Balkowitsch v. Minneapolis War Memorial Blood Bank, Inc., 39240
Decision Date | 22 January 1965 |
Docket Number | No. 39240,39240 |
Citation | 132 N.W.2d 805,270 Minn. 151 |
Parties | Marle A. BALKOWITSCH et al., Appellants, v. MINNEAPOLIS WAR MEMORIAL BLOOD BANK, INC., Respondent. |
Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
The relationship between the Minneapolis War Memorial Blood Bank, Inc., a nonprofit public service corporation, and the recipient by transfusion of human blood supplied by it is sui generis in that it involves acts common to legal concepts of both a sale and a service; recovery for damages sustained by recipient who contracted serum hepatitis as a result of transfusion may not be predicated on implied warranty of fitness because no medical or scientific knowledge can determine the presence in the blood of serum hepatitis and the determination of whether the benefits of the transfusion outweigh inherent risks is one of professional medical judgment.
Richard W. Johnson and Stewart R. Perry, Minneapolis, for appellants.
Meagher, Geer, Markham & Anderson, and O. C. Adamson, II, and M. J. Coyne, Minneapolis, for respondent.
This is an appeal from a summary judgment for defendant in an action by which plaintiff Marie A. Balkowitsch sought to recover damages for personal injuries sustained when she contracted the disease of serum hepatitis from a transfusion of impure blood supplied by defendant, Minneapolis War Memorial Blood Bank, Inc. Plaintiff John Balkowitsch sought recovery based upon his derivative rights as the husband of Marie Balkowitsch. The claim is predicated upon a breach of implied warranty under a contractual sales-act theory as well as strict liability in tort.
The facts may be briefly stated. Between March 20 and March 29, 1958, quantities of whole blood were administered by transfusion to Mrs. Balkowitsch, hereinafter called plaintiff, while she was a patient at St. Mary's Hospital in Minneapolis. The blood she received was furnished by the defendant, the Minneapolis War Memorial Blood Bank, Inc. The transfusions were ordered by her physician. Prior to the receipt of the blood, ownership of it remained in the defendant. Payment was based upon the amount of blood received and was made directly by plaintiff to defendant. It does not seem to be disputed that the blood was contaminated and produced the disability from which plaintiff suffered. Neither is it claimed that defendant was negligent in the processing or distribution of the blood. Plaintiffs assert that defendant 'sold' the blood to her, impliedly warranting its fitness and merchantable quality; that the blood was not as warranted in that it contained the virus; and as a consequence plaintiff sustained damages.
In considering the merits of plaintiffs' case, it is necessary to examine the function of defendant's activities and the nature of the service in which it is engaged. Defendant is a nonprofit public service corporation engaged in the collection and storage of whole blood which is used for transfusion purposes. The process by which human blood is grouped and stored for use involves an advanced science which employs complex and elaborate facilities. The blood must be obtained, processed, stored, and transported so that it is immediately available in sufficient quantities, and carefully labeled as to group, 1 RH factor, and other pertinent data. Science has perfected storage techniques with the result that whole blood may be stored safely up to 21 days and blood derivatives, such as plasma, may be stored for longer periods of time. This program is carried on largely through the activities of the American Red Cross and 923 regional blood banks, of which defendant is one, and their branch banks. In addition to these, there are one national and five district 'clearing house' offices which accomplish the interbank transfers of blood; five central and 18 regional reference laboratories; a central file of rare donors and a special bank of extremely rare blood. 2 The blood-bank arrangement provides an accessible place where sufficient quantities of all kinds of blood are readily available and from which people may obtain needed blood at actual cost.
In spite of the great advancements which have been made in the collection and storage of blood, there remain certain risks which medical science has been unable to eliminate. A few diseases may be communicated from person to person by blood transfusions. Some of these are susceptible to tests whereby their presence in the blood may be ascertained. But this is not so in respect to serum hepatitis, a virus disease which is also referred to in medical literature as homologous serum hepatitis or homologous serum jaundice or simply as SH virus. 3 This situation is well summarized in the following passage quoted by defendant in its brief:
Relatively few serum hepatitis blood-transfusion cases have been reviewed by appellate courts. The earliest reported case, Parker v. State, 280 App.Div. 157, 112 N.Y.S.2d 695, involved a transfusion of pooled dried blood plasma which the Red Cross had acquired after the United States had declared it 'war surplus.' The action was brought against the state which had distributed the plasma on the theory of negligence. In holding against plaintiff, the court commented that the medical profession was well aware of the risk of serum hepatitis and that the state had a right to expect hospitals to rely on the judgment of the medical profession as to the circumstances requiring the use of the plasma. Negligence was also one of the grounds for an unsuccessful attempt to impose liability upon the State of New York as a distributor of Red Cross pooled plasma in Hidy v. State, 207 Misc. 207, 137 N.Y.S.2d 334, affirmed, 2 App.Div.2d 644, 151 N.Y.S.2d 621, affirmed, 3 N.Y.2d 756, 163 N.Y.S.2d 985, 143 N.E.2d 528; Fischer v. Wilmington General Hospital, 1 Storey 554, 51 Del. 554, 149 A.2d 749. In discussing the asserted negligence involved in the latter case, the Delaware court said (51 Del. 561, 149 A.2d 753):
In Merck & Co. v. Kidd (6 Cir.) 242 F.2d 592, a different approach was used. There, plaintiff claimed that his hepatitis resulted from plasma transfusions and thus the plasma was an adulterated drug within the meaning of the Tennessee Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, which makes the sale of an adulterated drug negligence per se. In setting aside a judgment for plaintiff...
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