Balkind v. Telluride Mountain Title Co.
| Decision Date | 06 July 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 98CA2182.,98CA2182. |
| Parties | Robert L. BALKIND, a/k/a Robert Balkind and Judith A. Balkind, Plaintiffs-Appellants, Counterclaim-Defendants and Cross-Appellees, v. TELLURIDE MOUNTAIN TITLE COMPANY and Martin Bregman, Defendants-Appellees, and Town of Telluride, Defendant-Appellee and Cross-Appellant. |
| Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
Joe Gordon McPhee, Robert Korn, Telluride, Colorado, for Plaintiffs-Appellants, Counterclaim-Defendants, and Cross-Appellees.
Coleman, Jouflas & Williams, Joseph Coleman, Grand Junction, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellees.
Sandra M. Stuller, Telluride, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee and Cross-Appellant.
Opinion by Judge ROTHENBERG.
This case involves equitable claims between plaintiffs, Robert and Judith Balkind (property owners), and defendant, Town of Telluride (the Town); and legal claims between the property owners and defendants, Telluride Mountain Title Co. (Telluride Mountain); Martin Bregman, the president of Telluride Mountain; and Meredith Muller (seller). The property owners appeal from judgments favoring the Town on the equitable claims and favoring all defendants on the legal claims. The Town cross-appeals the trial court's reduction of its requested attorney fees. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
The trial court bifurcated the trial and considered the equitable claims first. Following a bench trial on those claims, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the Town. The property owners appeal that judgment, contending that: (1) the judgment is too vague to be enforced; and (2) the trial court erred in denying their post-judgment motion to amend the complaint and join an indispensable party under C.R.C.P. 19.
Following the trial on the equitable claims, the court granted summary judgment on the legal issues in favor of the remaining defendants, dismissing the property owners' remaining claims of fraud, negligent misrepresentation, professional negligence, negligent omission, breach of warranty of title, and breach of contract. The trial court based its ruling on uncontradicted testimony in the trial on the equitable issues. The property owners also appeal this summary judgment.
This case concerns two parcels of property in the Town of Telluride, described as Lot 1 and Tract J, Backman Village Subdivision. Lot 1 has a house on it, and Tract J is reserved for public use under a 1984 agreement between the Town and the original developer of the subdivision (the 1984 Agreement).
The evidence at the trial on the equitable issues showed the following. Seller purchased Lot 1 in 1990 and obtained title to Tract J in 1992 through a quitclaim deed. Seller intended to expand her house onto Tract J, and obtained a letter from Bregman, the president of Telluride Mountain, setting forth the opinion that Tract J was no longer reserved for public use. However, after seller was informed by the Town that no improvements would be allowed on Tract J, she decided to sell both it and Lot 1.
In November 1993, the property owners bought the property for a reduced price reflecting the inability to build on Tract J. At trial, seller testified that, before closing on the property, she informed the property owners that the Town would not allow them to build any improvements on Tract J. Robert Balkind responded that, "I'm an attorney and I know how to handle the Town."
The evidence further showed that, before closing, the property owners saw Bregman's letter expressing the opinion that Tract J was not reserved for public use because the conditions in the original covenant and the 1984 Agreement had not been fulfilled. According to Robert Balkind, Bregman later confirmed this opinion in person. The property owners also obtained the opinions of several other attorneys who believed that Tract J was no longer reserved for public use. These opinions supported the opinion of the property owners themselves, both of whom are real estate specialists.
Bregman and his company, Telluride Mountain, insured the property owners' title to their new property, but the title policy specifically excepted the covenants and restrictions on Tract J arising out of the subdivision plat and the 1984 Agreement. The warranty of title issued by seller contained an identical exception. Robert Balkind testified at trial that, before closing on the property, he reviewed all of these documents, including the 1984 Agreement, the policy, and the warranty.
