Baldwin v. State

• Decision Date: 31 October 1848
• Citation: 12 Mo. 223
• Parties: BALDWIN v. THE STATE.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

12 Mo. 223

BALDWIN

v.THE STATE.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

October Term, 1848.

APPEAL FROM ST. LOUIS CRIMINAL COURT.

SHARP, for Appellant.

1st. The 13th section of article 6th, title Practice and Proceedings in Criminal Cases, Rev. Stat. of Mo. 880, declares “that it shall be good cause of challenge to a juror that he has formed or delivered an opinion on the issue or on any material fact to be tried.” Can the true construction of this statute be that such persons as are described in the statute, are competent jurors unless challenged by the defendant? Most certainly not. 2nd. The court erred in allowing witnesses to testify to matter which the witnesses stated was said to the defendant jokingly, and for the purpose of relieving prisoner's mind. The objection by the appellant to this act of the court was, that it put in evidence before the jury statements drawn from the defendant by improper inducements, and that the facts so detailed were illegal, improper and entirely irrelevant to the issue. 3rd. The court committed gross error in excluding evidence from the jury which was calculated to show the state and condition of defendant's mind, and how far it was affected before the commission of the offense charged in the indictment. 4th. The following question was asked one of witnesses for the defense: “From all that you know of the defendant, what is your opinion as to whether he was or was not an insane person at the time he left your house for Arkansas?” 5th. The court erred in excluding from the jury evidence which went to show the treatment which the defendant had received prior to his leaving home, as that of an insane person, and that he was regarded by all who knew him as one of unsound mind. 6th. The court erred in excluding from the jury that part and portion of depositions of Mary Mathews and Nancy Mathews as proved the condition and situation of the defendant at the time he remained in Arkansas. 7th. Passing from a consideration of the errors of the court in withholding proper and legal evidence from the jury, we shall next assign for error the refusal by the court to give the instructions asked for by defendant's counsel, from number 1 to 17 inclusive, as marked and set forth in the record. 8th. The court erred in giving the instructions contained in the record, first, because they are not the law; and second, because they were calculated to mislead the jury; and third, because they took the case entirely from the jury. 9th. The court committed gross and willful error in refusing to instruct the jury when asked by them if it was in their power to find defendant guilty of a less offense than that charged in the indictment. 10th. The court erred in granting a new trial, first, because the verdict was against law and evidence and against the weight of evidence. 11th. The court erred because the jury were permitted to separate and sever, which fact the court refused to hear upon written affidavit, but signed bill of exceptions with this cause assigned for error.

STRINGFELLOW, for State.

1st. McCoy and Wise were competent jurors. The opinions formed by the jurors were not such as to prejudice their minds; indeed all bias and prejudice were expressly denied by the jurors. 2nd. The evidence objected to and marked exception No. 3, p. 31, was proper; it was one of a chain of circumstances proper to be established. It went to show that Baldwin, shortly preceding the murder, had no money--to show a motive for killing Mathews, viz.--to get his money. 3rd. The objection marked exception No. 4, is too idle to argue. See p. 41; so, too, of objection No. 5, p. 54. 4th. Exceptions No. 7 and 8, p. 54. The witness not being a physician, nor skilled in the nature of disease, could not give his opinion as to the condition of defendant. He could only testify to facts. 5th. The evidence excluded marked ex. No. 9, was clearly illegal; even more objectionable than that excluded in seven and eight; it was even less than the mere opinion of an ignorant witness. 6th. The evidence marked No. 1 and 2, p. 84, 85, was properly excluded. It was incompetent to prove what the witness' father had said of defendant's want of sense, as it was also improper for the witness to give an opinion as to defendant's mental condition. The interrogatories on pages 111 and 112, which were excluded, proposed to obtain evidence of the same character as that excluded by the court, to-wit: the opinions of the witnesses and the statement of defendant's father as to his mental condition, and were properly stricken out. The law governing the case was fully and clearly laid down by the court, and the instructions asked by defendant were either embraced in the instructions given by the court, or were properly refused. No exceptions; however, appear to have been taken to the giving or refusing instructions.

