 21 stopped on probable cause to believe the driver was committing any state or local traffic offense and whose BAC is .02% or more. There was no error in finding that because Ballard's BAC exceeded .10%, the first suspension clause applies, regardless of his age. (If his BAC was between .02% and .099%, the second clause requiring probable cause for the stop may have come into play.)

(2) Section 302.541.2 and 302.545.1, which provide certain exemptions and expungement, apply to any person under 21 whose license was suspended under section 302.505.1 for driving with a BAC of .02%. The words "but less than .10%" do not appear in the amendments. Accordingly, the statutes apply to Baldwin. To the extent Ford v. Director of Revenue suggests a different conclusion, it is overruled.

Opinion Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part summary:

This author would affirm the judgment in both Ballard and Baldwin's cases. This author would hold that the first part of section 302.505.1 overrides the second part of that section to the extent that the second part purports to apply to persons under 21 who drive with a BAC of more than .1%. These persons do not qualify for special treatment in sections 302.541.2 and 302.545.1, as those apply only to persons under 21 who come under the second part of section 302.505.1. If the first part of section 302.505.1 overrides the second part as the majority holds for Ballard, then it also overrides sections 302.541.2 and 302.545.1 in Baldwin's case.

Opinion Author: John C. Holstein, Judge

Opinion Vote: REVERSED AND REMANDED AS TO BALDWIN; AFFIRMED AS TO BALLARD. Price, C.J., White and Wolff, JJ., concur; Limbaugh, J., concurs in part and dissents in part in separate opinion filed; Covington and Benton, JJ., concur in opinion of Limbaugh, J.

Opinion:

At issue in this consolidated driver's license suspension case is an asserted ambiguity resulting from 1996 amendments to secs. 302.505 to 302.545, RSMo Cum. Supp. (1996).¹ Following the suspension of their licenses, appellants filed petitions for de novo review in circuit court. Each circuit court rendered a decision in favor of the director. Due to the similarity of the issues of law presented, the cases have been consolidated. The facts are not in dispute in either case. The circuit court's judgment is reversed as to appellant Bradley Baldwin. The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed as to appellant Jimmy Ballard.

I.

In the early morning of October 17, 1998, an officer of the Parkville Police Department stopped appellant Bradley C. Baldwin for speeding and weaving in and out of his lane of traffic. The officer asked Baldwin to exit his truck and proceeded to explain why Baldwin was stopped. During the conversation, the officer smelled a strong odor of alcohol on Baldwin's breath. The officer asked Baldwin whether he had been drinking, and Baldwin replied that he "had a lot to drink earlier." Baldwin agreed to submit to a sobriety test and failed. The officer arrested Baldwin for driving while intoxicated and transported him to the Parkville Police Department. There, it was determined that Baldwin's blood alcohol content (BAC) was .133%. At the time of the arrest, Baldwin was 20 years of age. The record does not indicate whether Baldwin was convicted of an offense under chapter 577 or whether such charges are pending.

At his trial de novo and on appeal, Baldwin argues he was entitled to avail himself of secs. 302.541.2 and 302.545, providing an exemption from proof of financial responsibility filing requirements and record expungement, respectively. The trial court concluded otherwise, ruling Baldwin ineligible for the benefits of those statutes. This Court granted Baldwin's application for transfer. Jurisdiction lies under Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 10.

II

In the second case, an Albany, Missouri police officer was exiting the police station in the early morning of May 31, 1998, when he heard the sound of squealing tires nearby. He walked to a favorable vantage point and saw two pickup trucks traveling from the direction from which the sound came. A red Ford pickup truck was being followed by a green and yellow Chevy pickup truck. Eventually, the Chevy reached the officer's location, and he stopped the vehicle in order to ask about the squealing tires. The occupants explained that the driver of the Ford, Jimmy Ballard, was responsible. The officer went to his patrol car and proceeded to pursue the Ford.

Within five or ten minutes, the officer found Ballard double-parked on the west side of the city square. Eventually, he pulled behind Ballard in an attempt to get him to leave the space. Then, Ballard drove around to the east side of the square. The officer activated his emergency lights and stopped Ballard's truck. He informed Ballard that he had been stopped for squealing his tires. At that time, the officer smelled the odor of intoxicants emanating from Ballard and began conducting several field sobriety tests. Ballard failed the tests, and the officer arrested him for driving while intoxicated. The officer transported Ballard to the Albany police station and administered a breathalyzer test. The test revealed Ballard's BAC was .135%. Ballard was under age 21 at the time.

Subsequently, the director suspended Ballard's license, and Ballard filed a petition for a trial de novo in circuit court. Ballard claimed the director was required to establish the officer had probable cause to stop him. The court disagreed. It ruled that sec. 302.505.1 treats all drivers with a BAC of .10% or more the same so that probable cause was needed to arrest Ballard, but not to stop his truck. Following opinion by the court of appeals, it ordered the case transferred to this Court under Rule 83.02. Jurisdiction of this case lies pursuant to Mo. Const. art V., sec. 10.

III.

Prior to 1996, sec. 302.505.1, RSMo (1994) provided:

The department shall suspend or revoke the license of any person upon its determination that the person was arrested upon probable cause to believe he was driving a motor vehicle while the alcohol concentration in the person's blood or breath was ten-hundredths of one percent or more by weight of alcohol in his blood, based on the definition of alcohol concentration in section 302.500.

In 1996, the General Assembly amended the statute, replacing the period at the end of the original statute with a comma and adding:

or where such person was less than twenty-one years of age when stopped and was stopped upon probable cause to believe such person was driving while intoxicated in violation of section 577.010, RSMo, or driving with excessive blood alcohol content in violation of section 577.012, RSMo, or upon probable cause to believe such person violated a state, county or municipal traffic offense and such person was driving with a blood alcohol content of two-hundredths of one percent or more by weight.

Simultaneously, the legislature amended sec. 302.541, adding a subsection .2, which provides:

Any person less than twenty-one years of age whose driving privilege has been suspended or revoked solely for a first determination pursuant to sections 302.500 to 302.540 that such person was driving a motor vehicle with two-hundredths of one percent or more blood alcohol content is exempt from filing proof of financial responsibility with the department of revenue in accordance with chapter 303, RSMo, as a prerequisite for reinstatement of driving privileges or obtaining a restricted driving privilege as provided by section 302.525.

Finally, the legislature enacted sec. 302.545, which provides in relevant part:

1. Any person who is less than twenty-one years of age and whose driving privilege has been suspended or revoked, for a first determination under sections 302.500 to 302.540, that such person was driving with two-hundredths of one percent of blood alcohol content, shall have all official records and all recordations maintained by the department of revenue of such suspension or revocation expunged two years after the date of such suspension or revocation, or when such person attains the age of twenty-one, whichever date first occurs. . . .

2. The provisions of this section shall not apply to any person whose license is suspended or revoked for a second or subsequent time pursuant to subsection 1 of this section or who is convicted of any alcohol-related driving offense before the age of twenty-one including, but not limited to:

(1) Driving while intoxicated pursuant to section 577.010, RSMo; or

(2)...