Brown v. Crawford

• Decision Date: 24 July 1990
• Docket Number: No. 89-5927,89-5927
• Citation: 906 F.2d 667
• Parties: Columbus BROWN, a/k/a Lenwood Johnson, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Fred CRAWFORD, director of Dade County Jail, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 667

906 F.2d 667

Columbus BROWN, a/k/a Lenwood Johnson, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Fred CRAWFORD, director of Dade County Jail, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 89-5927.

United States Court of Appeals Eleventh Circuit.

July 24, 1990.

Steven Wisotsky, Ft. Lauderdale, Fla., for plaintiff-appellant.

Eric K. Gressman, Dade County Atty., Miami, Fla., for defendant-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

Before FAY and JOHNSON, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD R. GIBSON ^*, Senior Circuit Judge.

FAY, Circuit Judge:

In this civil rights action, the pro se inmate alleges that he received contaminated drinking water and was forced to sleep on the floor. The district court granted the prison director's summary judgment motion because it concluded that the inmate failed to establish a causal connection between the objectionable conditions and an act or omission by the prison director. Because the inmate has not shown a genuine issue of material fact under summary judgment standards following the prison director's factual explanation, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1983, appellant/inmate Columbus Brown filed his first in forma pauperis, civil rights complaint on November 26, 1986, against appellee Fred Crawford, director of Dade County Jail in Miami, Florida. Brown alleged that sleeping on the floor because of prison overcrowding had caused his back and neck pains and that the jail drinking water had caused his headaches and stomach pains. The district court subsequently dismissed this complaint based upon the magistrate's recommendation and information that Brown had been released from Dade County Jail and had left no forwarding address.

On December 15, 1987, Brown, still confined at Dade County Jail, filed a second section 1983 complaint with the same allegations. ¹ 1] He requested that Crawford pay him $50,000.00 and all of his medical bills. Thereafter, Crawford moved for summary judgment contending that Brown had failed to establish a causal connection between the conditions about which he complained and his ailments, and that there had been no notice by Brown to jail officials of these objectionable conditions.

Attached to Crawford's summary judgment motion is an affidavit by Jerry Meece, director of operations at the Corrections and Rehabilitation Department of Metropolitan Dade County. Meece avers that he had reviewed Brown's file and found no complaints or notice of medical problems related to the drinking water or sleeping on the floor. At the time of Brown's complaints, Meece states that the drinking water at Dade County Jail came from the City of Miami. Furthermore, officials at Dade County Jail were not notified of any problem with the drinking water by Brown or any other inmate.

Meece also attests that all prisoners at Dade County Jail are issued either a mattress or a bed. To Meece's knowledge, Brown was issued a mattress by Dade County Jail officials. Meece states that Crawford had no direct responsibility over distributing mattresses or for the drinking water at Dade County Jail.

In response to Crawford's motion for summary judgment, Brown filed an unsworn statement and affidavit by a fellow inmate. Brown's statement reiterates that his back and neck pains resulted from sleeping on the floor of the Dade County Jail and that the drinking water, "even though supplied by the City of Miami," was contaminated and had caused his stomach cramps and headaches. R1-20. Among the listed reasons for holding Crawford responsible, Brown claims that "[t]he defendant is to make sure that all inmates have a bed, which was not done." Id. The fellow inmate's affidavit represents that he as well as Brown slept on the floor and verifies Brown's back, neck, headache, and stomach pains.

The district court granted Crawford's summary judgment motion and found that Brown had failed to establish a causal connection between the conditions about which he complained and any act or omission by Crawford. On appeal, Brown contests the district court's granting summary judgment to Crawford because he claims that there is a question of fact concerning the existence of a policy or custom of problematic drinking water and sleeping conditions at Dade County Jail. Brown challenges Crawford's responsibility in his official and personal capacity for these objectionable conditions about which he complains. We, therefore, must determine whether or not the district court erred in granting summary judgment to a supervisory official in a section 1983 action, when that official did not cause or know about the alleged constitutional deprivations.

II. ANALYSIS

This court reviews a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, and we apply the same legal standards "that should have been applied by the district court." Hiram Walker & Sons, Inc. v. Kirk Line, 877 F.2d 1508, 1513 (11th Cir.1989); Livernois v. Medical Disposables, Inc., 837 F.2d 1018, 1021-22 (11th Cir.1988). Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). After adequate time for discovery, the Supreme Court has held that summary judgment is mandatory against a party failing to show the existence of an element essential to the proof of its case at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

The Court has instructed that "the substantive law will identify which facts are material" and that the trial judge ruling on a summary judgment motion, must evaluate the evidence presented by the substantive evidentiary burden. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 254, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 2513, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. 477 U.S. at 256, 106 S.Ct. at 2514; Florida Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313, 1318 (11th Cir.1990). When a motion for summary judgment has been made properly, the nonmoving party may not rely solely on the pleadings, but by affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions must show that there are specific facts demonstrating that there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), (e); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. Although we must view factual inferences favorably toward the nonmoving party and pro se complaints are entitled to a liberal interpretation by the courts, we hold that a pro se litigant does not escape the essential burden under summary judgment standards of establishing that there is a genuine issue as to a fact material to his case in order to avert summary judgment. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986), Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 596, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972) (per curiam); Augusta Iron & Steel Works, Inc. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 835 F.2d 855, 856 (11th Cir.1988) (per curiam); Jackson v. Reese, 608 F.2d 159, 160 (5th Cir.1979).

Under summary judgment standards and procedure, Brown has failed to demonstrate the most basic factor in countering a summary judgment motion: he has not shown a genuine issue of fact material to his allegations of unclean drinking water and sleeping on the floor. Meece's affidavit, filed with Crawford's summary judgment motion, states that the drinking water at the Dade County Jail is supplied by the City of Miami; therefore, Brown received the same water that all Miami residents drank. In his responding statement, Brown concedes that the drinking water about which he complained came from the City of Miami, but contends that it was the source of his stomach cramps and headaches. Brown has not submitted a doctor's diagnosis or any medical evidence supporting his allegations that the City of Miami drinking water at Dade County Jail caused his stomach pains and headaches. Furthermore, Dade County Jail officials received no complaints regarding the drinking water from Brown or any other inmate. We, therefore, conclude that Brown's allegation of contaminated drinking water at Dade County Jail is unsubstantiated and completely speculative.

We also find that Brown's allegation regarding sleeping on the floor is meritless. Meece's affidavit states that each prisoner at Dade County Jail is issued a mattress or a bed and that he knows that Brown was issued a mattress. Significantly, Brown's responding statement alleges that Crawford is responsible for providing all inmates with a bed. Brown does not argue or represent that he did not have a mattress, and that allegation is not made by the supporting affidavit of his fellow inmate. Additionally, Brown gives no diagnosis or medical evidence whatsoever that his back and neck pains were caused from sleeping on the floor, apparently on a mattress. Meece's affidavit asserts that Brown's file at Dade County Jail shows no complaints or notice of medical problems associated with sleeping on the floor.

Brown simply has not presented any evidence to rebut the explanation regarding the drinking water and sleeping conditions at Dade County Jail in order to create a genuine issue of material fact warranting trial. ² See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), (e). Furthermore the controlling substantive law shows that Brown's factual claims are not material. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510; see Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). We explicate this lack of materiality by reviewing the law regarding any potential liability that Crawford, the jail supervisor, could have to Brown, a prisoner.

"It is axiomatic, in section 1983 actions, that liability must be based on something more than a theory of respondeat superior." H.C. by Hewett v. Jarrard, 786...