After purchasing the property, the property owners obtained a Certificate of Appropriateness from the Town permitting them to build a shed on Lot 1, and another Certificate of Appropriateness permitting them to improve a fence along the property line of Lot 1 and Tract J. The second Certificate required that the fence be located on the property line and not encroach on any public right of way unless the property owners obtained a permit.
In November 1996, the property owners filed this action, seeking a declaration that Tract J was theirs to do with as they wished. However, in the event that Tract J was found to be reserved for public use, they sought damages against Telluride Mountain, Bregman, and seller.
The Town counterclaimed, seeking an order requiring the property owners to remove the shed and fence from public rights of way including Tract J and Colorado Highway 145. The Town also sought a declaration that it was the owner of Highway 145 and that the property owners were trespassing. Alternatively, the Town sought to enforce its Land Use Code by making the property owners comply with the terms of the Certificates of Appropriateness and limit their improvements to their own property.
After determining as a matter of law that Tract J was still reserved for public use under the terms of the 1984 Agreement, the trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the Town. This determination has not been appealed.
At the bench trial on the equitable claims, the property owners also admitted they had not complied with the conditions in the Certificates of Appropriateness and that their improvements encroached on the public rights of way. However, they raised the defenses of equitable and promissory estoppel. The court resolved the credibility issues in favor of seller and against the property owners, finding that equitable estoppel did not apply because the property owners knew about the restrictions on the use of Tract J before they bought the property.
The court similarly rejected the property owners' promissory estoppel argument, and ordered them to remove the fence from Tract J and the fence and shed from the public right of way along Highway 145.
Following the trial, the property owners asked for a stay of the judgment to give them time to locate the boundary line between Highway 145 and Lot 1. The understanding at trial was that the boundary was as set forth in an Improvements Location Certificate admitted into evidence. But, after the trial, the property owners asserted that the boundary line was uncertain and could not be determined by their surveyor.
The trial court granted a stay of thirty days to give the parties an opportunity to reach an agreement, or to give the property owners an opportunity to file a quiet title suit to settle the question. The property owners instead filed a motion to amend the complaint and to join an indispensable party. The motion was based on their belated discovery that San Miguel County, not the Town, was record owner of the portion of Highway 145 at issue. The property owners claimed the County was an indispensable party and had to be joined to the action under C.R.C.P. 19.
The trial court denied the motion, concluding the issue of the County's ownership had nothing to do with the claims between the property owners and the remaining defendants. Nevertheless, it granted the property owners a 60-day stay in which to resolve the problem or to file a quiet title action. If they failed to do so, the court ordered that the judgment incorporate the boundaries set out in the Improvement Location Certificate admitted into evidence at trial. As of the time the property owners filed this appeal, they had taken no such action.
After the bench trial, the remaining defendants — Telluride Mountain, Bregman, and seller — filed a summary judgment motion. Defendants contended that, based on Robert Balkind's testimony and the trial court's findings of fact in the first trial, the property owners had not justifiably relied on Bregman's letter in purchasing the property and, therefore, could not pursue their claims of fraud and negligent misrepresentation. Also, because the policy issued by Bregman and his company excepted the 1984 Agreement, defendants contended they had no duty to the property owners and were not negligent. For the same reason, defendants contended the breach of warranty of title claim against seller had to be dismissed.
The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the legal claims. It found that the property owners had abandoned the breach of contract claim.
The property owners first contend the trial court erred in denying their motion to amend the complaint and add San Miguel County as an indispensable party. They maintain that, because the County appears to be the record owner of the section of Highway 145 adjacent to their property, the trial court's judgment in the first trial affected the County's property interest, and therefore, the trial court was required to join the County as an indispensable party under C.R.C.P. 19. We disagree.
Whether a person is an indispensable party is a mixed question of fact and law. The necessity of joinder must be determined on the facts of each case, and a trial court's decision under C.R.C.P. 19 will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Aztec Minerals Corp. v. Romer, 940 P.2d 1025 (Colo.App.1996).
Under C.R.C.P. 19(b),...
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