Baldwin v. Wilkie
| Decision Date | 07 February 2019 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 5:15-cv-594-Oc-34PRL |
| Parties | RAYMOND B. BALDWIN, Plaintiff, v. ROBERT WILKIE, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, United States Department of Veterans Affairs, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on the Plaintiff [sic] Request Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 63, Baldwin Motion), filed on January 5, 2018, and the Federal Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 69, VA Motion), filed on January 16, 2018 (collectively Motions). This action arises out of the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) decision to transfer Raymond B. Baldwin from his police officer position to a non-law enforcement position, following the VA's determination that Baldwin was unfit to serve as a police officer. Proceeding pro se, Baldwin generally asserts that the VA's decisions to require him to undergo a fit for duty evaluation (FFDE), and to transfer him from his police officer position, were discriminatory and retaliatory, and subjected him to a hostile work environment, all in violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794. See generally Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 31, SA Complaint), filed August 25, 2016.
In the Baldwin Motion, Baldwin seeks entry of an order granting summary judgment in his favor on his claims that the VA discriminated and retaliated against him by subjecting him to a FFDE which resulted in his removal as a VA police officer, and also subjected him to a hostile work environment. See Baldwin Motion. The VA opposes the Baldwin Motion. See Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Second Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 72, VA Response), filed January 31, 2018. Additionally, the VA seeks summary judgment in its favor on all of Baldwin's claims. See VA Motion.2 Baldwin opposes the VA Motion. See Plaintiff's Opposition to the Defendant's Summary Judgment Motion (Doc. 74, Baldwin Response), filed February 16, 2018. With leave of Court, the VA replied to the Baldwin Response. See Federal Defendant's Reply in Support of Motion for Summary Judgement (Doc. 78, VA Reply), filed March 23, 2018.3 As such, both the Baldwin Motion and the VA Motion are ripe for review.4
Under Rule 56, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule(s)), "[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(a). The record to be considered on a motion for summary judgment may include "depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials." Rule 56(c)(1)(A).5 An issue is genuine when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the nonmovant. See Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739, 742 (11th Cir. 1996) (quoting Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Publ'g Co., 9 F.3d 913, 919 (11th Cir. 1993)). "[A] mere scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party's position is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment." Kesinger ex rel. Estate of Kesinger v. Herrington, 381 F.3d 1243, 1247 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)).
The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating to the court, by reference to the record, that there are no genuine issues of material fact to be determined at trial. See Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). "When a moving party has discharged its burden, the non-moving party must then go beyond the pleadings, and by its own affidavits, or by depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d 590, 593-94 (11th Cir. 1995) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Substantive law determines the materiality of facts, and "[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, a court "must view all evidence and make all reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing summary judgment." Haves v. City of Miami, 52 F.3d 918, 921 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing Dibrell Bros. Int'l, S.A. v. Banca Nazionale Del Lavoro, 38 F.3d 1571, 1578 (11th Cir. 1994)). Notably, the instant action is before the Court on cross-motions seeking summary judgment. "The principles governing summary judgment do not change when the parties file cross-motions for summary judgment." T-Mobile S. LLC v. City of Jacksonville, Fla., 564 F.Supp.2d 1337, 1340 (M.D. Fla. 2008). Instead, applying the same principles, "the Court must determine whether either of the parties deserves judgment as a matter of law on the undisputed facts." Id.
The Court further notes that "pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed." Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998). However, "a prose litigant does not escape the essential burden under summary judgment standards of establishing that there is a genuine issue as to a fact material to his case in order to avert summary judgment." Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 670 (11th Cir. 1990). Although courts show leniency to pro se litigants, courts "will not serve as de facto counsel or 'rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.'" Nalls v. Coleman Low Fed. Inst., 307 Fed. Appx. 296, 298 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting GJR Invs., Inc. v. County of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998)).
The broad facts of this controversy can be summarized as follows: In August of 2008, Baldwin, a police officer for the North Florida/South Georgia Veterans Health System (NF/SGVHS) in Gainesville, FL, accidentally shot his left hand with a personal weapon while off duty. During his recovery, Baldwin was reassigned to light duty work, but also had surgery on his injured finger, requiring him to be out of work for an extended period. When Baldwin sought to return to his full duties as a VA police officer, the VA informed Baldwin that he needed to undergo a FFDE. The final report from his FFDE deemed Baldwin psychologically unfit for police duty. Accordingly, the VA removed Baldwin from his police officer position, but transferred him to the Acquisition and Materials Management Systems (AMMS) department at the same grade and pay level as his police officer position. Baldwin remained employed with the VA in that capacity as of the filings of the Motions. Believing that the reasons for the FFDE were specious and hisjob transfer unwarranted, Baldwin filed several Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaints along with a Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) action challenging the VA's actions against him. After proceeding through the full administrative process for his EEO and MSPB actions, but failing to prevail in either forum, Baldwin filed the current action in federal court.
More specifically, on August 25, 2008, Baldwin visited his father to collect a gun that his father lawfully possessed. Doc. 69-2 at 5-7 (Baldwin Deposition); Doc. 63-1 at 7 (Marion County Sheriff's Incident Report). When Baldwin received the gun from his father, it was unloaded. Baldwin Deposition at 7. However, as he was driving out of his father's driveway, Baldwin reloaded the weapon and was holding it in his right hand. Id. at 7-9, 12. Baldwin then accidentally "ran off the road and hit a rough spot and [his vehicle] bounced and the gun flew out of [his] hand." Id. at 12; Marion County Sheriff's Incident Report at 7. Baldwin reached for the gun and in doing so, accidentally discharged it. The bullet from the gun grazed his left pinky finger, injuring his left hand. Baldwin Deposition at 13, 21. Baldwin immediately sought emergency care, id. at 18, which included an initial surgery to clean the wound. Doc. 69-9 at 2 (Feb. 12, 2015 EEOC Decision); Baldwin Deposition at 25-26. Baldwin was out of work for several weeks. Doc. 64 at 4 (MSPB Pre-hearing Submission). Because the incident occurred in Marion County and not on VA property, the Marion County Sheriff's Office investigated the event, and determined that Marion County Sheriff's Incident Report at 7.
On October 20, 2008, Baldwin returned to work. MSPB Pre-hearing Submission at 4. However, because his finger was still healing he "performed light duty tasks as an evening dispatcher." Id. At that time, Chief of Police James Henry Foster did not tell Baldwin that he might need to complete a FFDE before returning to full duty, nor did Foster contemplate the necessity, or lack thereof, of having Baldwin complete a FFDE. Doc. 74-1 at 44-45 (August 8, 2011 MSPB Hearing).
Soon thereafter, Baldwin learned he would need to have corrective surgery on his finger, requiring him to take additional leave from work. Doc. 69-8 at 10 (Baldwin EEO Complaints); MSPB Pre-hearing Submission at 4. He had the surgery on December 16, 2008. Baldwin EEO Complaints at 10; MSPB Pre-hearing Submission at 4; Doc. 69-3 at 22 (Baldwin's Answers to Interrogatories). On January 5, 2009, Baldwin's doctor cleared him to return to work on "light duty" for four weeks, and according to Baldwin, by February 4, 2009, his finger was fully functional with no limitations. Baldwin Deposition at 22; Baldwin's Answers to Interrogatories at 22; MSPB Pre-hearing Submission at 4.
During Baldwin's leave from work after his second finger surgery, Foster left the NF/SGVHS to work elsewhere,...
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