Baldwin v. Thompson

• Decision Date: 05 April 1864
• Parties: BALDWIN v. THOMPSON et al
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

15 Iowa 504

BALDWIN v. THOMPSON et al

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

April 5, 1864

[Syllabus Material]

Appeal from Johnson District Court.

THIS is a suit in equity, brought to set aside and cancel a Sheriff's sale and deed of certain real estate in Johnson County. On or about the first of March, 1860, the plaintiff traded farms with one Lucas, both farms being situated in Johnson County; the plaintiff giving his farm and nine hundred and fifty dollars cash in exchange for the real estate in controversy. The contract for exchange was in parol; but the plaintiff gave to Lucas full possession of his farm on or about the day the contract was made, and received partial possession of the real estate in controversy on the same day, and afterwards and about the twenty-second day of March, 1860, received full and entire possession of it. One hundred dollars of the boot-money was settled by an indebtedness before that time incurred by the said Lucas to the plaintiff, and the balance was to be applied towards the satisfaction of a mortgage executed by Lucas to James Cavanagh, upon the real estate in controversy. The plaintiff then resided and still resides in Ohio, and the entire trade was made through Dennis Baldwin, his relative and agent. By the terms of the trade, five hundred dollars of the difference in value as agreed, were to be paid, and the deeds exchanged as soon as the money and deed could be received from the plaintiff in Ohio. About the fifth of May, the plaintiff's agent, having received the money, and the deed made by plaintiff to Lucas for the land given in exchange, which deed was dated April 20th, 1860, met Lucas and the mortgagee, Cavanagh, at an attorney's office in Iowa City, to exchange deeds and pay the boot-money, which by the contract, was to be then paid. At this interview some difficulty occurred between Lucas and the plaintiff's agent in relation to the balance which would remain due on the Cavanagh mortgage, after the payment thereon by plaintiff of the difference to be paid by him in the exchange of farms. The difficulty was finally settled by Lucas executing to plaintiff a mortgage upon the land conveyed by plaintiff to Lucas, to indemnify plaintiff against the Cavanagh mortgage executed by Lucas, "on certain lands this day sold and conveyed by said Lucas and wife to said Baldwin," &c.; this mortgage was also dated April 20, 1860.

On the 29th day of March, 1860, the defendant, James Thompson recovered a judgment in the District Court of Johnson County against Lucas and one Woods, for $ 575, with stipulation for stay of execution for one year; execution was issued on this judgment December 2, 1861, and levied upon the land in controversy, which was sold to the defendant, James Thompson, January 25, 1862, for sufficient to satisfy his judgment, and a Sheriff's deed therefor was made to him.

The cause was tried by the Court upon the testimony submitted by both parties, and a decree rendered setting aside the Sheriff's sale and deed, and quieting the title in the plaintiff; and the defendants appeal.

Affirmed.

Edmonds & Ransom for the appellants.

I. A judgment recovered against a vendor subsequent to the contract of sale, is a lien upon the unpaid purchase money. Dart. Vend., 119; Prid. Judg., 21; Cook & Sargent v. Dillon et al., 9 Iowa 407; Harrison v. Kramer, 8 Id. 561.

II. The recital in the mortgage, showing that this conveyance was made in the preceding April, operated as an estoppel to bind the mortgagee. Crane v. The Lessees of Morris & Astor, 31 U.S. 598, 6 Pet. 611, 8 L.Ed. 514; West v. Pine, 4 Wash. C. C. R., 691; Jackson v. Halstead, 5 Cow. 216; Penrose v. Griffith, 4 Binn. 231; Mitchell v. Maupin, 3 Monr. 186; Kentucky Bank v. Vance, 4 Litt. 172; Jackson ex dem. v. Harrington, 9 Cow. 86; Thompson v. Thompson, 9 Ind. 823; Rawson v. Copeland, 2 Sand. Ch., 251; Ferns v. Crawford, 2 Denio 595.

III. Woods and Lucas are necessary parties to a complete determination of the rights involved, and to avoid multiplicity of suits, and they were, therefore, necessary parties to the suit. Camp. v. McGillicuddy et al., 10 Iowa 202.

Clarke & Davis for the appellee.

I. A parol contract to convey land, if the possession is delivered under it, is voidable but not void, and if executed afterwards in good faith, the title of the vendee cannot be defeated by a judgment against the vendor, rendered after the making of the contract, and before the execution of the conveyance, or fulfillment of the agreement. Minns v. Morse et al., 15 Ohio 568; Weeks v. Harper, 1 Barb. 338.

II. The acceptance of a deed containing recitals does not estop the grantor from claiming under an older conveyance. Miller v. Holman, 1 Grant's Cases, 243; Hays v. Askew, 5 Jones 63; Thrall v. Lathrop, 30 Verm. 307; Gardner v. Greene, 5 R. I., 104; Lorain v. Hall, 33 Penn. S. R., 270; McComb v. Gilkey, 5 Cush. 146; Duell v. Bear River Mine, 5 Cal. 84; Merrifield v. Parrett, 5 Cush. 590; Osborn v. Ferris, 1 Dutch. N. J., 633; Giddens v. Unity, 10 Foster 104; Rich v. Hotchkiss, 16 Conn. 409; Stoughton v. Lynch, 2 John. Ch., 209.

Hon. GEORGE G. WRIGHT, Chief Justice, Hon. RALPH P. LOWE, Judge, Hon. JOHN F. DILLON, Hon. CHESTER C. COLE, Judge.

OPINION

COLE, J.

I. The parol contract for the exchange of farms being accompanied by the delivery of actual possession of the lands exchanged, in accordance with the contract, became valid and binding. Rev. of 1860, §§ 4007, 4008. The subsequent disagreement in relation to the payment or manner of securing the balance due on the Cavanagh mortgage, could not, at the election of a third party, defeat or rescind the contract. The plaintiff having taken full and actual possession of the lands acquired from Lucas by the exchange, before the defendant Thompson recovered his judgment against Lucas, such possession was notice to Thompson of plaintiff's title, and of the facts connected therewith.

II. Under our statute a judgment is a lien upon all interests of the judgment debtor in real estate, legal and equitable. Rev of 1860, §§ 4105, 29. What is an interest in real estate, and how a lien upon such interest may be enforced, are questions which are not settled...