MCBRIDE, J.

At the March term, 1848, of the Criminal Court of St. Louis county, the grand jury found an indictment against Elisha Baldwin, for murder in the first degree, perpetrated upon the person of his brother-in-law, Victor Mathews, late of the State of Arkansas. The defendant being in custody, was put upon his trial at the July term of said court, when, conceding the killing of the deceased, the defendant relied upon the plea of insanity, at the time of committing the act charged against him. The jury found the defendant guilty: whereupon he moved the court to grant him a new trial, alleging several reasons therefor, which the court refused, when he excepted to the opinion of the court and prayed an appeal to this court, which was granted.

In the impanneling of the jury a question was raised as to the competency of a juror, and the judge of the criminal court having decided the juror competent, the defendant took an exception to the opinion of that court, and relies upon the point in this court, as error. The juror having been sworn to answer questions, stated that he saw statements in regard to the transaction in the New Orleans public papers; that from these he formed an opinion, and believes that if the statements were true, he has an opinion as to the defendant's guilt or innocence; but he had then no prejudice or bias, nor has he now any against the defendant. That opinion is now unchanged if the facts are as stated; he should be governed solely by the evidence; he has not conversed with any of the witnesses; his opinion depends solely upon what he saw in the New Orleans papers; he has conversed on the subject with persons since his return to St. Louis, but does not know whether or not they are witnesses.

Before the enactment of the provision hereafter referred to, great difficulty existed in obtaining a jury to try a criminal cause, which, by reason of the circumstances attending the commission of the act charged, gave to it general notority. Inquisitiveness is a component part of every rational thinking mind; when, therefore, an offense of a high grade, or one of unusual occurrence, or one attended with aggravating circumstances, takes place, it is but natural that it should become a subject of conversation and inquiry with the community in which it occurred. This produces impressions rather than opinions of the guilt or innocence of the party accused, and hence the difficulty, in some cases, of obtaining a jury, from the vicinage, free from impressions, amounted almost to an indemnity for crime. Having witnessed this state of things, and doubtless being desirous to obviate the difficulty as far as practicable, the General Assembly of this State passed the following act: “It shall be good cause of challenge to a juror that he has formed or delivered an opinion on the issue or any material fact to be tried; but if it appear that such opinion is founded only on rumor, and not such as to prejudice or bias the mind of the juror, he may be sworn.” Rev. Code, p. 880, § 12.

The information upon which the juror predicated his opinion, was derived from newspaper statements, which, of all other sources of intelligence, are the most uncertain and unreliable; gleaned, as such matters are, from the streets and alleys, beer houses and oyster cellars of a large commercial city, and without any special pains being taken to ascertain the particulars of the affair. The juror further stated that he had no prejudice or bias on his mind. If, therefore, the question of competency is referable to the the juror himself, then he was competent; but it was not his province to pass upon that question; he could only state facts, and it was the duty of the court to decide whether, according to the facts, he was competent. In deciding this question, the presiding judge at the trial, having the juror before him, witnessing the manner of his examination, possessing a knowledge of his character, is infinitely better qualified than we are to decide whether under all the circumstances, his mind and feelings are in a condition which will enable him to discharge honestly and impartially his duty as a juror. Where the juror qualifies himself under the statute, and the presiding judge accepts him, this court cannot say that an error has been committed.

When the evidence closed the defendant's counsel asked the court to instruct the jury as follows: 1. That if the jury believe from the evidence that the defendant was of unsound mind previous to the time at which the offense charged in the indictment was committed, and that derangement or unsoundness of mind was such as to leave him without sufficient reason, judgment and will, to enable him to distinguish between what was right and what was wrong, with regard to the particular act in question (the killing of Mathews for violence used upon his, defendant's sister) and unless he knew that the act was a crime against God and nature, they must find him not guilty. 2. If the jury believe from the evidence that the prisoner acted under a false and insane, but sincere belief that the deceased had threatened to kill his sister, and...