Baldwin v. Parsons

• Decision Date: 17 February 1922
• Docket Number: No. 34112.,34112.
• Citation: Baldwin v. Parsons, 193 Iowa 75, 186 N.W. 665 (Iowa 1922)
• Parties: BALDWIN v. PARSONS.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

193 Iowa 75

186 N.W. 665

BALDWIN

v.PARSONS.

No. 34112.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Feb. 17, 1922.

Appeal from District Court, Marshall County; B. F. Cummings, Judge.

Action for personal injuries occasioned by plaintiff being struck by an automobile driven by the defendant's son. The court directed a verdict for the defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Reversed.C. H. E. Boardman, of Marshalltown, for appellant.

F. E. Northup, of Marshalltown, for appellee.

FAVILLE, J.

[1] The appellant's petition alleges that on or about the 1st day of November, 1919, the appellee was the owner of an automobile which was being operated for him and in his behalf by his son, Vern Parsons, who was at that time in the employ of the appellee, and operating said car by the authority of the appellee. The petition alleges negligence in the operation of said car, resulting in damages for which recovery is sought. The appellee filed an answer, in which he “admits that he owns a certain automobile which was being driven and operated by his son,” and pleads a general denial and contributory negligence. The appellant proved the facts and circumstances surrounding the injuries and the damages resulting therefrom, and rested his case. The appellee filed a motion for a directed verdict on the ground that there was no evidence to show that the minor son of the appellee, who was driving the car at the time in question, was engaged for any business or purpose of the appellee, or was operating the same by the authority of the appellee. The motion for a directed verdict was sustained. It should have been overruled.

The case comes squarely under our holding in Landry v. Oversen, 187 Iowa, 284, 174 N. W. 255, where we had under consideration a similar situation. In said cause we said:

“As minor daughter of the owner and member of his family, she was something more than a mere chauffeur. She was one of those for whose pleasure and convenience the car was kept. When so operated, the machine was being used in one of the enterprises or in the business of the owner. Collinson v. Cutter, 186 Iowa, 276;Daily v. Maxwell, 152 Mo. App. 415, 133 S. W. 351;Stowe v. Morris, 147 Ky. 386, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 224. The rule is well established that proof that defendant owned the automobile at the time his daughter was operating the same made out a prima facie case that the vehicle was then in his possession, and that she was operating it for him. Birch v. Abercrombie, 74 Wash. 486, 50 L. R. A. (N. S.) 59;Edgeworth v. Wood, 58 N. J. L. 463, 33 Atl. 940;Schulte v. Holliday, 54 Mich. 73;Norris v. Kohler, 41 N. Y. 42;Seaman v. Koehler, 122 N. Y. 646, 25 N. E. 353. This, however, is a mere inference that an owner probably is in control of his own property, and is to be given no greater weight than is required to compel the owner to identify those operating the vehicle, and explain by what authority, if not his own, it is being run. Although an automobile is not per se a dangerous agency (House v. Cramer, 134 Iowa, 374;McNeal v. McKain, 33 Okl. 449, 41 L. R. A. [N. S.] 775), it usually moves at a high speed; and a person injured, or others, after it has passed, at least experience difficulty in recognizing its driver or other occupants. The owner may be ascertained, however, by noting the number on the car, and by an examination of the official registration thereof. The owner may well be assumed to know how and by whom his property is being used, and, if he deny that the automobile was...